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Christian healthcare is as old as the church itself. From the very beginning, 
Christianity has been functioning as a moral source that empowered people to take 
care of the sick, the poor and the needy. Until today there are still many healthcare 
organizations (HCOs) all over the world that express their connectedness with this 
source by maintaining a Christian – Catholic or Protestant – identity (Kaufmann, 
1995; Heijst, 2008). However, in modern western culture many of these HCOs face 
problems when interpreting their religious identity against the background of 
growing pluralism and secularization. This ethical study aims, first, to disentangle 
some of these problems and, second, to develop perspectives on possible meanings 
of Catholic-Christian identity of healthcare organizations today, with a specific 
focus on the moral responsibility of an HCO: the way they perceive their moral 
obligations and deal with ethical dilemma’s and choices in and of the organization. 
In order to limit the research field, the focus of the study is on Roman-Catholic 
HCOs. With regard to the search for new perspectives, we will investigate how care 
provided by HCOs can be a moral source for Catholic tradition, and how Catholic 
tradition can be a moral source for this care. 
 In this study the notion ‘Catholic identity’ covers different meanings: a formal 
one, in the sense that an HCO is Catholic according to its statutes. And a normative 
one, in the sense that an HCO takes the Catholic tradition, including the 
ecclesiastical moral teaching, as a guiding frame of reference for its practices. If an 
HCO is formally Catholic, than it may be expected that it also tries to give due 
consideration to this Catholic, normative frame of reference. The reverse is not 
always the case: worldwide, many HCOs consider themselves Catholic in the 
normative sense, without being formally Catholic. For that reason, this study uses 
the second, normative meaning as the best embodiment of Catholic identity. 
Drawing on this approach, Catholic identity is not just following the moral views 
and prescripts of the Catholic Church, but is shown and developed by investigating 
how to connect contemporary society- and culture-bound practices of care, as well 
as ethical issues arising within these practices, with Catholic tradition.  
 This study will pursue its objectives by using the works of the Canadian and 
Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor on modern identity. With this term he means 
“the ensemble of (largely unarticulated) understandings of what it is to be a human 
agent: the senses of inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in 
nature which are at home in the modern West” (Taylor, 1989: IX). The appeal on 
Taylor both limits and specifies this study. It also necessitates a modification of his 
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approach. Since his central interests are the identity of the Self and modern 
western culture in general, this study has to reconsider the value of his insights in 
the light of our own interests: Catholic identity as an organizational institutional 
characteristic and how this relates to the specific context of modern Western 
healthcare.  
 This introduction starts with a brief history of Catholic healthcare in the North-
Atlantic world. Next, as an example of this history, it describes its development in 
the Netherlands. It continues with the central question of this study as framed by 
Taylor’s philosophy. The following section presents an institution theory in order 
to enable an ethical reflection on healthcare and on HCOs as moral agents of 
healthcare. Next, the study’s objectives, demarcations, and methods will be 
presented, as well as the general outline. This introduction concludes with a 
clarification of the meaning of some terms as used in this study. 
 
1. Christianity and the practice of organized care in history 
Already in the ancient Greek and Roman world there were close ties between 
medicine and religion. But whereas in these cultures medicine was practiced as a 
mainly private trade, Christianity enjoined all believers to care for those in need: 
the destitute, the handicapped, the poor, the hungry, those without shelter and the 
sick (Porter, 1993: 1449-1456). Care was praised as a work of mercy: feed the 
hungry; visit the imprisoned; give drink to the thirsty; clothe the naked; shelter the 
homeless; visit the sick. The Bible announces that when the Son of Man returns at 
the end of times he will judge us, and whatever we did for one of the least of His 
brothers, we did for Him (Matthew 25: 31-46). Many historians also offer a less 
magnanimous interpretation: the mercifulness displayed by Christians is a kind of 
sublimated egoism, since by doing good works, one could deserve a place in 
heaven (Heyden, 1994: 21-22). Other historians add to this that charity was a 
means to win receivers of care over to the Catholic church. According to Van Heijst 
such motives undoubtedly played a role, but it would be one-sided to see only 
these motives. The old Christian spirituality of helping people in need for which no 
other decent care was available has always been present. It has inspired many 
women and men to devote their life to caring, and to work pro Deo: for God, and for 
free (Heijst, 2008; Kaufmann, 1995).  
 Institutional care, in the form of hospices, came into existence in the fourth 
century AD in the eastern Roman Empire, originally as charitable institutes for the 
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poor, and as departments of monasteries (Saunders, 1998). In the year 370 Basil, 
the bishop of Caesarea in Asia Minor, expanded the mission of these hospices to 
the sick (Miller, 2004). Medical care was provided by monks, as part of their 
religious calling. During the early Middle Ages several church councils called on 
bishops to provide accommodation for the poor. These accommodations were 
attached to cathedrals or churches and their main objective was not medical care, 
but to offer shelter to the destitute in their communities, and to travelers and 
pilgrims. For that reason they were known as xenodochia (guest-houses), and soon 
more commonly as hospitia or hospitalia (Amundsen, 2004: 1562 – 1565). To the 
oldest monastery-hospitals belong the ones in Lyon (452 A.D), Paris (660 A.D.), 
London (794 A.D.) and Rome (800 A.D.). From the ninth century these monastery-
hospitals started to play a key role in the provision of medical care. They became 
the predecessors of the ‘Godhouses’ and ‘Guesthouses’, run by prominent lay-
persons. Gradually they evolved into institutions providing minimal services for 
those that were not able to take care for themselves, like the sick without any 
means or relatives. Admission to such a hospital was not given to receive cure, but 
was based on the impossibility to be sick at home. The main goal of the God- en 
Guesthouses, therefore, was to offer hospitality to the poor, not medical treatment.  
 This lasted until the 19th century. From then two important developments took 
place. First, medical possibilities became available that made admission 
meaningful with regard to curative treatments (Querido, 1967; Boot, Knapen, 
2005: 49-50). Second, in the last half of the 20th century the more or less self-
evident ties between healthcare and Christian tradition, as sketched above,  came 
under pressure in modern western societies. The Catholic identity of an HCO 
becomes problematic. 
 
2. Developments in the Netherlands 
For several reasons the Netherlands offer an illustrative example of the 
developments of Catholic healthcare in the North-Atlantic world. First, Holland 
counts as one of the most secularized countries in Europe (Halman et al., 2005: 
73), and it attained that situation very rapidly in comparison with other European 
countries: about half a century ago it still belonged to the most religiously 
observant European countries (Kennedy, 2005: 30). So, secularization, being one 
of the processes that may explain why the self-evident nature of Catholic HCOs in 
western societies has diminished, is enlarged here. But, secondly, the 
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developments in the Netherlands also show the complexity of the concept of 
secularization: it appears to have different meanings so that different influences on 
the relation between religion and healthcare can be distinguished. Third, more 
than in other western countries, general developments like the rise of rational and 
pragmatic thinking, the proliferation of healthcare facilities, and the introduction 
of market mechanisms have had an important influence on the Catholic identity of 
Dutch HCOs.  
 We will first look at some processes in Dutch healthcare. Next we will turn to 
developments in Dutch religiosity and to the question raised above concerning 
how to understand secularization in these developments.  
 
2.1. Catholic Healthcare 
2.1.1. The rise of Catholic hospitals in the Netherlands 
Dutch Catholic hospitals, in the sense of hospitals or nursing homes which are 
officially and according to their statutes Catholic, came into existence during the 
19th century. In this period, so called ‘confessional’ hospitals were founded. The 
first was a Jewish hospital in Amsterdam, 1804, followed by the first protestant 
hospital Utrecht, 1844. Catholic hospitals have a different history. They started not 
with founding such hospitals, but with religious congregations of the Sisters of 
Charity (founded in 1832) and the Sisters of St. Carolus Borromaeus (1837). In 
most cases these sisters were invited on the private initiative of local priests 
and/or prominent lay-persons to move into existing houses to take care for 
nursing. Their arrival brought a great improvement in the care, which at that time 
often had a very low and inhumane level (Lieburg, 1986: 35-38; Querido, 1967: 23, 
99-104). Their spirituality empowered them to care for the most needy and to do 
the most humble tasks, in often degrading circumstances. Hence, in this period 
Catholic care existed, Catholic hospitals did not. The latter became the case in the 
second half of the 19th century. Then, Catholic hospitals became a means to 
enforce and protect the Catholic population and to contribute to its emancipation; 
they were strongly regulated by ecclesiastical hierarchy  (Hendrikx, 1985: 58-61).  
 In the 20th century these confessional Catholic hospitals expanded, and started 
to organize themselves in the Association of Catholic Hospitals (VKZ, Vereniging 
van Katholieke Ziekenhuizen), the Catholic Association of Institutes for Treating 
and Nursing the Mentally Ill (KVI, Katholieke Vereniging van Inrichtingen voor de 
behandeling en verpleging van geestelijk gestoorden), and the Catholic Association 
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of Nursing Homes (KVV, Katholieke Vereniging van Verpleegtehuizen). They had a 
Central Office for the Catholic Hospitals (Centraal Bureau voor het Katholieke 
Ziekenhuiswezen).  
 Besides Catholic hospitals and institutes, also Catholic caregivers in healthcare 
started to raise organizations. In 1905 the Roman-Catholic union of lay nurses, 
´Salus Infirmorum’, was founded, followed in 1926 by the union for nuns, the St. 
Canisiusbond (Heyden, 1994: 61). Catholic doctors organized themselves in 1919 
in the  Catholic Doctors Association. It is those doctors who, in cooperation with 
board members of the nursing religious congregation, became important actors in 
the development of policy and identity of Catholic hospitals during the past 
century.  
 As we saw, in addition to the religious inspiration to raise confessional 
organizations, at the end of the 19th century the motive within different 
population groups to emancipate and to express their own identity played an 
important role. Catholic, but also other identity-based organizations, became part 
of the process of ‘pillarization’. Pillarization denotes a segmentation of Dutch 
society into Catholic, Protestant, liberal and socialist structures, as an important 
means of emancipation of these different groups (Houtepen, 2001: 345-351). A 
pillar covered all areas of life. It had its own political party, media, clubs, 
associations, schools, labor unions, sports clubs, and healthcare facilities. People 
even went shopping within their own denomination. ‘Confessional’ was opposed to 
‘neutral’ or ‘public’, meaning all those facilities that did not belong to a pillar, like 
for instance municipal hospitals. Pillarization fully developed in the first half of the 
past century and started to collapse in the second half. Besides the fact that the 
primary goal of pillarization, emancipation, had been achieved, depillarization was 
welcomed as a liberation from closed structures (Kennedy, 2005: 29-32; Boot, 
2001: 4-12).  
 Catholic hospitals were, as far as nursing was concerned, to a large extent 
staffed by sisters and friars of religious congregations, according to two 
organizational models. In the contractmodel a hospital entered into a contract with 
a religious congregation to take care of nursing. In the enterprisemodel a 
healthcare facility was raised by the congregation itself. Around 1950 14 belonged 
to the second model, 46 to the first (Roes, 2000: 20-21). These figures show that in 
most cases Dutch Catholic HCOs were owned by a civic-judicial foundation and 
started by a particular initiative of Catholic lay persons. Although in these cases the 
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congregation or the diocese was represented in the board of the organization, they 
were not the owners.  
 These two models also make understandable that the decline of religious 
vocations and societal influence of the Church constituted some of the obstacles to 
maintain a Catholic HCO. Another obstacle was the increasing influence of 
government control and public financing. After World War II, the health status of 
the population asked for state coordination. The rise of the welfare state further 
enhanced this influence, but still the main responsibility belonged to the different 
pillars and their boards. In the seventies, however, provisions and costs had 
expanded to an amount and complexity that made central regulation necessary. As 
a result, confessional HCOs and their national associations gradually lost influence 
on the planning and organization of healthcare.  
 However, they were the first to acknowledge that new times and new 
complexities asked for new structures. Drawing on these insights, they were 
among the initiators of the foundation of a new national, non-confessional 
organization in 1966, the Nationale Ziekenhuisraad (National Hospital Council). 
This organization became responsible for the planning and coordination of 
healthcare, and for cooperation and negotiations with the government 
(Pijnenburg, 1986: 20–23). But the sense of religion as an important dimension in 
and for healthcare continued to exist in two ways.  
 First, new confessional associations came into existence, arising from previous 
existing ones working for hospitals, nursing homes and institutes for mental 
health. In 1976 the Katholieke Vereniging van Zorginstellingen (Catholic 
Association of Care Institutions), KVZ, was founded, a year after the Christian (= 
Protestant) association (CVZ) (KVZ, 2003). The primary goal of the KVZ was to 
reflect on fundamental issues regarding hospitals and healthcare, with reference to 
the Catholic view on man and society.  
 Second, a platform for reflection on religious and ethical issues was created as 
an integral part of the Nationale Ziekenhuisraad. This platform was named the 
CABLA, College voor Advies en Bijstand in Levensbeschouwelijke 
Aangelegenheden (College of Advice and Support in Religious Issues), and had an 
advisory function to the board of the Ziekenhuisraad and the affiliated HCOs. The 
new confessional organizations were represented in the CABLA, in addition to 
representatives of the humanists and of the different ‘neutral’, in casu  not religion 
bound associations within the Ziekenhuisraad, such as the association of hospitals, 
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or of nursing homes. In 1989 the CABLA changed its name into CELAZ, College voor 
Ethische en Levensbeschouwelijke Aspecten van de Zorg (College of Ethical and 
Religious Aspects of Care), expressing a growing need for ethical reflection. At that 
time the Nationale Ziekenhuisraad became the Nationale Ziekenhuis Federatie 
(National Hospital Federation), and in the nineties this changed into the Branche 
Organisatie voor de Zorg (Branche Organization of Care). These latter 
developments were a consequence of a growing independence of the different 
fields of healthcare: hospitals, nursing homes, mental health and care for the 
mentally retarded. In the meantime many Dutch HCOs had developed their own 
ethical expertise and supporting structures, such as ethical committees and 
structures for moral deliberation. The need for a central, national organization for 
ethical support and advice declined. As a result, the CELAZ ceased to exist in 2004.1 
 With respect to the two confessional organizations (KVZ and CVZ), in the course 
of the years their number of members decreased. In 2003 they combined forces, 
and merged in a new member organization, Relief. It includes mostly homes for the 
elderly and nursing homes, and to a lesser extent hospitals, mental health 
institutions, and institutes for the mentally retarded.  
 
2.1.2. ‘Catholic’ as a problematic characteristic 
The decrease of HCOs affiliated with KVZ and CVZ demonstrated the increase of 
difficulties to maintain religion-based organizations. We mention some of them, 
first at the structural level, second at the cultural level.  
 Within the structure of healthcare, there is first the advance of medical 
technologies. Together with the growing emphasis on costs, it enforced the rise of 
instrumental rationality in healthcare. This is the kind of rationality that is focused 
on the means to reach certain goals, and not, as opposed to religious traditions, to 
the goals themselves and their implicit and intrinsic values. Second, as a 
consequence of efforts to contain costs and to resist an unbridled proliferation of 
healthcare provisions, institutions merged and got regional functions or became 
part of networks. In these processes, the religious identity was often abandoned. 
Third, the increase in public funding of healthcare – largely by insurance premiums 
of individual citizens and only for a small percentage by state financing – 
diminished the possibility of self-governance and increased the dependence on 
                                                   
1  With thanks to Hans van Dartel, the former secretary of the CELAZ, for providing information on 
these developments. 
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public control. Fourth, the rise of the welfare-state after World War II led to a 
change from religiously based healthcare to state-controlled healthcare. Inherent 
in this transition was a change from care-as-a favor, motivated by charity, to care-
as-a-right; at the same time, the concept of man changed from a human being as 
relational and responsible for others to a human being as a self sufficient and 
autonomous individual. Fifth, the wish to contain healthcare costs and the 
apparent inability of the state to control these costs led to an introduction of 
market-mechanisms in healthcare (Boot, Knapen, 2005: Ch 14; 16). In 2006 a new  
insurance system was introduced in which insurance companies have to compete 
for the favors of – potential – patients (denoted as ‘consumers’) by signing 
contracts with HCOs, based on price and quality.  
 At the cultural level there are, first, tendencies that run parallel to the more 
market-oriented approach of providing care. From the sixties in the past century 
autonomy had become an increasingly important principle in healthcare. When a 
market ethos was introduced it referred to this change to ideologically legitimize 
the new understanding of patients: from more or less passive – in latin: patiens – 
receivers of care, they now were considered deliberative, autonomous consumers. 
Second, new medical technologies and developments raised new ethical questions 
for which the traditional religious answers no longer could provide satisfactory 
answers. This partly explains the rise of bioethics, as a new branch within the field 
of ethics. Third, the rise of individualism, the decline of the former religious 
frameworks and the increasing number of immigrants from other cultures and 
religions, especially Islam, representing a considerable number of people 
(approximately one million), also promoted religious and moral pluralism. Being 
Christian became an option among many others.  
 The present situation is marked, on the one hand, by a further decrease of 
religious influences on healthcare, in particular the influence of the churches, and, 
on the other hand, by a change in the nature of religiosity. This change is 
demonstrated, among others, by a growing interest in spirituality, with a 
concentration on spirituality in nursing (see for instance Tiesinga, 2008) and on 
spirituality in end-of-life care. Also, an increasing uneasiness with one-sided 
instrumental thinking in healthcare can be noted. We need, as a North-American 
publication states, a ´rebirth of the clinic´’, that offers to people a medicine that 
aims to heal not only the body, but also the soul (Sulmasy, 2006). It demonstrates a 
renewed interest in questions of meaning (Bouwer, 2008), both on the personal 
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level of persons in need of care, and of caregivers. On the organizational level 
spirituality gains interest in the reflection on the mission of an HCO beyond a 
merely successful complying with market mechanisms (Gribnau, Pijnenburg, 
2008).  
 This brief sketch of developments in Dutch healthcare shows that the position 
and significance of confessional HCOs is defined by and dependent on historical 
and societal factors. It is, therefore, in the present state of healthcare that the 
meaning of Catholic tradition, if any, has to be discovered. The course we intend to 
take in the search for this meaning is from the practice of present-day institutional 
care to Catholic tradition, and the other way around: from Catholic tradition to the 
practice of care. To be more precisely, we will argue that through this reciprocity 
institutional health care can become a source of moral knowledge for Catholic 
tradition, and at the same time the Catholic tradition can become a critical and 
ethical source for HCOs to fulfill their moral responsibility. We will do so by 
making the necessary detour of an ethical analysis of care, of institutions of care, 
and the relevance of moral resourcing.  
 
2.2. Religiosity in the Netherlands 
The diminishing self-evident nature of embracing a Catholic identity also has to be 
explained from the radically changed position of religion in the past fifty years. 
Usually this process is labeled as ‘secularization’, but this term has many different 
meanings. If one understands secularization as the loss of societal power of the 
institutional churches and religion-based organizations, then such an explanation 
is convincing. If one understands secularization as the disappearance of religion, 
then the rise of new religious movements, the interest in spirituality and the 
growing influence of Islam in western culture contradict it. But if one interprets 
these latter developments as a return of religion, one risks neglecting the profound 
transformations that have been taking place in religion.  
 Thus, it is not secularization yes or no that makes religiously based HCOs 
problematic. Instead, we have to examine in what sense secularization has become 
a problematic factor for religiously based HCOs.  
 
2.2.1. Quantitative changes 
To illustrate some of the changes we derive some quantitative data from the most 
recent study of religion in the Netherlands, God in Nederland, carried out by three 
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researchers, T.Bernts, G. Dekker and J. de Hart (Bernts, Dekker, Hart, 2007). This 
study is the last of a series of studies that have been carried out every ten years 
from 1966 onwards. The first table shows the decline of the religious 
denominations between 1966 and 2006.  
 
Tabel I: Part of religious affiliation according to people’s responses in percentages (Dekker, 2007: 
14) 
 
Catholics and Protestants together have lost 50% of their members, and the 
number of people without affiliation has markedly increased. ‘Others’ are members 
of orthodox-reformed churches, and not-western religion, in particular Islam. The 
researchers estimate their number at 6% of the whole Dutch population.  
 Fewer people go to church, but looking at frequency of church going among 
church members, there is a decline as well: in 1966 77% of church members went 
regularly, in 1996 44%, in 2006 40%. 
 
 1966 2006 
Regularly (almost every week) 50 16 
Sometimes 7 14 
Seldom 8 23 
Never 35 47 
Tabel II: Decreasing church going among population in percentages , according to people’s own 
responses (Dekker, 2007: 17). 
 
There also is a decline of traditional beliefs: belief in a personal God, in Jesus as 
God’s son, in the bible as God’s word, in a life after death and in the possibility of 
heaven, hell, reincarnation, resurrection etc. As an example only the changes in 
belief in a personal God are mentioned here. They appeared to be almost halved. 
There is a slight rise of people who believe in a non-personal higher power in 
comparison with 1966, but if we had presented their numbers in all the studied 
years: 1966, 1979, 1996 and 2006, a rise in 1979 up to 40%, followed by a decline 
to respectively 39, and 36 would have been noticeable.  
 
 
 1966 2006 
Roman Catholics 35 16 
Protestants 25 14 
Others 7 9 
Without affiliation  33 61 
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 1966 2006 
Theists (there is a personal God) 47 24 
Believers in ‘something’ (higher power) 31 36 
Agnosts (don’t know) 16 26 
Atheist (no God or higher power 6 14 
Tabel III: Decline of belief in a personal God in percentages (Dekker, 2007: 40) 
 
Finally, there is a decrease in the number of people that consider themselves to be 
religious persons:  
 
 1979 1996 2006 
Absolutely 43 40 31 
actually yes / to a certain 
extent 
25 27 31 
actually not 12 13 19 
definitely not 20 20 19 
Tabel IV: People that consider themselves religious in percentages (Dekker, 2007: 52) 
 
Dekker takes the first two categories as ‘somehow believing’. Then there is a 
decline from respectively 68, to 67, to 62. So, there is a majority somehow 
believing yet. Indeed, in 1996 it was assumed that belief in a God/higher power 
had remained constant but that the number of persons belonging to a church or 
religion had diminished. In other words, although there was less organized 
religion, there was still a relatively high number of believers. The figures of 2006, 
however, show that in total both the number of people belonging to a church and 
the number of believers is declining. Moreover, if we take into account that most 
believers are among the older generations, there is no sign that this trend will 
reverse (ibidem: 52-53).  
 Inherent in a longitudinal study is the necessity to keep figures comparable. 
Consequently, the emphasis remained on developments in Christian religions, and 
on the classical parameters of membership, attendance, and changes in traditional 
beliefs. However, the researchers are well aware that there are qualitative changes 
as well in religiosity.  
 
2.2.2. Qualitative changes 
The researchers perceive a new spirituality, less bound to churches and more 
individualized and experiential (Bernts, 2007: 77). Religion and spirituality seem 
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to counterbalance the modern cultural norm – often experienced as too demanding 
- that people are responsible for their own life and happiness (ibidem: 110). 
Moreover, a majority of 73% still regards religious rituals as very valuable at 
important moments in life and 74% attach importance to the maintenance of 
moral values and norms in society (ibidem: 85-86). Hence, the present longing for 
religion entails both a firm conviction that religion is a personal matter, and a 
confirmation of the moral importance of religion, which implicates communality 
and the need for commonly shared values and norms. But common to both is that 
the modern quest for religion distances itself more and more from the traditional 
‘pillars’ and churches (ibidem:109-114).  
 With regard to the longing for spirituality, Hart qualifies this as a post-modern 
quest. He characterizes post-modernity as a crisis in the credibility of massive 
ideologies or religious systems; as an eclectic attitude towards traditions and 
traditional worldviews; and as the disappearance of differences between elites and 
masses, and between high and low culture. He marks post-modernity also as a 
form of profound relativism and an unwillingness to reason from universal 
principles, categorical imperatives and officially confirmed canons. Instead, 
characteristic of post-modernity is a willingness to act on the basis of feelings, 
emotions, and concrete situations. Truths are temporary, not perennial (Hart, 
2007: 174). In post-modern spirituality the traditional religious narratives and 
certainties are given up. Many people believe that they have to compose their own 
religion out of different traditions and elements, that religion has little to do with 
churches, that religion can have many sources and that it continuously changes 
during life. To a large extent post-modern spirituality is the contemporary 
response to a still massive need for reflection on the meaning of life: only 14% of 
all the respondents declare that they have absolutely no interest in this type of 
reflection.  
 In sum: the study God in Nederland shows a decline in organized religion, in 
belonging, and in believing. But at the same time religiosity has transformed: it has 
become individualized, experiential, dynamic, open to new directions instead of 
adhering to fixed certainties.  
 
2.2.3. The misconception about the ‘secularization thesis’ 
For a long time it was believed that modernization and secularization were two 
sides of the same coin: modernization was supposed to lead to secularization, and, 
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reversely, secularization was taken as a feature of modernization. In light of the 
data we presented above, we must conclude that the validity of this thesis highly 
depends on how ‘secularization’ is defined. If it stands for the decline of organized 
religion, then it might be true. However, if one interprets secularization as the 
disappearance of religiosity, it is not true. This leads Kennedy to the observation 
that in the Netherlands the secularization thesis itself “has had a huge impact on 
how religion has been constructed and understood (…)” (Kennedy, 2005: 29). It led 
to perceiving organized religion, in particular pillarization, as belonging, in 
shorthand, to the Middle Ages, and modernization as a liberation of a barbaric 
religious past. It constructs the historical process of modernization as a process 
with secularization as its natural outcome, resulting into progress, a better 
situation than before.  
 Kennedy argues in favor of a more nuanced approach by constructing a 
tripartite periodization of recent Dutch religious history (ibidem: 32–41). He 
marks the first period, 1945–1965, as the heyday of religious cultures and church-
based organizations. In our view: ‘religion-based’ would be a more correct term, 
since, as we described above, most Dutch organizations in healthcare may have 
been stimulated and supported by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, but started from 
private initiatives of believing citizens and religious congregations. In the second 
period, 1965–1985, churches opened their doors to the world. Churches became 
‘secular’ in the sense that they propagated an engagement with the world, and with 
a universal solidarity. The closed structures of the old pillars were broken down in 
favor of a new openness. Activism became a religious virtue, and the Netherlands 
was known and wanted to be known as a progressive guide to the world: 
‘Nederland gidsland’ (Netherlands guiding land). In the third period, 1985 – 
present, the primacy of this religiously motivated engagement went into rapid 
decline. What came in its place was an emphasis on the inner life, on personal 
spirituality. This new religiosity developed largely outside organized religion.  
 In addition to Kennedy’s characterization, and focusing on healthcare, it is 
relevant as well to point to the rise of a harsh pragmatism. In particular, in the 
third period the emphasis on practical applicability, utility and financial 
accountability became decisive as a moral guide for acting. It replaced the 
traditional evaluation of the act of caring as an expression of engagement and 
compassion with the needy. Such a religious framework became optional and 
private, and a matter of subjective preference. Banned into the world of the inner 
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Self, religion lost its significance as a frame of reference for the public domain and 
for healthcare as a public provision.  
 A second point of criticism is that Kennedy offers several explanations for the 
loss of religious-ethical activism in the third period: a crisis in the welfare state, the 
failure of development aid and the peace movement to achieve social justice, and 
the advent of a new generation of young people whose moral and religious views 
widely differed from those of their parents. However, with regard to the Catholic 
community Kennedy omits to mention another influential development. In the 
second period the Dutch bishops, inspired by the Second Vatican Council, were 
leading figures in the renewal movement of the church towards an open and 
ethically engaged attitude to the world and a renewal of traditional Catholic ideas 
and moral prescripts. The National Pastoral Councils and the edition of The New 
Catechism in 1966 became famous. However, the central Roman authority of the 
Church intervened in these processes by appointing new conservative bishops, 
whose loyalty to Rome was above all doubt. It was the beginning of a polarization 
within the Dutch Catholic community that persisted into the third period. Many 
disappointed believers left the church. It also became a reason for many Catholic 
organizations to give up their Catholic identity. They preferred to be ‘nothing’ 
above being ‘Catholic’, and, hence, submissive to ecclesial authorities. What came 
in its place was either a non-belief, or an emphasis on personal spirituality, 
disconnected from organized religion.  
 Reflecting on this tripartite history, Kennedy rightly warns against an overuse of 
the secularization thesis. Instead, he proposes to talk about three essentially 
incompatible religious paradigms: religion as social organization, religion as social 
activism, and religion as individual spirituality (ibidem: 40). 
 
What are the possible implications of the developments mentioned above for the 
main objective of this study: to gather elements for an ethical view on the 
significance of institutional Catholic identity for present-day healthcare 
organizations? To recall: we used the Netherlands as an example of the 
development of Catholic healthcare in the North-Atlantic world. As an example in 
contains its own ‘typically Dutch’ features. However, it also demonstrates 
developments in religion and care that are characteristic for western culture in 
general. Although pillarization, for instance, has been distinctive for the 
Netherlands, the changing role of religion in general, and of the relation between 
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religion and healthcare organizations is a characteristic of the contemporary 
Western world as a whole. This holds true, even when one takes into consideration 
differences between western countries; see, for instance, the rise of Christian 
fundamentalism in the US (Paul, 2005). Processes of secularization, in the sense of 
less organized religion and more personal and experience-based searches for 
meaning developed very rapidly in the Netherlands, but they confirm an 
observation Taylor makes with regard to western culture in general: you only 
believe what “rings true to your own inner Self” (Taylor, 2002: 101). Also, 
individualization, a growing influence of economics and markets and technical 
reasoning in healthcare characterize modern western culture.  
 These common traits have three implications for this study. First, the meaning 
of the Catholic identity of an HCO must be examined in connection with the 
individual quest for meaning of employees and patients. Second, if it is true that 
religion is still expected to be an important source for moral values and norms that 
differ from merely pragmatic and rationalistic approaches, then the meaning of 
Catholic identity must also be investigated from the perspective of the practice of 
institutional healthcare. Third, what happened in the Netherlands at the level of 
inner-ecclesiastical polarization demonstrates a more general clash of western 
modernity with the Church, and vice versa. The meaning of Catholic identity of 
HCOs must, therefore, also be examined in their relation with the Church, in 
particular with the magisterium, and vice versa.  
 
3. Catholic tradition and western culture: an approach from Charles Taylor 
This study aims to analyze problems with regard to the meaning of Catholic 
identity of HCOs in contemporary western culture and to develop new 
perspectives on possible meanings, in order to better understand the moral 
responsibility of HCOs. For this analysis we will make us of the philosophical 
studies on western culture of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor.  
 Taylor (Québec, 1931) belongs to the most prominent philosophers of modern 
culture, in particular with respect to the identity of the modern western subject, 
and to the role of religion in modern western culture. His specific contribution to 
the philosophical debate on modernity can be demonstrated by looking at his 
stance towards three headlines in this debate as described by Hartmut Rosa (Rosa, 
1998: 305–317). First, modernization is usually valued as a process of liberation 
from former dependencies of religion and irrationality, ór criticized as a process of 
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alienation. Second, problems of modern culture, like atomism and fragmentization, 
are often considered as developments that can be corrected, ór as the very essence 
of modernization. One way to understand postmodernism is by considering 
atomism and fragmentization inherent to modern culture and the main causes that 
modern culture must is approaching its end. Human subjects can be neither 
anymore described, nor morally oriented by ‘meta-narratives’; they continuously 
have to reinvent themselves (ibidem: 310-311). Finally, some authors believe that 
the project of modernity deserves it to be saved and can be saved, while others 
want to leave it behind. For instance, MacIntyre considers the project a failure, and 
wants to return to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Foucault interprets modernity as 
a project of disciplination which results in the dead of the subject. More optimistic 
is Habermas. He recognizes pathologies of modernity, and diagnoses them as a 
dominance of instrumental rationality at the cost of a value-oriented rationality, 
and a colonization of the life-world by powers of state and economy. But he 
believes these pathologies can be corrected by free and open communication about 
substantive and commonly shared values. Rosa demonstrates that Taylor takes a 
middle position between those rather pessimistic, and more optimistic evaluations 
of modernity.  
 Taylor acknowledges the ‘malaises of modernity’ (Taylor, 1991a), but also the 
positive strength of the goods that constitute it. He therefore wants to save 
modernity by retrieving its moral sources: the goods that are constitutive for the 
process of modernization, and that rend the power and motivation to pursue them. 
In comparison to Foucault and Habermas, Taylor shares their conviction that the 
one-sided subject-centered philosophy of modern culture must be conquered. But 
whereas Fouceault proclaims the death of the subject, and Habermas wants to 
replace this philosophy by his theory of communicative acting, Taylor elaborates 
an intersubjective genesis of the Self within the culture where it comes to 
development. He resists the idea that phenomena like secularization, technical 
rationalization or differentiation of spheres of values are more or less neutral, 
‘natural’, and  unavoidable elements of modernization everywhere and in every 
culture. In his view, such processes are preceded by specific and culture bound 
ways in which individuals understand the meaning of being human, time, cosmos, 
goods, or community. These views constitute a kind of moral map that orients 
them, not as a theory, but as an ensemble of more implicit distinctions of values, 
and of aims more or less worthwhile to pursue which are expressed in social 
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practices and institutions. Modern culture can be understood by exploring this 
map, and by articulating the goods that it implies (Rosa, 1998: 324).  
 While in the first centuries of our era the dominant map was theistic and 
Christian, modernization is a process of new moral goods and sources coming to be 
acknowledged. Partly they were developed within the previous theistic 
background, partly they took distance from this background. This new moral 
sources can be traced by a reconstruction of the history of modern identity. In this 
history Taylor discloses three developments (Rosa, 1998: 330-339). First, a turn to 
inwardness: moral truth is to be found by reflection on the inner Self. Second, a 
turn to nature, in a double sense. On the one hand nature is understood as the 
nature of an object, that, as opposed to earlier understandings, no longer expresses 
a metaphysical or abstract idea, but is hidden in the object itself. At the same time 
the Logos of it can only be discovered by the thinking human subject. Nature in this 
sense became a source for ‘naturalism’, being a scientific method for exploring the 
nature of things following the criteria of autonomy and rationality. The naturalistic 
method has become one of the constitutive goods of the present-day moral 
landscape. It holds that the world and the reality around us are neutral and  can be 
studied by natural sciences, and that it is us who project values on them.  On the 
other hand nature is considered the voice inside us that we have to express: one 
has to live according to his or her own nature. In this sense nature became a source 
for the modern goods of expressionism and authenticity. Nature as a source   
motivated and is motivated by the Romantic reaction to the rationalistic 
Enlightenment. Third, the turn to the ordinary life of labor and reproduction. In 
Aristotelian times this life just was a condition for the good and virtuous life. Now 
it became by itself the source of such a life.  
 These three developments are implied in and enforced by Enlightenment and 
Romanticism. Together with the previously all compassing theistic framework they 
model the modern self-understanding of individuals and of social practices and 
institutions. Modern culture and modern subjects are constituted by these 
frameworks and sources, and constitute their further developments and their 
inner conflicts. Taylor does not aspire to a universal reconciliation of these 
conflicts (Rosa, 198: 378–381). At the contrary, he considers them inherent to 
modern culture. In stead of solutions, he pleas for articulation of the original 
sources of modern culture, as the only way to reinforce them, to become aware of 
malformations, and to search for reconciliation in concrete lives and practices. 
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 Drawing on this brief sketch of Taylor’s position in the debate on modern 
culture, we expect him to be helpful in our search for sources of care. Modern 
healthcare in itself can be considered a mix of different sources. The source of 
nature in a naturalistic sense is recognizable in the rise of instrumental rationality 
in science, technology and economics. The source of nature in a expressionistic 
sense can be traced in movements for patient-centered or personal care. It is also 
clear that these two sources can conflict with one another: the patient as an object 
of science and a rationalistic approach, versus the patient as a unique individual. 
The theistic source has changed profoundly through the process of modernization. 
But it still comes to the fore in questions of meaning, and in the motivation and 
spirituality of a number of caregivers. For this study it is relevant to investigate 
how HCOs that commit themselves institutionally to a particular theistic source, in 
casu the Roman-Catholic tradition, can deal with the other, non-theistic sources of 
modern healthcare.  
 Other reasons that motivate this study to appeal to Taylor are, first, the 
observation that individualization has become a central feature of modern times. 
Often, Taylor is labeled as a communitarian (see for instance Buchanan, 1995). The 
communitarian philosophy prioritizes the community, and perceives a human 
being as essentially a social and cultural being. As opposed to this, the liberal 
philosophy sees a human being as self-sufficient, who ‘uses’ the community as an 
instrument in order to serve its own purposes and interests. Taylor prefers to 
characterize his stance somewhere in-between: a liberal communitarian, or a 
communitarian liberal (Taylor, 1995). He strongly advocates the central goods of 
the liberal view, like autonomy, freedom, rationality and self-responsibility. But he 
criticizes the liberal view, that these goods are ‘invented’ by the individual. Instead, 
we are born in a culture, amidst a mix of traditions, and speak a language that is 
pre-existent to us. It is within these background that we exist as “self-interpreting 
animals” and develop our identity in dialogue with others, communities and 
traditions (Taylor, 1985). Drawing on this refined communitarian stance, Catholic 
tradition can be considered one of the traditions in Western culture in light of 
which we interpret ourselves and develop an identity. 
 Second, we assume hypothetically that in thinking about how to conceive 
institutional Catholic identity, experience and practices should play a crucial role. 
Taylor confirms this assumption. By evaluating and articulating our experiences 
and practices we are interpreting ourselves, because in our feelings of, for 
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example, admiration or awe, we open the moral map of the modern self-
understanding, inclusive its inner conflicts. Articulation is an entrance to this map: 
it is a way to transcend the level of mere subjective experience and to try to spell 
out what we experience as good in se: the properties of kinds of life that appear to 
be desirable and demanding in themselves. For instance, respect for other human 
beings is not a subjective invention, but it is demanding in itself, and that is why we 
value it. In this sense, it is objective: not dependent of the capriciousness of 
personal feelings. It is a kind of objectivity that differs from the objectivity in the 
natural sciences: in the latter it refers to entities that exist in space and time, and 
that can be observed.  
 These goods, therefore, neither exist independent of our experience, nor do they 
exist, as in naturalism, as merely subjective inventions and projections on a value-
neutral world. Articulation of goods  is only possible because they are part of pre-
existent frameworks we find ourselves in: our culture, tradition and community. 
These frameworks, also denoted as ‘horizons of meaning’, offer qualitative 
distinctions between  good and evil, worthwhile and worthless, admirable and 
reprehensible. They constitute the moral map that orients us when we try to 
articulate why we experience some acts, some state of affairs, or some kinds of life 
as good or evil. We shall approach the Catholic tradition as such a framework or 
‘horizon of meaning’, which may be helpful in attempts to articulate experiences.   
 Third, these frameworks have their roots in time and place (Taylor, 1989: part 
II-V). They consist of traditions of ideas, practices, politics, religion, science, art, in 
short, the whole diversity of elements that separately and in interaction with each 
other made up the history and culture of the Western world. Just as Taylor, also 
this study emphasizes the relevance of putting reflection on Catholic identity in a 
historical perspective.  
 Fourth, Taylor is a Catholic. Although there is debate about his real intentions 
(see for instance Fraser, 2007: 46), he tries to argue from a philosophical point of 
view in favor of the plausibility of a Judaeo-Christian perspective to keep up the 
moral standards of contemporary western culture, and to defend it against the 
risks of trivialization of goods and the emptiness of meaninglessness. In a sequence 
of publications he tries to elaborate this argument. Starting at the end of Sources of 
the Self (1989) with merely expressing his hope that Judaeo-Christian theism will 
save the highest spiritual aspirations of western culture (Taylor, 1989: 520-1), he 
makes this hope explicit for the first time in his Marianist Award lecture, A Catholic 
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Modernity? (Taylor, 1999). This lecture is about the contents of Christianity. Later, 
in Varieties of Religion Today (Taylor, 2002), he elaborates the conditions for 
religion in a modern secularized world. Instead of the old situation in which one 
has to conform to fixed truths and rules of the Church and the faith-community - a 
conformity which conservative parts of the Church and the Christian community 
still seem to force on believers - , religious life is nowadays more of a kind that is 
developed individually. A synthesis of his work on religion is presented in his last 
magisterial magnum opus, A Secular Age (Taylor, 2007). Its central question is how 
to understand a development from a society 500 years ago “in which it was 
virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the 
staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” (Taylor, 2007: 3).  
 Fifth, he favors a substantive ethics, and criticizes the current preference for a 
proceduralist approach of ethical issues (Taylor, 1989: 75-90; 496). Substantive 
ethics is about the good, while proceduralist ethics is about the right. 
Proceduralism tries to base ethics without any reference to what it means to lead a 
morally good life, and starts from personal intuitions about what is right to do. It 
presumes that the moral freedom of an individual can only exist by the denial of a 
commonly shared idea about what makes life good and meaningful. As a result, 
ethics is no more than the procedural arrangement of the freedom of the aggregate 
of individuals to pursue their own life plans. It fails to answer the question why we 
should behave morally at all, except that we should not damage the freedom of 
another. As opposed to this, Taylor argues in favor of a teleological perspective: we 
need to reflect on the good life (Joas, 1999: 195-226).  
 In sum, Taylor is strongly connected to the central question of this study: how to 
interpret problems of the relation between Catholic tradition and HCOs today, and 
which new perspectives can be developed? Similar to the beginning passages of A 
Secular Age this introduction started with the transition from healthcare in which 
Christianity always played a self-evident role, into one in which Christianity is an 
option at best, or considered an outmoded and suppressing tradition at worst. A 
common issue between this study and Taylor is, first, how to balance individuality 
(religion as a personal issue) and communality (religion as a source for values and 
norms for people acting together, like in healthcare organizations). A second 
common issue is the central role of experiences and practices as finding places of 
goods. Third, common to this study and Taylor is the focus on the role of religion in 
the formation of the modern identity. Fourth, similar to Taylor’s historical 
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approach, we also claim that HCOs that want to reflect on the meaning of Catholic 
tradition for fulfilling their central mission to care should orient themselves to 
their own particular history and the general history of Western healthcare.  
 However, this study is surely not about Taylor. Readers who expect a full-
fledged overview and critical debate of the works of Charles Taylor will be 
disappointed. We apply Taylor’s views selectively: because and in as far as they are 
helpful to develop a clearer insight in the meaning and the problematic aspects of 
Catholic identity for healthcare organizations today. No more, no less. In the same 
way we will deal with the numerous and extended debates about Taylor’s works. 
We will make use of them in so far as they contribute to the answers we are 
looking for.  
 Moreover, there is also an issue Taylor hardly pays attention to: the role of 
organizations. He is concerned with persons, with culture in general, with 
institutions of this culture like language, economics, law, but he neglects the 
perspective of the mediating level of organizations. HCOs are such organizations, 
mediating between persons – patients, employees, taxpayers – and the overarching 
institution of healthcare. Our claim is that such organizations have an identity of 
their own, and that, like frameworks, they orient persons in the development of 
their identity. To support this claim, we need to have a closer look at the nature of 
HCOs.  
 
4. The institutional character of healthcare organizations: a sociological 
perspective 
A sociological definition of an institution is: “A pattern of social interaction, having 
a relatively stable structure, that persists over time. Institutions have structural 
properties - they are organized - and they are shaped by cultural values. (…) There 
is not full agreement about the number or designation of social institutions in a 
society but the following would typically be included: family, economy, politics, 
education, health care, media.” (Dictionary Social Sciences, 2008). Taylor does not 
offer a sharp definition of ‘institutions’, but according to this sociological definition, 
he deals with institutions like economy, markets, politics, science: these are both 
shaped by the goods of modern culture, and in turn influence the shaping of these 
goods. His interest is in the reciprocity between changes in these institutions and 
changes in the identity of the modern Self.  
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 The research field of this study is more specific qua focus, and qua level: 
healthcare organizations, localized between (societal) institutions and the modern 
subject. Although they are sometimes also labeled as ‘institutions’ (see for instance 
Bulger, Cassel 2004), it seems more correct to say that, sociologically, HCOs are 
organizations or institutes situated at the meso-level between the macro-level of 
the institution of healthcare, and the micro-level of care-giving and care-receiving 
individuals.  
 What characterizes organizations? First and foremost, they organize the 
effectuation of the goals and the values of the institution they belong to. HCOs 
primarily belong to the institution of healthcare. But in order to fulfill this 
organizational task, they have to cross the borders of this particular institutional 
domain. They need, among others, to guard their finances, to comply with judicial 
regulations and scientific standards, to offer care to patients and future patients, to 
monitor safety and quality, to behave as a good employer. Fisher and Lovell define 
an organization as a configuration of “people and other resources that has been 
created to coordinate a series of work activities, with a view to achieve stated 
outcomes, or objectives” (Fisher, Lovell, 2006: 18). Healthcare organizations 
coordinate a series of work activities like diagnostics, nursing, feeding, medical 
therapies which all resort under the institution of healthcare, but also activities 
like administration, billing, human resources management, governance, and so on 
which have their roots in institutions different from healthcare, such as economics 
and science. We argue to consider an HCO a meeting place of different institutions.  
 The moral responsibility of a HCO relates to the question how to balance these 
different institutions. HCOs are not just ‘configurations to coordinate a series of 
activities’, but HCOs are also moral agents which make choices, take decisions, and  
have specific responsibilities to people in- and outside. HCOs can be asked to 
render moral account for what they did and how they did it (see also Chapter 4 of 
this study). One of the ethical challenges is how to properly rank the different 
institutional settings that meet in the organization. For example, the institutions of 
healthcare and the market meet in the HCO, and many people, in particular in the 
US but also in European countries where market systems have been introduced in 
healthcare, are worried that the market is taking over healthcare.  
 Conflicts between healthcare and market are dealt with in several of the 
succeeding chapters. For the moment it suffices to say that the identity crisis of 
Catholic healthcare organizations is not only about their religion-based identity, 
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but also about their healthcare-based identity. The primary question with regard 
to identity is, then, how an organization understands itself as an agent of the 
institution of healthcare, and in what way this understanding is under pressure of 
a growing dominance of other institutions within the organization. In order to 
answer these questions, one needs a normative reflection on HCOs and on the 
goals of the institution of healthcare.  
 
5. The institutional character of healthcare organizations: a normative 
perspective 
Ricoeur considers institutions the third and indispensable dimension of living an 
ethically good life, in addition to two other dimensions, the relation to oneself, and 
to the other. He defines an institution as a “structure of living together (italics by 
Ricoeur) as this belongs to a historical community – people, nation, region, and so 
forth – a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with 
these”. (Ricoeur, 1994: 194). It is irreducible to the interpersonal because 
institutions deal with persons in plurality: the ones we do not know, we do not 
know yet, or have never known. The institution of healthcare is such a structure, 
aiming at rendering healthcare to all singular and abstract individuals who need it. 
Yet, it is bound up with the interpersonal because it enables the direct, immediate 
and personal encounters in caring situations by placing the ones involved in 
certain roles, by creating certain expectations and obligations, and by protecting 
personal involvement against becoming too emotional or too burdening. For 
instance, caregivers just go home after their shift. The abstract character of the 
institution protects the concreteness of the face-to-face encounter, the social 
structure of the institution establishes the private (Ricoeur, 1965: 106).  
 As we read this definition, Ricoeur does not make a sharp division between 
institutions and organizations. Neither we will always distinguish them in the 
other chapters of this study. This introduction, however, uses the distinction 
between institutions and organizations in order to clarify that organizations are 
bound at the aims of the institution they belong to. An HCO, therefore, is bound at  
the aims of the institution of healthcare.    
 According to Ricoeur, an institution is characterized by a bond of common 
mores that guides the institution’s power-in-common. This power is political, not 
in the sense of state- or party-politics, but of organizing the polis under the 
condition of plurality: there are parties involved outside the face-to-face 
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encounters, and, moreover, there are parties in the past, like founders of the 
organization, or the political community itself, and parties in the future, like future 
patients. Being a structure of living together-in-plural justice, as Ricoeur quotes 
Rawls, ought to be the first virtue of social institutions (Ricoeur, 1994: 197). 
Virtues refer to an Aristotelian teleological ethics: having a disposition towards the 
just (ibidem: 198). Justice refers to conditions of equality (to treat all as equals) 
and of distribution (to render roles, responsibilities, rewards, services and so forth 
to what is due to everyone): suum cuique dare (Ricoeur, 1995: 322).  
 It is, however, this institutional virtue of justice that also introduces the 
inherent evil of ‘objectivation’: in order to treat all equally, and to render everyone 
his or her due, justice has to be blindfolded. Anonymity and abstract 
administration are the necessary tools of justice. Also, evil is inherent in the 
different forms of equipment which institutions use to pursue their goal: the 
equipments tend to become a means of domination, and not of service: “Within the 
center of the most peaceful and harmless institutions lies the beast, obstinacy, the 
tendency to tyrannize the public, and the abstract justice of bureaucracy” (Ricoeur, 
1965: 106-107).  
 Instead of an approach based on the term ‘equipments’ which institutions use to 
pursue their goal, we prefer to approach an HCO as a meeting place of different 
institutions. Market economy, technology, science, as well as the division of labor 
are all structures (of living together) in a certain community or society that have 
their own goals, and their own tendency to suppress other goals. By envisaging 
these competing institutional goals within (the walls of) an HCO, the urgency of 
raising the basic question of ‘why we are here in the first place’ becomes 
unavoidable. The term ‘equipment’, on the contrary, ‘solves’ the problem already, 
because equipments by definition are means to an end. But the moral challenge of 
present-day HCOs consists in how to balance different institutional ends.  
 The prime goal of an HCO is defined by its belonging to the institution of 
healthcare, which is to organize and render care. In order to accomplish this, it has 
to do justice to other institutions as well. An HCO is also agent of the institution of 
economy, using big amounts of public money; one of its goals, therefore, is to 
function according to the standards of sound and just business. An HCO is as well 
an agent of the institution of science: it has to carefully follow scientific standards 
in healthcare, since these standards define the quality of care to a great extent. 
Next, an HCO is an agent of the institution of labor: it employs professionals to do 
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what they have chosen to do and what they have been professionally trained for: to 
offer care to people. In order to do this, they rightly want to work in a place with 
proper working conditions and decent salaries.  
 Within an HCO these different institutional settings compete with one another. 
With the rise of economics, criteria of efficiency have gained importance, if only for 
the simple reason of survival of the organization. However, economics also tends 
to narrow efficiency down to financial costs and benefits. From an ethical 
perspective that puts the goal of care first, one need to reflect about what costs and 
what benefits or effects are the ultimate standard for judging an HCO, and at which 
point economic discourse is going to infringe with care as the primary goal 
(Pijnenburg, 1988: 185; also Vosman, Baart, 2008: 37-44).  
 The same can be applied to other institutional settings. Scientific developments 
are, at least ideally, for the good of the patient, but critical-ethical reflection is 
needed about what kind of good is pursued, whether other goods, for instance 
spiritual ones, are neglected, and about the proportion between the goods and 
burdens of science and technology. Good staff management is intrinsically 
valuable, but also instrumental to the primary purpose of an HCO: to organize care 
for actual, and potential patients. But the care for employees may infringe on the 
care for patients. For example, there is a limit to what an organization may ask of 
its employees in terms of working pressure.  
 Accordingly, the focus of this study on the meaning of Catholic identity of an 
HCO must include the appropriate ranking between the different institutional 
settings HCOs find themselves in.  
 
6. Objectives of this study 
The first objective of this study is to come to a better understanding of problematic 
aspects of Roman-Catholic identity of present-day HCOs. The second objective is to 
develop new perspectives on the possible meaning of this identity today for the 
moral responsibility of the HCO involved. With regard to this notion of 
responsibility, this study examines how institutional care can be a moral source for 
Catholic tradition, and how this tradition can be a moral source for institutional 
care and for the identity of HCOs themselves. This reciprocity in the notion of 
moral responsibility will be examined by arguing:  
a. that the Catholic identity of an HCO can offer a framework to individuals in the 
organization to orient them in the development of their identity;  
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b. that the Catholic identity can orient organizations with regard to the question 
how to behave as moral agents of the institution of healthcare, given the 
tensions between different institutional settings HCOs are operating in;  
c. that experiences in the practices of institutional care can be constitutive for 
Catholic identity; 
d. that Catholic HCOs can contribute to the Church and its moral teachings.  
 
In pursuing this objective this study will contribute to three debates:  
1. The debate on organizational ethics. Until now bioethics has been mainly 
focused on issues at the micro-level: clinical-ethical decisions of and between 
caregivers and care-receivers; and at the macro-level of society, in particular on 
issues regarding distributive justice. These fields of research are recognizable in 
the definition of bioethics, formulated in 1992: “The study of ethical, social, 
legal, and other related issues arising in health care and the biological sciences.” 
(Singer, 1993: 298) Although this definition does not explicitly exclude the level 
of organizational ethics, it also allows its neglect. That this in fact has been the 
case, is demonstrated in a recent paper: traditionally trained clinical ethicists 
appear to have a lack in knowledge and understanding of organizational 
decision making processes, and in organizational ethics (Silva et al, 2008). Also 
Bulger and Cassel note that “healthcare institutions are often overlooked in 
discussions of healthcare policy, biomedical ethics, and the allocation of 
resources” (Bulger, Cassel, 2004: 1087) This examination of the meaning of 
Catholic identity is a way to reflect on the responsibility of organizations as 
moral agents of healthcare.  
2. The debate within the Church between its leadership and Catholic HCOs. From 
the perspective of leadership in the Church, healthcare is perceived as a 
ministry of the Church, which means, according to, for instance, Mgr. Barragán, 
that a Catholic HCO “bases its identity on the mission received by the Church 
from Christ to heal the sick (Lk 9: 1-2)” (Barragán, 1999: 61). To Barragán, at 
that time president of the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health 
Care Workers, a Catholic hospital is “first and foremost motivated by the 
developing within its walls the exercise of Christian charity towards the sick. 
(…) When the Gospel message and Christian charity are those which are 
practiced, lived out and taught by the Catholic Church then that hospital may be 
deemed to be Catholic.”(ibidem: 61). An indispensable precondition for being 
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regarded as Catholic is that the HCO accepts the Magisterium of the Church and, 
reversely, is recognized as ‘Catholic’ by the relevant ecclesiastical authority. This 
study will not question the ecclesiastical approach, of which Barragán offers an 
example. But we will emphasize what the Church can learn from the 
experiences of Catholic HCOs with care. Catholic HCOs are a ministry to the 
Church, and not only a ministry of the Church. 
3. The debate on the role of moral theology. This is part of the debate mentioned in 
the previous point between the Church and Catholic HCOs. As opposed to those 
leaders in the Church who approach moral problems out of a corpus of fixed 
moral principles, and expect moral theologians to just demonstrate the 
plausibility of these principles, we sympathize with those moral theologians 
who argue in favor of the relevance of experience, as a source of moral 
knowledge in its own regards, in addition to Divine revelation in Scripture and 
tradition. For instance David Kelly argues that neither faith, nor its institutional 
embeddedness in Catholic identity, are just predispositions for a passive 
obedience to the moral teachings of the Church, but also ask for an active search 
for intelligibility (Kelly, 2004). Vosman and Leget argue that moral theological 
reflection should start with reflecting on experiences, with an examination of 
what is experienced as good and evil and why, and with trying to clarify how 
Christian tradition offers a framework to articulate these implicated goods and 
evils (Vosman, Leget, 2007). We as well will argue that experiences in care offer 
a source for moral knowledge about God’s will.  
 
7. Limitations 
This study focuses on the meaning of the relation between Catholic tradition and 
healthcare organizations, as opposed to a focus on the meaning of Catholic belief 
for individuals. Also, much of what will be said may also be true or valuable for 
HCO’s with a Protestant identity, because of a commonly shared Christian 
tradition. Often the text uses the terms Catholic and Christian indiscriminately, 
unless it focuses on the Catholic part only. Every time the text uses the term 
‘religion’, it refers to Christian religion, unless mentioned otherwise. We do not 
claim the research and its conclusions applicable to Islam and other world 
religions.  
 The focus on Catholic tradition enables us to develop a more specific insight in a 
single tradition. The study draws on the assumption, however, that the limitation 
 Introduction 
35 
to one single tradition constitutes a challenge to other traditions to reflect on their 
own specific approaches.  
 
8. Methods 
The first characteristic of this study is that it largely draws on hermeneutics in the 
sense Taylor uses this term referring to  Gadamer: ”the inquirer’s own knowledge, 
beliefs and values cannot but shape his or her interpretation of a particular society, 
group or event.” (Abbey, 2000: 160). The inquirer of this study is committed to 
Catholic tradition, and the objectives of this study demonstrate his interest in 
discovering meanings of this tradition for nowadays healthcare. Consequently, this 
study is not objective in the sense of objectivity in the natural sciences: that all who 
read it should come to the same evaluations and conclusions. This kind of 
objectivity would only be possible by leaving out the meaning that things have for 
people. The natural sciences, as Dilthey holds, seek to focus on the way things 
behave independently of human involvement, while human sciences take account 
of this involvement. They aim at understanding the lived experience in a concrete 
historical life. The natural sciences abstract from the dimension of meaning in 
human experiences, but human sciences start with the assumption that leaving out 
this dimension makes any understanding of, for instance, ethical and spiritual 
issues in healthcare impossible. The very essence of the human sciences is 
understanding (‘verstehen’), while natural sciences strive for explanation 
(‘erklären’) (Makkreel 1998). This understanding is not a subjective enterprise in 
the sense of being merely individual, since its methods consists of critical analysis 
of phenomena and arguments that can be intersubjectively assessed with regard to 
consistency and rationality.  
 When we apply these ideas to this study, it is clear that we interpret the human 
significance of care and the Christian tradition of care for the mission, behaviors 
and policies of Catholic HCOs in modern Western culture. The investigation of this 
significance is an indispensable part of a rational enquiry of Christian tradition as a 
potentially valuable moral source for modern western healthcare. It is not 
motivated by an interest in the mere survival of Catholic HCOs or an interest in 
strengthening individual Catholics in their beliefs.  
 The interest in Catholic tradition is not to be interpreted as an advance positive 
appraisal. Too much harm has been done to individuals in history by the Church or 
religious organizations. Also at the level of charity there is ambiguity: it is a fact 
Chapter 1 
36 
that Catholic nuns gave care to persons who needed care, but were deprived of it. 
It is also a fact that there has been a lot of heartlessness in this care, both towards 
the ones who depended on it, and the nuns who gave it (Van Heijst, 2008). As a 
Dutch saying goes: `Sisters of Love (as the Sisters of Charity called themselves in 
the Netherlands) could turn into Bitches of Mercy’. Catholic healthcare practices 
are, therefore, ambiguous.  
 The commitment to Catholic tradition also discloses some biographical traces. 
For about twenty years the principal researcher was professionally employed in 
the Catholic Association of Care Institutes in the Netherlands (KVZ, Katholieke 
Vereniging van Zorginstellingen). In this quality he dealt with issues of 
organizational management and policy of Catholic HCOs. In addition, he has been 
committed to the practice of care since the time he worked as a professional nurse, 
and, later, as a university teacher in medical ethics.  
 A second characteristic of this study is that it is largely based on a research of 
the literature, and to a relatively small extent on empirical research. Empirical data 
are used in this introduction, with respect to the role of religion, and in Chapter 6. 
The literature, relevant to the different chapters was gathered through Pubmed, 
Medline and library catalogues searches. With regard to Taylor, we used the 
primary sources of Taylor, secondary sources about Taylor, as well as critical 
comments of his works. The emphasis on literature may lead to criticisms of one-
sidedness, which is, moreover, at odds with what we stated in the beginning: that 
the meaning of Catholic tradition has to be discovered in concrete situations and 
practices. This criticism contains some truth. However, for Catholic tradition to 
have some meaning, one also needs an analysis of the barriers and problems of 
invoking this tradition. Insights into theory that is available in the literature can be 
of great help for such an analysis.  
 Third, the study is designed as a work-in-progress. This is a direct consequence 
of composing a thesis based on a series of journal articles, and of the time between 
preparing and writing an article and the date of publication. For instance, the first 
paper was prepared in 2000, but published in 2002. It is now Chapter 2 in this 
study. In the meantime there have been new developments, among which the 
fundamental change with regard to the position of religions since 9/11. Also, 
insights into the main research question have deepened, as well as insights in the 
works of Taylor. Moreover, Taylor published several works during the preparation 
of this study. From the beginning the main focus has been on Sources of the Self 
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(1989) and Ethics of Authenticity (1991b; originally published under the title The 
Malaise of Modernity, 1991a). These works have been the main references also for 
following papers. But during the preparation of this study, A Catholic Modernity? 
(1999), Varieties of Religion today (2002), Modern Social Imaginaries (2004), and 
finally A Secular Age (2007) became available. In this study this most recent book 
has certainly not received the attention it deserves, but it offers a rich source for 
future research.  
 Finally, the main question of this study has remained the same from the 
beginning, but at the same time the background to this question continued to 
develop. That is the reason why it has not been sufficient to sketch the background 
as it was at the start, but also as it is now. This more extensive description in this 
introductory chapter also aims to show that the question is still relevant to our 
times.  
 
9. Outline 
The work-in-progress characteristic of this study is mirrored in its outline. It is 
structured in three parts: introduction, followed by five chapters on different 
themes, and a concluding chapter. The five chapters constitute the main body of 
this thesis and can be divided into two parts: a more theoretical (Chapter 2-4) , and 
a more practice-oriented part (Chapter 5-6).  
 Chapter 2 raises the question why this study of the relation between Catholic 
tradition and HCOs needs a social-ethical approach. It considers the reflections on 
the moral responsibility of an HCO, which is the object of organizational ethics, a 
branch of social ethics. It argues that discussions of humane care or meaningful life 
can not be disconnected from their social and cultural contexts. It also introduces 
Charles Taylor as the philosopher of modern culture who strongly pleads for 
articulation of our moral sources, and who criticizes tendencies in modern culture 
to hide and privatize them as the only way to deal with the prevailing pluralism.  
 Chapter 3 discusses why problems in embracing a Catholic identity can be 
understood from certain specific characteristics of modern culture. An explanation 
has been sought in Taylor’s critical analysis of the contemporary ethics of non-
articulation. In its reference to a Catholic framework Catholic identity shares the 
problem common to all moral frameworks: that modern culture tends to hide 
them. But, by hiding these frameworks, modern culture jeopardizes its own 
achievements.  
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 Chapter 4 studies the question why institutional moral responsibility and 
organization’s identity are interdependent. We apply Taylor’s dimensions of 
identity - a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one – to HCOs. However, because 
Taylor neglects the organizational level, we turn to Ricoeur to make a transition 
from Taylor’s focus on the identity of persons and modern culture to 
organizational identity.  
 Chapter 5 raises the question why it is relevant to publicly articulate Catholic 
identity on the organization’s website, despite pluralism and secularization. It 
partly makes use of empirical research in some Catholic HCOs in the United States. 
We approach the relevance of this articulation from an organizational, an 
ecclesiastical and a philosophical perspective. We argue that by articulating their 
identity Catholic HCOs can contribute to moral dialogues within their own 
organization and in modern, pluralistic societies, and can create a background to 
interpret their experiences in the practice of care as sources of moral knowledge 
for the Church.  
 Chapter 6 asks whether and, if yes, how Catholic HCO can contribute to the 
preservation of solidarity in healthcare. We first argue that, as all healthcare 
organizations, Catholic ones can also embody and strengthen solidarity by just 
doing their quintessential job, i.e. to care for people with ill health. Second, we 
focus on the Catholic identity of these organizations and argue that it can empower 
a radical commitment to solidarity. Finally, we argue that Catholic social teaching 
provides a critical ethical framework for approaching solidarity from the 
perspective of the common good.  
 Because all these chapters deal with Catholic identity, modern culture and 
Charles Taylor, but were originally published in different journals, some 
reiteration of arguments is unavoidable. These chapters also discuss some current 
problems in HCOs, like tensions between care and market processes, or between 
care and technology. Here, too, is some duplication, for the same reason.  
 The final Chapter 7 presents and discusses the main findings and conclusions.  
 
10. Terminology 
This section clarifies the meaning of some terms that have been used throughout 
the study.  
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10.1. Western countries.  
These will be understood geographically as countries in the North-Atlantic region, 
in particular the United States, Canada, and North-West Europe.  
 
10.2. Modern Western culture 
Western culture transcends geographical borders. It is marked by a plurality of 
roots, derived from ancient Greek and Rome, Christianity, humanism and 
Enlightenment, Romanticism and socialism, the industrial revolution and its 
critical counter movements in socialism and Marxism. It attaches great value to the 
dignity and uniqueness of individual persons, to their fundamental equality and 
freedom, to the inviolability of every human life, and to the universality of these 
fundamental values. It believes rationality to be the driving force behind progress. 
Testimony of its commonly shared goods is given, among others, by the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, signed on 
4 April 1997 in Oviedo, Spain. This Convention states the primacy of the human 
being and the equitable access to healthcare of appropriate quality (Council of 
Europe, 1997), and which demonstrates many similarities with U.S. federal 
precepts (Dommel, Alexander 1997). Traces of this culture can be found 
worldwide.  
 We talk about modern, and not about postmodern culture. Postmodernism 
consists of certain views, that, in Taylor’s own characterization, stand outside the 
structures he is talking about (Taylor 2007:10). Moreover, postmodernism is 
rather an collection of views, than a certain specific view on culture. It is 
characterized by terms like the end of the subject, history or the great narratives, 
or new individualism, or neo-modernization (Rosa 1998, 305). We will, therefore, 
follow the terminology of Taylor, the more because in his work the postmodern 
criticism on modernity and its sometimes pessimistic stance towards modernity 
return in many respects in Taylor’s own critical reflections on modern culture.  
 
10.3. Modern healthcare 
Modern healthcare is the kind of healthcare as it developed in Western culture. It 
consists of a great diversity of provisions for public and individual health, aiming at 
the restoration of health, the prevention and the cure of diseases, the care of the 
sick and handicapped, and the alleviation of suffering. It is marked by a rational 
and analytic approach of diseases, and secular in the sense that it broke with 
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former and still existing sacral interpretations of diseases and medicine. Modern 
medicine relies on a scientific and evidence based approach, and strives for 
unraveling the mechanisms that cause diseases, and for curing them if possible.  
 
10.4. Christian tradition 
Christianity is perceived as a tradition, consisting of certain beliefs in a 
transcendent, divine reality, and of practices and institutions. The term ‘tradition’ 
itself has a double meaning. On the one hand it suggest a more or less fixed reality, 
like in ‘the moral tradition of the Church prescribes A, and forbids B.’ On the other 
hand the term tradition itself refers to the Latin tradere, which expresses an 
activity of ‘passing on’. This process of passing on presupposes interpretations of 
meanings, and, therefore, conversations and dialogues on the relevance and truth 
of these meanings. Since interpretations inherently belong to traditions, traditions 
also exist as living realities. In is in this double sense that also Taylor uses the term 
tradition. He states that in developing our Self and our moral convictions, we never 
start from a zero point but necessarily from a pre-existent context. We start with a 
past, and we come after what has already been given. But we also develop our Self, 
which means, that we translate this past into our present and our future. In that 
sense we come before what is passed on. Alisdair MacIntyre uses the terms 
‘tradition-constituted’ and ‘tradition-constitutive’, to make comprehensible how 
we are both constituted by traditions, and constitute traditions (Kuna, 2005). It 
follows that Christianity, taken as a tradition, is not only understood as a past that 
belongs to the constitutive elements of modern culture, but also as a living present 
that is constituted by modern culture by the way it is interpreted, and by the 
conflicts it raises. In short, we understand Christianity both as a given and a living 
tradition, which together with other traditions, for instance Enlightenment, has 
shaped modern culture, and is still doing so. More specifically, we investigate how 
HCOs, which by their history and policies are constituted by the given Catholic 
tradition, may also be constitutive for a living Catholic tradition. 
 
10.5. Practice 
The term ‘practice’ is partly used as in daily usage: if we refer to how things go in 
‘practice’, we mean how things go in everyday reality of, for instance, a hospital. In 
a philosophical sense practice refers to a kind of human activity. A well-known 
definition is offered by MacIntyre: “any coherent and complex form of socially 
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established human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” (MacIntyre, 1984: 187). 
Central in this definition is that a practice is an established activity through which 
goods are realized that are internal to that activity.  
 MacIntyre, however, makes a connection between practices and goods that may 
not be as obvious as he assumes. It is often not clear, in particular for people who 
participate in a practice, for instance the practice of care, what exactly these goods 
are. A lack of clarity poses a problem for realizing them, and makes them sensitive 
to distortion or suppression. Many people experience a moral uneasiness with, for 
instance, the rise of pragmatic, merely result-oriented thinking in healthcare, but 
are not able to (precisely) articulate what goods ‘internal to the practice of care’ 
are threatened. Nor is it possible, then, to critically reflect on shifting goods, and, 
hence, on changes in practices. A practice of care in which, for instance, concern 
with patients is central differs from a practice dominated by evidence-based 
effects, or by consumer-satisfaction.  
 We will make use, therefore, of the more limited definition of Taylor, qualified 
by himself as “extremely vague and general. (Practices are) more or less stable 
configurations of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of 
dos and don’ts” (Taylor, 1989: 204). A practice is, for instance, the way we greet 
each other in the street, or the way we raise our children. Inherent to practices are 
certain ideas – moral ideals or certain concepts of the Self, resembling therefore 
MacIntyre’s goods – that mostly stay hidden and unarticulated. It is Taylor’s main 
plea to bring these ideas to the surface by means of articulation. By achieving such 
articulations, the explicated goods can further the reflection on practices and 
empower people to engage with these practices.  
 
10.6. Care 
Drawing on Joan Tronto, care is defined as a “species activity that includes 
everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can 
live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our 
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” 
(Tronto, 1993: 103).  
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 By calling care a ‘species activity’, Tronto deliberatively distances herself from 
the widely shared assumption that care is dyadic and individualistic, mirroring a 
romanticized idea of a mother-child relation. Care is also institutional and 
organizational. The all-inclusive character of her definition allows us to 
understand the existence and maintenance of healthcare and healthcare 
organizations as caring activities of the human species: by these structures a 
society demonstrates its engagement and its activities. It complies with a moral 
obligation: “For a society to be judged as a morally admirable society, it must, 
among other things, adequately provide for care of its members and its 
territory.”(Tronto, 1993: 126). The other elements in her definition are relevant to 
this study as well. The aim to maintain, continue, and repair our world 
distinguishes care from other activities directed to living as well as possible; the 
pursuit of pleasure, industrial activity, creating art are not care. The possessive 
pronoun ‘our’ expresses that care is always culturally, historically, and socially 
mediated.  
 Tronto also criticizes the idea that care is solely a disposition. In her view, care 
is both a disposition to reach out to something or someone other than the self, and 
a practice. To address care as only a disposition makes it a kind of ‘natural’ 
possession, or even an emotion of an individual, in particular of women, according 
to prevailing ideologies, and easy to sentimentalize and privatize. Such a reduction 
to a disposition confirms the boundaries between public and private, and between 
people-in-charge (mostly men), and people who perform the ‘more inferior’ tasks. 
By defining it as both a disposition and a practice Tronto aims to introduce a 
politically relevant concept of care (ibidem: 118 – 119). 
 In the context of this study of sources of care we agree with the criticism of the 
Dutch care-ethicist, van Heijst, that Tronto pays too little attention to the 
dimension of motives and inspiration (Heijst, 2006: 76-77). This aspect is relevant, 
because it directly relates to the moral responsibility of HCOs: to foster and uphold 
this motivation, and to critically reflect, and eventually change circumstances in 
the organization that weaken this motivation.  
 
10.7. Source 
The term ‘source’ is a key-term in Taylor’s studies. We will extensively deal with it 
in the next chapters. For the moment, we will confine ourselves to a working 
definition. A source combines a moral as well as a spiritual good. It defines the 
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moral goodness of something, and the power to pursue it. Sources of care explain 
why caring for another is morally good, and empower someone to practice such 
care. Sources can be of a secular nature: for instance, the need of a fellow human 
being makes care a morally praiseworthy activity, and the care-giver is driven by 
the awareness of the right of every individual to care. For many caregivers, the 
caring relation itself is an energizing source. A source of a religious nature could 
be: the care for another person is an answer to God’s care for us, and is part of the 
way one tries to observe a religious life.  
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Humane healthcare as a theme for social ethics 
 
Martien Pijnenburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The concept of ‘humane healthcare’ cannot and may not be limited to a personal 
virtue. For elucidating its meaning and making it functional as a critical ethical 
criterion for healthcare as a social institution, it is necessary to reflect on the social, 
cultural, and historical conditions in which modern healthcare finds its offspring 
and its further development. Doing this is the object and aim of social ethics. Social 
ethics in itself covers a broad area of different approaches. A main division can be 
made between a liberal and a communitarian approach. This article focuses on the 
latter and concentrates on one of its representatives, Charles Taylor. The paper 
starts with two clarifying paragraphs: one about the terms humane and human, a 
second about the scope of social ethics. Next, because the term humane 
presupposes a certain view of man, attention will be paid to the lack of consensus 
in this respect within modernity, using some reflections of Taylor. In his view, 
resigning in this lack is a threat for one of the main motives behind modernity: the 
pursuit of a good and meaningful life. In the following section Taylor’s analysis is 
applied to contemporary healthcare, by means of two examples. At the end the 
question is raised how to promote humane healthcare. In a short and conclusive 
sketch, three suggestions are offered for further research: scrutiny of goals and 
meanings within healthcare and culture, the broadening of the concept of 
autonomy and the upholding of human dignity as an intrinsic and imperative 
value. 
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Introduction 
In this article I will elaborate the importance of a social-ethical approach of 
humaneness, a qualifying criterion for moral judgments about healthcare as a 
social institution. This criterion is, although often used for evaluating healthcare 
and human acting within healthcare, problematic when we try to define its exact 
meaning. In a very general sense we could say that humane refers to what is fitting 
for a human being. But then the problem is not really solved, but shifted to the 
question what fits a human being. The first objective of this article is to show that 
the latter question cannot be disconnected from cultural and traditional 
conceptions of the good life and the good, human beings are striving at. The second 
objective consists in an attempt to make these conditions accessible for a social-
ethical reflection. For elaborating both objectives, I will appeal to the Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor.1 In general, he is considered a representative of the 
communitarian philosophy (Buchanan, 1995).  
 In his view, one of the essentials of being human and of developing self-identity 
is the strive for a good and meaningful life. In addition, making an own identity is 
always a project, situated in and in permanent dialogue with already existing 
‘horizons of meaning’, interconnected with concrete communities, languages and  
traditions. However, the culture of modernity is profoundly ambivalent in the way 
it deals with such horizons. Taylor considers the pursuit for a good and meaningful 
life as the big empowering force behind modern achievements such as individual 
freedom, the emphasis on ordinary life and the worldwide efforts to alleviate 
human suffering. But at the same time there is a widespread attempt in moral 
theory and contemporary thinking to deny or to hide the basic assumptions, or the 
basic moral frameworks, which motivate these achievements. 
 Although Taylor is not specifically dealing with healthcare, except in some 
examples to illustrate his interpretation of modernity, I think his analysis of 
modernity offers an entrance to gain insight in the humaneness or inhumaneness 
of modern healthcare. An example used by Taylor himself: the appeal to 
instrumental reason, as a means for building up a good and meaningful life, is one 
of the characteristics of modernity. Instrumental rationality enlarges our range of 
possibilities to alleviate human suffering. But when it becomes an end in itself, 
when it gets disengaged of what a human being is, namely an embodied, dialogical 
and temporal nature, instrumental rationality turns into inhumaneness. “Runaway 
extensions of instrumental reason, such as medical practice that forgets the patient 
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as a person, that takes no account of how the treatment relates to his or her story 
and thus of the determinants of hope and despair, that neglects the essential 
rapport between care-giver and patient – all these have to be resisted in the name 
of the moral background in benevolence that justifies these applications of 
instrumental reason themselves” (Taylor, 1991: 106). 
 
1. Terminology 
According to the dictionary (Webster, 1996), ‘humane’ means in the first place: 
“having or showing kindness and tenderness; compassionate.” Secondly it refers to 
“tending to refine; polite; elegant.” The first meaning is paramount, which is 
illustrated by its synonyms: “benevolent, benignant, charitable, clement, 
compassionate, forgiving, gentle, gracious, human, kind, kind-hearted, merciful, 
pitying, sympathetic, tender, tender-hearted.” Humane “denotes what is rightly to 
be expected of mankind at its best in the treatment of sentient beings; a humane 
enterprise or endeavor is one that is intended to prevent or relieve suffering.”  
 ‘Humane’ therefore appoints to certain morally praiseworthy characteristics of 
men. It stands for what a human being is at his best and to how we have to behave 
morally – at least idealistically – towards fellow human beings (or towards the 
non-human nature: animals). ‘Human’ is “pertaining to or characterizing man or 
mankind” and “possessed by of suitable for man”. So human can be a synonym for 
humane or a reference to the species of men. This double meaning makes clear that 
the concept of ‘humane’ is closely connected to a certain view of a human being. 
 In the expression ‘humane healthcare’ humane appears as adjective of a social 
institution or organization, and not of individual healthcare providers. Of course, 
without any humane healthcare providers the institution of healthcare will never 
be able to fulfill the standard of humaneness. But when a certain organization or 
institution is called humane, a certain characteristic is meant that surpasses the 
extent in which individuals working there show kindness and tenderness. That 
characteristic can be so strong and solid, that it compensates the lack of humane 
capacities of some of those individuals. So the concept of ‘humane’ can function 
both as a measure for judging the moral quality of the healthcare institution, and as 
an ideal or goal, worthwhile to pursue. The concept of humane healthcare may not 
and can not be privatized to personal virtues. A prudential argument for this is, 
that preaching about humaneness while leaving aside inhumane structures is the 
best recipe for unsatisfied patients and burn out of humane workers. 
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 Taylor suggests a more fundamental view. Developing an identity as a human 
being is always a dialogical process between a subject and the given frameworks of 
social and cultural values and interlocutors by whom he is surrounded (Taylor, 
1989: 25–32). In the same way the developing of a moral identity, in casu of the 
moral identity of a caregiver, is an ongoing process of interaction between the 
individual and the institutions in which he is embedded. So the question becomes 
crucial to what extent these institutions are promoting or threatening humaneness 
in care-giving.  
 When we take a closer look into what can be ‘rightly expected of mankind at its 
best in the treatment of sentient beings’, we are confronted with a lack of 
consensus on what ‘mankind at its best’ stands for. In a globalizing and pluralistic 
world different conceptions compete with each other. Its contents are influenced 
by social, cultural, economical and historical circumstances. Humaneness therefore 
seems to be a concept that necessarily has to be the object of a permanent quest 
for meaning (MacIntyre, 1981) rather than a fixed and universal criterion. For 
Taylor, this quest is the object of his scrutiny of modernity. In his observations, for 
several reasons the question of what it means to be a human being is in a way 
removed from the agenda of modernity. One of them is, that according to modern 
philosophy, this dimension of our moral consciousness is “confused and irrelevant” 
(Taylor, 1989: 4). Other reasons are inherent to the question: articulating of what 
it means to be a human being, or what a good and meaningful life stands for are at 
tension with pluralism and are marked by tentativity and uncertainty in their 
formulations (ibidem: 8–10). As a result, an ethics of inarticulacy, of silence about 
our deepest moral and spiritual intuitions came up, particularly in naturalistic 
philosophies.  
 For Taylor this predicament is unsatisfying because silence and non-articulation 
can threaten the achievements of modernity. These achievements, like individual 
freedom, can degenerate in mere subjectivism and atomism when they are not 
permanently mirrored against their original sources. Moreover, the commitment 
to these achievements and the further developing of them can weaken by 
amputating their sources. “Articulacy here has a moral point, not just in correcting 
what may be wrong views but also in making the force of an ideal that people are 
already living by more palpable, more vivid for them: and by making it more vivid, 
empowering them to live up to it in a fuller and more integral fashion” (Taylor, 
1991: 22). 
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 Applied to humane healthcare institutions, one could hold, that articulating of 
the humane ideals of a society underlying giving care to sick, disabled and dying 
fellow-citizens and behind the institutionalization of this care in a healthcare 
system, is necessary as a moral source, as a motivational source and as a critical 
stance against possible institutional inhumanities. Therefore, scrutinizing 
healthcare from a social-ethical perspective becomes a necessity. 
 
2. What is social ethics? 
In the context of this article, I will limit myself to some basic issues.2  Social ethics is 
in the first place ethics: a systematic and critical reflection on concepts or 
convictions concerning the good life and the right acts, which are acknowledged as 
guiding in and for a given community. In other words, ethics is reflection on 
morals, on behalf of good praxis.  
 In the second place, social ethics is ethics of the social. The social can be 
described as the variety of interactions between individuals and society, in as far 
as these interactions have a certain constancy and regularity; in other words, have 
an institutional character. Examples of such social institutions are economy, the 
political and judicial system, culture and religion, science, family life. Healthcare is 
another example and at the same time a good illustration of the complexity of 
social institutions. Its primary goal is to promote health and to take care for the 
sick. But healthcare is much more than only healthcare: it is also an important 
economic sector, it is one of the greatest employers in our society, it is an area of 
very fundamental and very influential research, and sometimes it looks like a 
battlefield of social, political and economical powers. One of the main topics for 
social ethics is how these different interests can be combined and ranked, for 
instance in the search for a just and fair distribution of scarce resources. Additional 
topics are the scrutiny of the actual conceptions and models of justice which are at 
work in practice, and of the desirable conception of justice. 
 Social ethics is not a specific system, rather it contains in itself a diversity of 
systems. It stands for a certain perspective on moral responsibility by relating 
individual responsibility to the actual social, cultural, economic and historical 
conditions. To clarify the essence of this perspective, social ethics is usually 
compared with individual ethics. 
 Individual ethics concentrates on the goodness or badness of individual 
behavior within a given social context. It reduces the praxis to individuals and their 
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responsibility and situates them in personal relations. It looks to individual acts, 
motives, intentions, attitudes or virtues. It takes into account the circumstances 
and the consequences of individual moral choices of behavior. For instance: is it 
morally right to tell the true diagnosis to this concrete patient? On what grounds 
can I, or must I stop treating this patient? Most of the casuistry in clinical ethics 
belongs to the domain of individual ethics. 
 Social ethics concentrates on the goodness or badness of the social. Relations 
between people are considered not as personal, but institutional and influenced by 
prevailing values in our culture. In short one can say that social ethics is a 
reflection on the goodness and badness of social institutions created by men. 
 Individual ethics includes reflection on what lies behind and around individual 
choices: intentions, motives, circumstances and consequences.  Social ethics, at the 
contrary, includes reflection of collective values, prevailing views of men and 
society, social, cultural, historical roots and consequences for groups of citizens. An 
example: a social-ethical reflection on embryo-research will include a reflection on 
the value and impact of predictive medicine, on the cultural dominating view of 
men and of health and illness which is implicated, and on the consequences, for 
instance, for handicapped people.  
 The social context is not, as is the case in individual ethics, taken for granted, but 
as an object of analysis and ethical judgment and to a certain, but for social ethics 
decisive extent, accessible for changes. Social ethics starts from the presumption 
that our social institutions and the way they are functioning are ultimately 
submitted to human responsibility. They are created and brought to existence by 
men to guarantee values and interactions that are considered essential for the 
good life and the good society. The idea of institutions as human artefacts has to be 
kept in mind to keep open the possibility of changing or modifying the institution 
when desired and to resist the idea that social institutions live their own life and 
that nobody can do anything about it. But such as social institutions can be seen as 
human artifacts, so human beings can be seen, to a certain extent, as institutional 
artifacts. That is to say, we all are children of our cultural, social and historical 
conditions. There is no morally neutral situation, no zero point. Every praxis of a 
doctor begins in the track of already existing practices. A doctor is both an 
individual person and a functionary within a social system. A new book, a new 
thought is constructed by a language, by concepts and by meanings that were 
already there (Ricoeur, 1995, 1968). 
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 Given these two sides of the coin of moral responsibility one has to reflect on 
the right proportion between the personal and the social, the individual and the 
institutional. Here also begins the diversity in philosophical systems. Liberalism, 
for instance Nozick, puts the emphasis on the individual and individual liberty 
(Nozick, 1974). Rawls constructs his rules for social justice on the basis of a 
hypothetical contract between free and equal individuals (Rawls, 1973). 
Communitarians start from communities and the influence on human behavior of 
social conditions and of traditions.3 
 This communitarian approach is, in my view, particularly relevant for a social-
ethical approach of healthcare, because it introduces the attention to the 
humaneness or inhumaneness of its social and cultural conditions, – in terms of 
Taylor: ‘horizons of meaning’ or implicit ‘moral frameworks’ – and its 
underpinning presumptions and values. When we speak about humaneness, we 
cannot disconnect it from ideas, presumptions and preferences that are explicitly 
or implicitly present in our culture. 
 
3. The lack of consensus 
As we saw above, the standard of humaneness is based on the one hand on a 
certain view of man. But on the other hand, one of the features of contemporary 
western cultures is the lack of consensus in this respect. Religious, philosophical 
and cultural pluralism results in a multitude of private convictions. According to 
one conviction one could interpret humane in a liberal sense as ‘respecting every 
patient as an autonomous and self-determining person’. According to a more 
communitarian sense one could hold that ‘humane’ stands for respecting a 
person’s fundamental dependency and contingency. One of the characteristics of 
contemporary moral relativism is that both convictions can claim equality in 
worth, because they are defended as personal beliefs or preferences. There is no 
single golden standard for humaneness. Moreover, from our history we have 
learned that it is very risky as well to found institutional practices on a single 
outlined conception of humane or inhumane. Every positive concept of man, or of 
humane or meaningful life suggests it to be universal, but it might be the 
particularistic construction of a specific society, or of a cultural and historical 
episode. Claims to universality can work out to be very oppressive, totalitarian and 
sometimes even deadly on some categories of people: look for instance at slavery, 
communism, and apartheid. 
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 As a result of the lack of consensus there is a tendency in modernity to scratch 
the whole issue of ‘view of man’ or ‘conceptions of the good life’ from the agenda 
and to appeal instead to the individual freedom to follow one’s own convictions, as 
long as these do not bring harm to others. A mere proceduralistic ethics is believed 
to be the only possible way to deal with moral dilemmas and issues (Taylor, 1989: 
85). 
 As we saw earlier, Taylor is resisting this tendency. In Part I of Sources of the Self 
he starts with the observation that ‘scratching’ from the agenda stands in 
opposition to the fact that we all do have moral and spiritual intuitions “about 
what makes our lives meaningful or fulfilling” (ibidem: 4). Or, with a different 
term, we all have ‘strong evaluations’: “discriminations of right or wrong, better or 
worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards 
by which they can be judged” (ibidem: 4). In earlier times, these intuitions or 
evaluations were embedded in and supported by clearly outlined external moral 
frameworks; for instance Christianity in the Middle Ages. In the process of 
modernization these external frameworks weakened and converted into private 
and subjective convictions. A person in search of a good and meaningful life cannot 
appeal anymore to an external concept but has to engage himself with a personal 
quest for meaning. The risk is that he fails, with a meaningless, empty life as result 
(ibidem: 18). 
 The paradox of modernity however lightens up when we see that on the one 
hand we all do subscribe to its main values, but on the other hand, strongly believe 
that we all have to make our own lives. Taylor mentions among other things the 
modern emphasis on individual freedom and authenticity; the positive affirmation 
of the ordinary life as the focus of the good life; the efforts to alleviate human 
suffering and to resist the violation of human rights; the awareness of the 
importance of human dignity. In other words, essential for shaping our identity is 
that we transcend the borders of a merely personal enterprise and give bearings to 
meaning and values outside and beyond ourselves. These meaning and values are 
at risk when modernity neglects the moral sources in which they find their 
offspring and by which they are originally motivated. Furthermore, modernity 
denies the importance of articulating such sources. Works of retrieval are needed 
to save the achievements of modernity from erosion and to strengthen them in 
their further development. 
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4. Modernity and healthcare 
How could we apply Taylor’s analysis of modernity to modern healthcare? As I said 
before, Taylor himself deals with healthcare only with some references to illustrate 
his point (see for instance the quote in the introduction). But some suggestions can 
be made. 
 First, there is between the areas of modernity, healthcare and ethics a 
methodological analogy in the search for humaneness, moving from the negative to 
the positive. Taylor starts with the opposites of truly human, authentic, liberating: 
individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason and the loss of political freedom. 
He characterizes these phenomena as the ‘malaises of modernity’ (Taylor, 1991). 
In his approach he uses these malaises as starting point for his scrutiny of the 
positive moral sources behind modernity. Also healthcare, although the name 
suggests otherwise, finds its starting point not in health, but in the lack or 
disturbance of health: in illness, diseases, or handicaps. Ethics reflects the same 
procedure: often the ethical search starts in the experience of contrast, dissensus 
or doubts and in emotions of indignation, anger or confusion; it starts, because the 
humanum is felt to be threatened, violated or unclear. These kind of experiences 
ask for analysis of their causes and backgrounds and can offer insights in the 
positive content of the humanum in this specific situation. So, when we are looking 
for humaneness in healthcare, it can be helpful to start with all daily experiences of 
inhumaneness. For instance, the coming up of palliative care started with 
uneasiness and criticism about the way healthcare was dealing with incurable and 
dying patients (Janssens, 2001). 
 Second, Taylor strongly defends his point of view, that a human being develops 
his own identity, but that this shaping of identity is not merely a personal or 
subjective enterprise. In the personal search for a good and meaningful life, a 
human being is essential dialogical. He is the author of a narrative, which is tied in 
all its respects with other persons and with available moral frameworks. He 
develops a ‘self’ in the context of an already existing moral space (Taylor, 1989:  
25–52). To gain insight in what is really significant for me as a person, I am relating 
and orienting myself to significances around me, in culture, concrete communities, 
prevailing traditions. But, when this is true, and I think it is, then it becomes crucial 
to analyze what conceptions of a good and meaningful life surround me. Then, too, 
it becomes crucial to make these conceptions the object of an ethical evaluation. 
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 I try to clarify Taylor’s point with a quote of a former Dutch minister of Health 
Care. Some years ago, imagining for herself the possibility of becoming an 
Alzheimer patient, she spoke the following words: “Whenever I will reach the 
point, that I don’t recognize my children anymore, then my life may be put to an 
end.” It is quite possible to hold this statement for the utterance of a strictly 
personal preference; as such it was meant and from a liberal perspective it can be 
respected or rejected, depending on one’s moral point of view. But at the same 
time her words are more than strictly personal. When valuing her own life under 
the prospective of dementia, she makes use, implicitly or explicitly, of meanings 
and concepts of the good human life that are present in our social-cultural 
environment. In the vacuum that developed after the decline of Western 
civilization’s dominant Christian view on men and society, a growing emphasis was 
laid on individual freedom and the realization of individual life plans. In this 
perspective, however, new cultural values filled the gap. More and more the 
concept of a good and meaningful life is filled with new qualities which are being 
considered as decisive for human flourishing (Zola, McKinlay, 1974). Among these 
qualities are: being healthy (a majority in the Netherlands considers this the main 
value in life), independence, self-determination, vitality, and the disposal of good 
mental abilities (Oderwald, Rolies, 1991: 50–51). As such these values are not new: 
they have been pursued as long as mankind has existed. New is that the disposal of 
such qualities has become an important condition for enjoying a good and 
meaningful life. This generates new dividing lines between haves and have-nots. 
The haves represent or at least come close to the cultural dominant ideals of the 
good life; the have-nots function below the standards. Our society looks after them, 
gives them as much care as they need, but their lives are considered the opposite 
of the real life. Against this cultural background, and as one of its implications, the 
minister makes a choice against such a life and opens the possibility for others to 
put an end to her life when it sinks below a certain standard. 
 The first question is how free such a wish is within the sketched cultural 
conceptions of the good life. The second question is to what extent her words, 
although meant as personal, but uttered in her public function as minister of 
health, influence the social morality and the social attitudes towards demented 
citizens. The public message of her words sounds: dead has to be preferred above a 
life struck by dementia. She is offering or reinforcing, probably unintended, a 
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moral framework in which Alzheimer patients are considered living a less valuable 
life. 
 A similar example, uttered not as a personal opinion, but as a more or less 
objective economic analysis, is an article, about 10 years ago, in a German 
newspaper about the growing costs of ageing (Diessenbacher, 1989). The author 
presents calculations and asks what the ethics of taking care for the aged and 
weakened people may cost. He concludes that people should receive care as long 
as they wish, but that part of the human dying process is that people make their 
own decisions about the length of their life and the moment of their death. So, the 
first calculation for older and disabled people is the cost of their – and I quote the 
words of one of the commentators – “Ballastexistenz” (aggravating existence, MP) 
and their “socialschädliches Dasein” (societal damaging life, MP). In this way they 
are given the freedom of self-determination concerning their own death. 
 These kinds of modern moral frameworks are far more specific than the general 
and cultural frameworks Taylor is pointing at. Nevertheless, these examples can be 
interpreted as illustrations of Taylor’s critique of the primacy of instrumental 
reason. Instrumental reason has gained weight in the project of modernity for 
realizing individual freedom and alleviating human suffering. But to the extent that 
instrumental reason dominates our lives and our efforts to alleviate suffering, its 
reverse side is that it “tends to empty life of its richness, depth or meaning” 
(Taylor, 1989: 500). The quote of the Minister of Health Care can be interpreted as 
a kind of instrumentalization of life itself. Life, or rather a certain modus of life, 
becomes a means to a meaningful life. Taylor stresses the point that respect for 
human life cannot be equated to certain qualities of life, nor in human experience, 
nor in the history of the sources of modernity. There is a dimension “beyond life” 
(Taylor 1999: 20) in which respect finds its deepest roots. 
 A second important observation is, that on the public level the imperative 
character of instrumentalization threatens individual freedom. Taylor admits, “in a 
society whose economy is largely shaped by market forces, for example, all 
economic agents have to give an important place to efficiency if they are going to 
survive” (Taylor, 1991: 97). In this respect, the German newspaper cannot be 
blamed for calculating the costs of aging. But respect for the elderly in society is 
really at stake when the sources for this respect are getting darkened by these 
sorts of calculations. Then we get captured in an ‘iron cage’ – a concept Taylor 
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borrows from Weber – in which notions underlying reasons to respect the elderly 
and the individual freedom of the elderly are severely weakened. 
 
5. How to promote humane healthcare? 
One of the major conclusions from the preceding descriptions is that the question 
how to promote a humane healthcare cannot be answered in a simple, one-
dimensional way. As complex as our modernity is, so complex is modern 
healthcare and so complex and multifaceted are situations in which the question 
for humaneness arises. A general wisdom is undoubtedly, that the best way to 
promote a humane healthcare lies in the willingness for permanently raising the 
question what in this situation, with respect to this patient or with respect to these 
categories of patients seems to be the most humane practice or policy. But a more 
specific look at healthcare allows for more specific suggestions. 
 First, the goals of healthcare should be thoroughly assessed in the light of 
technological, economical and societal developments. Its primary goals consist in 
promoting health, curing and preventing diseases, alleviating suffering and 
preventing untimely death. However, the context in which healthcare is provided 
and received is larger. For a patient, becoming or being ill is not only a matter of 
getting cured, but also an experience for raising questions of meaning. Every 
disturbance of health is a disturbance of life itself, of what is considered as 
meaningful for life, and of someone’s identity. Cherished values and meanings 
break adrift, new ones or new rankings of the existing ones stand out or are – 
sometimes in vain – searched for. Similar for the helping professions: the goals of 
these professions are rooted in deeper sources of benevolence, compassion, love 
or charity. Their commitment to give care to people is often realized in an 
instrumental way, but finds its offspring in other sources. Probably, the renewed 
revival of interest in spirituality can be partly explained by the fact that the 
dominance of instrumental reason leads to a hankering for deeper and richer 
meanings (Sulmasy, 1997). 
 Taylor’s scrutiny of modernity brings forward the suggestion, that these deeper 
and encompassing levels of patients and professionals are at risk. On the one hand, 
given a lack of consensus and given a dominance of instrumental reasoning, they 
are falsely reduced to merely personal, individualistic affairs, while in fact they find 
their offspring and their conditions for sustaining in sources external and beyond 
the individual. On the other hand, one way or the other, the vacuum is filled with 
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new meanings – health and independency, economic efficiency and utility, 
individual freedom – which become ends in themselves and then at variance with 
their actual status. Although intrinsically valuable, they also are means for living a 
full life and fostering a healthcare system that embodies the solidarity of a society 
with sick or disabled fellow-citizens. We can discover the weakness in humaneness 
by applying the dominant collective values, norms and views for instance to those 
of us who cannot meet these ideals: i.e. people who are weak in health, not 
independent, not vital, not in possession of vital physical and mental capacities, 
and unable to stand up for their rights. So this first point underlines the conclusion 
that the humaneness of healthcare is served by confronting the prevailing meaning 
of a full human life and of giving care with deeper understandings and motivations. 
 Second, the prevailing concept of autonomy asks for further clarification. 
Contemporary bioethics is giving great weight to individual autonomy. As such, 
this is an important progress compared with earlier paternalism and the 
dominance of medicine. But autonomy is misunderstood when it works out in an 
isolation of patients or caregivers out of their relations and surroundings. Being 
autonomous is always related to other people and situated within certain societal 
and cultural conditions and institutions. This being so is not at variance with 
autonomy itself. Autonomy, taken as the moral right to fulfill one’s own life-plan, is 
a dialogical concept. It materializes its original content when it gives due respect to 
a person as a unique, relational, social and spiritual being. Liberalism tends to 
stress only the first dimension, and to consider the other three as merely 
instrumental to the first. 
 Third, one of the major concepts of modern morality is the concept of human 
dignity. It has two important dimensions (Rendtorff, Kemp, 2000: 31–38). It is in 
the first place the expression of the intersubjective and public recognition of a 
distinct characteristic or aspect of personality. It is a quality somebody can acquire. 
In the second place, dignity refers to an intrinsic quality of a human being. This 
second meaning has strong roots in Christianity, which holds that every person has 
received an intrinsic value of God and is created in His image. Kant acknowledges 
the dignity in every human person and formulates the categorical imperative to 
treat the person always as an end-in-itself and never only as a means. Dignity in 
this second meaning became the dominant principle justifying human rights and 
all sorts of protest against situations in which dignity is violated. 
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 Human experience with diseases, suffering, and decay are often expressed in 
formulations such as losing one’s dignity, or being in a state of indignity. The quote 
of the former minister of Healthcare can be interpreted in that way. What is lost 
then, is dignity in its first dimension: the public recognition, of the public 
appearance of a human being. Dignity in its second dimension can never disappear 
or diminish (Pijnenburg, Kirkels, 2000). However, it can be respected or violated 
by certain practices of societal institutions. One of these violations is the equation 
of the two dimensions. This happens every time when it is believed that somebody 
loses his dignity as a person because of his state of illness or decay. Prevailing 
value-concepts in modern culture concerning human life are not offering a strong 
counterweight against such equations. 
 Another example of diminished respect for human dignity are judgments about 
quality of life as decisive for the meaning of life and, eventually, as a moral 
justification for the termination of life. This risk is at greatest when the person 
involved is not able to speak for himself and other people make such judgments 
instead. 
 A last example is a healthcare system which favors cure at the expense of care. 
Such a system reflects and reinforces an anthropology arguing that investments in 
curable patients are socially more valuable than investments in the incurable or 
less spectacular patients. Human dignity then is degraded to an economical value: 
the price a society is willing to pay for their healthcare. 
 These three suggestions – scrutinizing the actual and the deeper meanings 
present in healthcare and culture, the broadening of the concept of autonomy and 
the upholding of dignity as an intrinsic and imperative value – do not yield a 
blueprint for promoting a humane healthcare. Thinking that this will be possible is 
in contradiction with the complexities of healthcare and the way ethics as a 
philosophical or theological discipline proceeds. But they do outline some 
orientations and critical sources for ensuring that the issue of humane healthcare 
not ceases to exist. Whether it is humane and what sorts of inhumanities it 
contains must be permanently on the agenda of ethicists, healthcare workers, 
patients and society. 
 
Notes 
1.  I will refer to Taylor’s Sources of the Self, Ethics of Authenticity and A Catholic Modernity.  
2.  I will use several references: Anzenbacher, De Graaf, Kerber. 
3.  Besides all underlying differences, this is the common theme amongst different 
communitarian philosophers like Taylor, MacIntyre and Walzer. See also: Buchanan, 1995. 
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Abstract 
The articulation of Catholic identity is a problem partly caused by modern culture. 
According to Taylor, this culture tends to reduce any conception of the good to 
something merely private and optional, and therefore not in need for any 
articulation. We argue that this feature of modern culture also affects the identity 
of Catholic organizations: they as well are hindered to articulate the moral goods 
and sources that are distinctive for their Catholic identity. Reasons for non-
articulation are partly epistemological, such as embodied in naturalism. 
Naturalism considers the world neutral in itself, and values and goods merely 
subjective. Partly, reasons for non-articulation are moral. Among others: 
articulation of moral sources is considered by definition particularistic, and 
considered at odds with respecting pluralism. However, silence about the sources 
that gave an impetus to modern culture, endangers the achievements if this 
culture. We will demonstrate this danger, using the role technology and economics 
have in modern culture and healthcare as an example. In the end we conclude that 
Catholic should articulate and revitalize their own sources, not necessarily for the 
sake of saving their Catholicity, but in order to reconnect modern healthcare with 
some of its own original sources, to maintain a critical potential towards one-
dimensionalities, and to contribute to a humane and just healthcare.  
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Introduction 
In recent decades many Catholic hospitals and other healthcare institutions1 in the 
Netherlands have been confronted with critical questions about their Catholic 
identity. They are often challenged both by their own employees and by their 
surroundings to explain and to defend what it means to be Catholic. As a result, the 
existence and maintenance of the Catholic hospital have become far less certain. 
Similar observations can be made with regard to Protestant healthcare 
institutions.  
 This situation is not unique to the Netherlands. Questions about Catholic 
identity have also been raised in the United States. The U.S. ethicist Richard 
McCormick, SJ, considers the contemporary Catholic hospital to be a “mission 
impossible” (McCormick, 1995; see also ibidem, 1998) In his view, it is the growing 
dominance of competitive-market thinking in modern culture that poses the most 
direct threat to the soul of Catholic healthcare. Bottom-line thinking becomes 
imperative: ‘no margin, no mission.’ Two other articles share the analysis of 
McCormick, although both arrive at more positive conclusions. Kevin O’Rourke, OP, 
considers the changing context of healthcare financing the real new challenge, 
from which he concludes that “continuing the mission of Catholic hospitals will 
require a more dedicated and energetic effort.” (O’Rourke, 1995). Daniel Sulmasy, 
O.F.M., M.D., follows a similar track: the more threats there are to Catholic 
healthcare - such as the growing place of technology and a hostile economic 
environment - the more reasons there are for not abandoning ship. 
 Despite their different interpretations and conclusions, McCormick, O’Rourke, 
and Sulmasy agree that there is a tension between the identity of a Catholic 
hospital and modern culture. In their view it is mainly the growing dominance of 
technology and economics in this culture that threatens Catholic identity. 
 The objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of this 
tension. This will be pursued by exploring the mode of interpretation developed by 
the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor in his critique of modern liberal culture 
(Taylor, 1989; 1991; 1999; 2002). Although Taylor does not specifically apply his 
analysis to the position of Catholic healthcare institutions, we believe that his 
approach offers valuable insights leading to an understanding of the challenges 
faced by such institutions.2 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a short introduction in 
Taylor’s theory of identity. Section 2 describes some main points in his analysis 
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with regard to tendencies in modern culture to obscure general conceptions of the 
good outside or beyond the individual person. Section 3 deals shortly with three 
negative consequences of such an obscurity in healthcare: the marginalization of 
questions of meaning, the imperative of technology, and the dominance of 
economics. Section 4 concludes with a short discussion. 
 
1. Identity 
Taylor's theory of identity enables us to interpret contemporary challenges for 
Catholic hospitals as symptoms of the general way modern culture handles matters 
of identity. In his view, the orientation towards pre-existent frameworks3 or 
horizons of normative and spiritual conceptions about the good within which “I 
can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to 
be done, or what I endorse or oppose” is crucial for having and developing an 
identity. It is by such an orientation that we take a stand as to what really matters 
for us and thus are able to become a self. However, modern culture tends to reduce 
any conception of the good to something merely private and optional, and to push 
such conceptions out of the public domain as much as possible. 
 Taylor distinguishes two consequences of this suppressing of the good. First, by 
hiding and privatizing conceptions about the good, modern culture neglects its 
own moral and spiritual sources; and by doing this, it endangers its own identity 
and jeopardizes the progress it has made in comparison with previous periods. 
Second, because modern culture devaluates all frameworks or conceptions of the 
good and the meaningful—whether traditional or contemporary—to the level of 
irrelevancy and subjective options but, at the same time, holds up very high moral 
standards of universal justice and benevolence, it is living beyond its moral means. 
In Taylor’s view, the best medicine for combating these consequences is the 
retrieval of the moral sources that underlie the identity of modern culture. The 
next section will elaborate on this theme more extensively. 
 Whatever can be said about the varieties of Catholicism, it certainly is a 
conception, or rather a framework of conceptions, regarding the good that, 
following Taylor’s mode of interpretation, will be suppressed by modernity, at 
least in the public sphere. As for any religion, it is expected to be confessed behind 
the walls of private life or within communities of coreligionists. Therefore, in this 
paper we will try to show that the problem facing Catholic hospitals, which are 
trying to legitimize their Catholic identity, is both a symptom and a consequence of 
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the way modern culture deals with the preliminary conditions for having an 
identity. We will not focus on modern culture as opposed to or even hostile to 
Catholic hospitals, but on the Catholic hospital as a full participant of this culture. It 
is because of this participatory position that Catholic hospitals often will be 
obstructed or be unwilling by themselves to express the core values of their 
Catholic faith in public. 
 An important remark has yet to be made. Taylor approaches identity from the 
perspective of an individual, while our problem, the Catholic identity of a hospital, 
concerns the identity of an institution. This presupposes a different concept of 
identity and moral responsibility, a concept in which institutional identity cannot 
be merely equated with the aggregate of all individual identities, nor may 
individual identity be absorbed or totally defined by the institutional identity. As 
such, there is no a priori contradiction between the Catholic identity of a hospital 
and the fact that an individual doctor or nurse working in that hospital is not 
Catholic. 
 However, we believe that Taylor’s approach to individual identity as taking and 
continually developing a stance in a moral space of different moral traditions and 
communities can be applied mutatis mutandis to institutional identity. We can 
understand an institution as a collectivity of individuals, or rather, as individuals 
working as a collectivity, that is convoked to express and develop its identity in the 
performance of the objectives and tasks of that institution. Thus a hospital takes a 
stance in a moral space, defined by society, history, culture, and different ethical 
and religious conceptions. And being a collectivity, the institution can be morally 
blamed or praised for the way it succeeds in this performance (Tongeren, 1986). 
When we say this particular hospital delivers good care, we are addressing both 
the hospital as an institution and its employees; the latter, however, we address 
not as individuals alone but as representatives of this hospital. 
 This being the case, there is an analogy between individual and institutional 
identity. In Taylor’s theory, individual identity is always related to values or the 
more general concept of the good. With respect to institutional identity, we could 
say that its identity is related to the conceived goods that are expressed and 
articulated in the objectives and the mission of the institution. If Taylor’s claim is 
right, namely, that the crisis of identity in our culture is caused by the tendency not 
to articulate our conception of the good, then the crisis of the identity of Catholic 
institutions is part of this cultural predicament. They are hindered in doing what is 
Chapter 3 
68 
essential for their identity: articulating the moral goods and values that are 
distinctive within a Christian framework, which they consider to be essential for 
the way they perform their task. This ’hindering’ can take different shapes. It may 
be because a Christian framework is reduced to a merely personal set of 
convictions. Or it may be because other frameworks like economics or technology 
suppress it. The latter is what worries McCormick. But whatever shape it takes, 
without the possibility to articulate and put into practice its central moral 
understanding of the good, there is no identity at all. Or paradoxically, its identity 
is defined by its nonidentity. 
 
2. Silence about the good 
One of the central claims of Charles Taylor is that modern culture tends to obscure 
and displace conceptions of the good.4 For Taylor, ‘the good’ has a broader 
significance than the way it is usually understood by most people and than what is 
often set forth in contemporary moral philosophy. Taylor’s concept of ‘the good’ 
encompasses all moral and spiritual visions underlying our moral acting and 
judging, based on implicit or explicit conceptions about what is desirable,5 what 
makes life fulfilling, and what makes us the kinds of persons we want to be. 
Contemporary moral philosophy has tended to focus “on what is right to do rather 
than on what is good to be, on defining the content of obligation, rather than the 
nature of the good life” (Taylor, 1989: 3). However, for human beings and human 
agency, it is essential that they have an orientation to a moral order—a horizon or 
framework of moral and spiritual meanings—that is preexistent. Only by virtue of 
such orders are human subjects able to make evaluations about what is good and 
evil, about what should be approved and rejected. 
 What exactly is a ‘good’? Taylor distinguishes ‘life goods’ and ‘constitutive 
goods’ (ibidem: 91-98). Life goods define facets or components of a good life, such 
as freedom, authenticity, altruism, benevolence, and universal justice. In moral 
theory, they function as measures for evaluating our life and our acting as right or 
wrong. Constitutive goods stand behind the life goods because they include the 
moral and spiritual visions underlying our moral acting and judging. They explain 
why we call it right to live or to act benevolently, altruistically, or justly. Therefore, 
constitutive goods have an epistemological meaning. For instance, within a 
Christian framework universal justice is made good, because of God’s calling to 
seek for his Kingdom. Or, within an Enlightenment framework, universal justice is 
 Catholic hospitals and modern culture: a challenging relationship 
69 
constituted as a good because all human beings should use their powers for 
rationality to realize equal rights for all. 
 The second feature of constitutive goods is that they offer us a motivation for 
pursuing life goods. For this reason, Taylor speaks about constitutive goods as 
moral sources: “a something the love of which empowers us to do and be good” 
(ibidem: 93). To take two examples, contemplation of God’s love for his children 
can empower people to realize the good of universal justice more fully. Or again, 
deeply felt respect for human rationality can empower people to dedicate 
themselves more fully to a just world (see also Smith, 2002: 114-115). 
 The place of moral sources in modernity—or rather, their absence of place— 
stands at the very heart of Taylor’s analysis. The silence about the good in modern 
liberal culture is a silence about these moral sources. Value-neutrality entails the 
claim that speaking about these moral sources is superfluous. Modern culture 
surrounds these substantive conceptions of the good with silence. In Sources of the 
Self, Taylor offers two categories of reasons for this silence: epistemological and 
moral. 
 
2.1. Epistemological reasons 
Epistemological reasons come most clearly to the fore in naturalism. Taylor uses 
this term in its general sense: it refers to all natural-sciences-based approaches 
within the humanities, such as behaviorism or sociobiology. Naturalism has its 
roots in Enlightenment rationalism. It explains human acting and behaving in a 
scientific and mechanistic way (Breuer, 2000: 20-21, 58-59; Joas, 1999: 195-226). 
It considers the world and the reality surrounding us to be neutral; all values are 
merely the fruits of subjective inventions and projections. The world and our 
actions are not possessed of intrinsic values, but it is we who attach certain values 
to them. Values and preexistent frameworks of qualitative distinctions do not fit 
into the scientific conception of man and nature.6 
 Naturalism, however, is wildly wrong in the eyes of Taylor: it falsely 
presupposes that there is nothing important beyond the self and that there is no 
significance in the world except the subjective significance attached to it by the 
self. For this reason, the modern naturalistic outlook considers all talk about 
frameworks, horizons of meanings, or moral sources as suspicious and irrelevant. 
People may do this sort of talking in private or with like-minded interlocutors, but 
they ought to keep to themselves whatever they prefer to believe or consider to be 
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significant in their lives. In the naturalistic outlook, such convictions are outmoded, 
kinds of projection, and superfluous. According to naturalists, frameworks are 
“things we invent, not answers to questions which inescapably preexist for us, 
independent of our answer or inability to answer”(Taylor, 1989: 30). However: “A 
total and fully consistent subjectivism would tend towards emptiness; nothing 
would count as a fulfillment in a world in which literally nothing was important 
but self-fulfillment” (ibidem: 507). Taylor’s claim is that the naturalistic conception 
of a value-neutral world is at odds with the way human beings live their lives and a 
threat to the very achievements of modern culture. It is a tendency to amputate the 
sources of the modern identity. 
 It should be clear that Taylor is not rejecting modernity as such. To the contrary, 
by retrieving its own moral sources, he wants to save modernity from the dangers 
of emptiness. This work of retrieval demands a confrontation with the modern 
naturalistic outlook which contains a hidden paradox: its stubborn attempts to 
deny and obscure any framework is itself a kind of framework, one of its own 
shapes or articulations of the good. Although it presents itself as neutral with 
regard to specific notions about the good, “the notion is never that whatever we do 
is acceptable” (ibidem: 23; italics by Taylor).  
 Taylor takes a different stance towards modern culture than does Alasdair 
MacIntyre. MacIntyre comes to the rather pessimistic conclusion that, in the 
process of modernization, and mainly as a result of the Enlightenment, we lost a 
previously commonly shared moral point of view, only fragments of which are left. 
The only rescue he sees is in the rejection of the whole construct of modern 
morality (MacIntyre, 1981). Taylor agrees with MacIntyre insofar as he also 
considers modernity to exist in a kind of moral vacuum; however, in Taylor’s 
interpretation, modernity encompasses more than a ‘vacuum’—it developed new 
moral standards as well. It is true, as MacIntyre rightly observes, that there is no 
longer a single commonly shared moral and spiritual framework in modern 
Western culture that is able to orient, bind, and inspire us. Modern Western 
culture separated itself from the formerly unique and all-encompassing framework 
of the Christian idea of a world created by God and led by Him toward a divine 
destiny (Taylor 1989: 17). The genesis of a moral vacuum is actually this specific 
process of disengagement from the traditionally theistic framework and its moral 
sources. Along this line of argument, secularization is often understood and 
welcomed only one-sidedly as a process of emancipation, through which people 
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liberate themselves from these frameworks and from the power of institutions that 
support them. 
 But, in Taylor’s view, this is only one side of the coin. Secularization is also an 
‘epistemic gain’: it opens alternative frameworks and moral sources, in the sense of 
important and real human potentialities that exist without any reference to 
religious transcendence.7 The Enlightenment naturalism gave a decisive impetus to 
the belief in human reason as the source of responsibility and human dignity, and 
to the idea of universal benevolence and justice. Romanticism, being partly a 
reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment, emphasized the 
particularity and originality of every human being, thus offering food to one of the 
ideals of modern culture: authenticity (Taylor, 1991).  
 Originally, both the Enlightenment and Romanticism had strong roots in a 
religious perspective of the world,8 but inherent in both of them was the potential 
to move away from their theistic origins. “What matters is that masses of people 
can sense moral sources of a quite different kind, ones that don’t necessarily 
suppose a God” (Taylor, 1989: 312-313).  The new sources behind the 
Enlightenment project were the love of human freedom; the basis for human 
dignity in men’s capacity for rationality and for taking responsibility; the 
conviction that science should be directed to practical and liberating benevolence 
through the relief of human suffering; the idea that ‘the good life’ should be 
realized in the ordinary life of family and production, not in the previous idea of a 
life dedicated to contemplation and renunciation; and the widening of the 
entitlements to equal justice over all human beings worldwide as consolidated in a 
universal declaration of human rights. Romanticism offered complementary 
sources: the sources for a good life are to be found in nature, with all its diversities 
and tensions, and particularly in the nature of every single human being, including 
our emotions and individual uniqueness. While the Enlightenment evaluates 
human beings in their universal equality and dignity as rational beings, 
Romanticism approaches human beings in their particularity and emotionality. 
 Thus, not as in MacIntyre, there are gains as well as losses. And instead of a 
moral vacuum, in the sense of a total moral emptiness, there is the space of new 
moral convictions and frameworks. However, modernity tends to hide these new 
sources, and by doing this, it deprives them of their empowering force. 
 With regard to the theistic or Christian sources of these movements, Taylor 
takes a challenging position. One the one hand, these sources are suppressed by 
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the Enlightenment and Romanticism. These developments were motivated in part 
by the revolutionary desire to liberate humans from Christian sources and their 
accompanying institutional powers. The newly found moral sources of human 
rationality and nature were considered to be victories over the previous 
domination of the Church. Secularization and emancipation walked hand in hand 
out of the formerly religious perspective. However, this process is not only to be 
considered as a loss for the theistic outlook; it is a gain as well. Ten years after 
Sources of the Self, Taylor defended the paradoxical view that secularization 
liberated Christianity from Christendom. The Christian faith was freed from its 
institutionalization and allowed to enter into the structures and culture of a wider 
society: “The notion is that modern culture, in breaking with the structures and 
beliefs of Christendom, also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they 
ever were taken or could have been taken within Christendom” (Taylor, 1999: 16).   
 If we take this paradox seriously and apply it to Catholic hospitals, Taylor’s 
challenge consists in a shift of perspective: it is not the maintenance of Catholic 
hospitals as such that should have priority, but the reflections on and debates 
about the way Catholic faith, as it is embodied in and passed down through the 
Catholic community, can contribute to a more humane and just healthcare. In this 
light a Catholic hospital is a means to this end; it is not an end in itself. Moreover, 
taking the consequences of Taylor’s vision seriously, it can be the case that a 
Catholic hospital itself becomes a hindrance for “certain facets of Christian life.” 
 
2.2. Moral reasons 
In addition to epistemological reasons, modern culture offers reasons founded on 
morality for its unwillingness to allow the articulation of the good and for its 
dismissal of axiological frameworks. Taylor mentions four (Taylor, 1989: 81-97). 
First, claims made on behalf of ‘higher’ modes of life should be rejected. Christian 
tradition had fostered the hierarchical idea that, for instance, a life dedicated to 
contemplation was more valuable in the eyes of God than the ordinary life of family 
and production. The first opposition to this idea came from within the Christian 
Reformation, but later on, the appreciation of ordinary life became one of the 
characteristics of modern culture. 
 The denial of ‘higher’ modes of life was gradually seen as a liberation from a 
Christian framework in which striving for the good was felt as a crushing burden 
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and as a reason for permanently inculcating an enduring sense of guilt. Instead, 
one could live a good life by means of the ordinary life. 
 The second reason proceeds from the modern insight that standards for the 
good life are embedded in ourselves, and not in an order outside of us, 
independent of our will: for example, in the Platonic cosmic order or in the world 
as God’s creation. The modern notion of freedom is based on the independence and 
disengagement of the subject. Every subject determines his own purpose of life. 
Descartes was one of the first philosophers in Western thinking to articulate to this 
cultural change. In his view, there is no meaningful and perennial order outside of 
us but only a neutral world, a machine, which can be controlled by the right 
application of our rational capacities (ibidem: Ch.8). Our dignity, in short, is based 
on our rationality. Later on, Max Weber introduced the concept of the 
‘disenchantment of the world,’ denoting the situation in which previous 
hierarchical and cosmic orders lose their magic and orienting value. 
 Modernity extended this thought to normative orders by connecting their 
origins with the human will. Kant developed this moral source in a radical way. 
The center of gravity in ethics was no longer concern about the good life as such, 
but about what is the right thing to do. To answer this question, the subject has to 
disengage himself from the idea of any preexistent natural order or objective good, 
and must take up his own responsibility as a rational agent. Moral freedom became 
equated with rational self-determination. Moral law comes from within, through 
the capacity of human reason; it is no longer defined by an external order. 
Therefore, Kant’s enlightenment motto: “have the courage to use your own 
understanding” (ibidem: 363-367). 
 In Kant’s vision, this use of human reason is the essence of human dignity, but 
the reason why we should live and act according to the demands of rationality falls 
out of sight, resulting in a mainly procedural morality. This morality is narrowly 
focused on obligatory action, on what “we ought to do, and not also with what is 
valuable in itself, or what we should admire or love” (ibidem: 84; italics by Taylor). 
 The third moral reason for the nonarticulation of any framework of the good 
results from the strong adherence of the Enlightenment project to the ideal of 
practical benevolence. From the time of Francis Bacon, science was directed away 
from contemplation of the higher good (as in scholastic philosophy) toward 
effectively improving the condition of mankind by relieving suffering, overcoming 
poverty, increasing prosperity, and augmenting human welfare (ibidem: 85). In 
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ethics, the emphasis shifted from the worry about the state of our souls towards 
universal altruism. 
 Fourth and finally, the desire for a universal ethics offered resistance to any 
orientation toward qualitative distinctions because on the whole such distinctions 
are embedded in a particular community or culture. This is at odds with the 
prevailing regard for pluralism. 
 These four reasons, and various combinations among them, gave rise to a 
procedural ethics, rather than a substantive one. By substantive we mean a 
morality that is based on the criterion that there are objective conceptions of the 
good, embedded in definite traditions and communities like Christian ones. 
‘Objective,’ in this context, means that these conceptions precede us and that they 
are not mere subjective inventions or mental projections. Modernity, however, has 
sidelined this vision of the good and considers it irrelevant and subjective. What is 
left is a procedural notion of moral thinking, be it in a utilitarian way that 
calculates benefits and burdens or in a Kantian way that tests by universalization. 
 
3. The malaises of modernity 
The core message of Taylor’s analysis of modern culture is that silence about the 
good, no matter how this good is conceived, endangers the very achievements of 
modernity. In The Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor describes three modern malaises. 
First is individualism, insofar as it results in atomism, loss of meaning, and a 
permissive society. Second is the primacy of instrumental reason, resulting in the 
danger that it takes over the whole of life. Third, as a consequence of atomistic 
individualism and the dominance of instrumental thinking, we are losing our 
political freedom. In this section we will limit ourselves to the first and second 
malaise: the loss of meaning and the primacy of instrumental reason. With regard 
to instrumental reason, Taylor elaborates two domains: technology and economics. 
These are the same domains that the authors mentioned above see as threats 
(McCormick) or challenges (O’Rourke, Sulmasy) to Catholic identity. 
 
3.1. Questions of meaning 
One of the most troubling problems for the modern self is the loss of meaning. The 
‘disenchantment’ of the world is both a kind of liberation and a source of 
emptiness. It is in the confrontation with disease, suffering, and death that this loss 
of meaningful horizons is most deeply felt. In today’s “exclusive humanism,”9 all 
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energy is directed towards human flourishing and what Taylor calls the life goods. 
Life itself takes on a “metaphysical primacy” (Smith, 2002: 234; Taylor, 1999) 
Again, in this respect there are gains and losses, grandeur et misère. The positives 
are a humanism that has liberated people and healthcare which looks for effective 
solutions to disease and suffering by approaching them as problems that can be 
solved in principle. The negatives are a widespread inability to render meaning to 
human suffering and death. 
 After all, suffering and death cannot only be conceived as problems: they 
represent mysteries as well. They ask not only for solution, but also for meaning. 
Denying the latter is actually a denial of what a human being is. In this respect, it is 
religions that have and always have had a liberating perspective of hope: life is 
good and meaningful, regardless of suffering and handicap, because God himself 
wants life. Religions do not liberate men from suffering, but they can join liberation 
to human suffering. Religions open up a perspective on a good beyond life and 
death.10 
 
3.2. Technology 
Instrumental reason became dominant both as a means for emancipation from the 
old orders and as a result of this emancipation. The sweeping away of old orders 
has liberated people to design new ones, directed to the practical consequences of 
the happiness and well-being of individuals. In healthcare, the use of instrumental 
reason gave rise to the enormous development of and admiration for healthcare 
technology. At the same, however, this technology is under attack because of its 
supposed depersonalizing effects. Admiration for technology is fostered by its 
impressive achievements in diagnosing and curing diseases. The worries are that 
technology is taking over the whole of life, even the experiences and events such as 
hope and despair, attentiveness and caring compassion, that do not fit into a 
technological approach. Taylor agrees with Patricia Benner “that the technological 
approach in medicine has often sidelined the kind of care that involves treating the 
patient as a whole person with a life story, and not as the locus of a technological 
problem” (Taylor, 1991: 6). Thus, the indisputable value of instrumental reason as 
a means for liberation and practical benevolence can degenerate into mere 
instrumentalism if its original motives are forgotten. 
 The debate about the place and contribution of technology in healthcare is 
rekindled every day by new technical inventions and innovations, for instance, in 
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the domains of genetics or diagnostics. Very often a new development gives rise to 
the question whether the new possibility should be applied or even must be 
applied. 
 From a naturalistic point of view, technology in itself is morally neutral: it is 
only we who attach moral value or moral disapproval to it. Taylor’s analysis, 
however, opens up a different perspective: technology, as a fruit of instrumental 
reason, was originally considered to be essential to the modern understanding of 
human dignity and responsibility. This has been forgotten. Moreover, during the 
rise of modern science, there was no principled contradiction between religion and 
science. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the scientific approach toward 
human suffering was seen as the best way to respect the deistic providential order. 
 At the same time, it is clear that the scientific approach possesses the inherent 
power to disengage itself from religion completely. Taylor nonetheless defends the 
idea that the adherence to a scientific and technological approach is in itself a kind 
of religion, one which strongly believes that all truths can be discovered by 
scientific methods and procedures, and that discovery ought to be the goal of all 
human endeavor. This ‘religious’ system forbids believing in anything whatsoever 
that is not proven conclusively by its own methods (Taylor, 1989: 404-406). The 
technological approach therefore has its moral sources in the dignity of man as a 
rational being and in his responsibility to relieve human suffering by rational, 
practical and ‘evidence-based means.’ It is, in the terms of Bjørn Hofmann, a “value-
laden” enterprise. Technology is not morally neutral, and its morality derives not 
only from external ends, but considered in terms of its internal purpose, 
technology is a moral enterprise in its own right (Hofmann, 2001).  
 To the extent that there is a strong argument in favor of continued reflection on 
the relation between technology and humanity (Gastmans, 2002), there is good 
reason to consider technology as part of the general question of what the good life 
is (Hofman, 2001: 335). Or to put it in Taylor’s terms, we need to integrate 
technology into our reflection on the good life and on its moral sources because it 
is an expression of and a contribution to those concepts. We cannot afford to 
privatize this effort or to strike it from the agenda as a merely subjectivistic 
enterprise. Despite the absence of consensus in our pluralistic culture, we should 
seek substantial agreements, even if the result is nothing more than a critical 
stance towards technology. Technology that is thought to be at odds with humanity 
is at odds at the same time with its own moral sources. 
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 There is no reason for the Catholic faith or tradition to hold an a priori attitude 
of hostility or mistrust towards technology. To the contrary, technology and 
science in general should be welcomed and encouraged because they are 
expressions of human dignity and creativity and are contributions to the well-
being of humanity. However, Catholic moral thinking introduces two critical 
perspectives. First, technology and science must ethically be orientated by the 
dignity of the human person; their goals may not be equated with what is 
technically possible but should be evaluated to the extent they contribute to the 
integral good of man.10 Second, in the Catholic tradition, health and the absence of 
suffering and premature death are certainly very important goods, but not the 
most important ones. Disease, suffering, or death do not diminish human dignity. 
This dignity is jeopardized instead by a technological approach that denies its own 
limitations and that considers the struggle against human suffering as a goal in se. 
Such a technology can be worse than the evils it wants to fight. Given this 
background, Catholic hospitals are in a position to strongly urge an ongoing and 
critical debate about the morality of the new technologies. 
 
3.3. Economics 
Besides technology, the growing influence of economics on healthcare and 
healthcare institutions asks for a thorough consideration. ‘Economics’ is a very 
general concept and it does not seem to have a very important place in Taylor’s 
work. For him, economics is mainly one of the ways instrumental reason manifests 
itself. This interpretation becomes clear in the way he defines instrumental reason: 
“the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical 
application of means to a given end. Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output 
ratio, is its measure of success” (Taylor, 1991: 5). 
 Taylor is particularly critical about the utilitarian philosophy that provides the 
background for this type of instrumental reasoning. The utilitarian device is to 
calculate the outcomes of our actions and decisions for the ‘greatest happiness of 
the greatest number.’ This device, however, reduces all human goods and goals to 
one single end: pleasure. This end is to be reached by calculating the best possible 
balance between costs and benefits. It is only the outcomes for the majority that 
count. 
 According to Taylor, utilitarianism, and the connected economic perspective, 
tends to colonize all life matters in a scheme of costs and benefits, even matters 
Chapter 3 
78 
that should be approached according to different criteria. It justifies an unjust 
distribution of welfare and income. It exploits natural sources as mere instruments 
for our purposes, with devastating environmental effects. It even tries to calculate 
the value of a human life in economical terms (ibidem: 6). More fundamental is his 
criticism of the utilitarian tendency to undermine every connection with moral 
sources. Even more troubling is that utilitarianism formulates and defends its 
position by attacking and polarizing against the former religious moral sources, 
which are at the origins of the Enlightenment project (Taylor, 1989: 338-339). But 
by doing this, it fails to offer a plausible answer to the question of why I should 
seek the happiness of the greatest number, or why I should be benevolent to 
someone who is of no benefit for me. 
 Again, Taylor is critical of economics, but at the same time open to its new 
potentialities. The rising appreciation of commercial activity and moneymaking in 
the eighteenth century is partly a result of, and partly a motive for the new 
evaluation of the ordinary life of production and reproduction (ibidem: Part III). As 
we saw earlier, the high valuation of ordinary life is one of the achievements of 
modernization. In addition, in Taylor’s view, the collapse of communist societies 
made one thing undeniable: “market mechanisms in some form are indispensable 
to an industrial society, certainly for its economic efficiency and probably also for 
its freedom” (Taylor, 1991: 110). With regard to market mechanisms, Taylor’s 
double stance towards modernity can again be illustrated. He refuses to join all the 
boosters of modernity, but neither does he side with its detractors. The market is 
an example of this stance: “We can’t abolish the market, but nor can we organize 
ourselves exclusively through markets. To restrict them may be costly; not to 
restrict them at all would be fatal” (ibidem: 110-111).  
 Thus we see that Taylor’s objections to economics, conceived as a mode of 
instrumental reasoning, are twofold. First, economics has an inherent potential to 
dominate the whole of life. Second, it fails to offer a moral motivation for realizing 
its own ends. Nevertheless, Taylor supports economics as an expression of the new 
evaluation of the ordinary life of production and reproduction, and as an 
indispensable part of industrial societies. 
 When applied to healthcare, the two objections are closely connected. The 
potential for domination is the main reason for McCormick’s pessimistic stance 
toward Catholic identity in healthcare. According to him, economics is a direct 
threat to the mission of Catholic healthcare. It gives rise to the maxim: no margin, 
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no mission. But at the same time, not being able to give expression to the life of 
your mission as a hospital or as a individual care-provider can be very damaging to 
moral motivation. An ‘ethos gap’ is growing between professional caregivers and 
their managers. Caregivers perceive that managers of healthcare organizations 
may have a very different agenda. The result is that caregivers have been 
“increasingly forced to work in ways that interfere with—even compromise—the 
values they hold most dear” (Pendelton, King, 2002: 1354). Ray et al. speak about a 
lack of congruence: economic values “undermine the core values of professional 
service centered on patient care” (Ray et al, 1999: 216). 
 However, the tensions between economics and care cannot be an argument to 
ban economic approaches to healthcare. First, healthcare cannot be conceived only 
in terms of the individual helping relation, for it is also an institutional and societal 
system, paid for with collective funds and with a total annual budget—in the 
Netherlands—of about forty billion euros. For this reason alone, a sound 
economical approach on the macro (national) and meso (institutional) level is 
needed. Taylor’s remark about the indispensability of the market in industrial 
societies can be applied to healthcare as well: we cannot abolish it, but neither can 
we totally organize healthcare through the market. 
 Second, for a complex of reasons, the scarcity of financial and human resources 
has become a problem during the last few decades. It follows that questions  of 
allocation and distribution, and in addition, of efficiency and justice, have become 
inescapable. Economics is one of the disciplines that can contribute to the question 
how to deal with this kind of moral dilemmas (Stolk, Busschbach, 2002). One of the 
achievements of modernity is the moral ideal of universal justice. This outlook 
broadens the scope of the individual helping relation to include third parties, the 
healthcare system as a whole, and the good of the community (see also O’Rourke, 
1995).  
 Taylor’s plea for the articulation of moral sources has specific relevance to 
economics and its contribution to a just use of scarce resources. What concept of 
justice do we hold? It makes a difference whether we start from a Rawlsian, 
utilitarian, or egalitarian approach. Adherence to one of these depends on our 
conceptions of the good life and the good society. The Christian tradition 
emphasizes, particularly in its social ethics, a preferential option for the poor and 
the weakest; as a consequence, an egalitarian approach of justice is favored 
(Pijnenburg, 1991). 
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 On a more fundamental level, the question can be raised about the roots of 
scarcity in healthcare. Many causes and factors can be found. One often mentioned 
is the high value that is attached to health in modernity. As a result, the need for 
healthcare, particularly for life-prolonging treatments, is endless, and the capacity 
to cope with our mortality, finiteness, and vulnerability has diminished. Christian 
tradition can appeal to moral sources that can nuance our high appraisal of health 
and a long life. It holds, for instance, that health is not the ultimate value in life, that 
finiteness is a natural part of our human condition, and that human suffering does 
not necessarily have to be in contradiction with a meaningful and fulfilling life. 
 
4. Discussion 
The objective of this article was to reach a deeper understanding of the crisis 
concerning the contribution of Catholicism to contemporary healthcare. Taylor 
offers a plausible argument for considering this crisis to be a problem that not only 
confronts Catholicism or Catholic institutions, but that is part of a more profound 
and widespread crisis in modern culture, caused by the way in which modernity 
deals with its own moral sources. Taylor also offers new perspectives for dealing 
with the ambiguities and malaises of modernity. There are ways forward offered 
by the moral sources of modern culture itself. Derailments come to the fore 
because these sources are suppressed, obscured, and hidden. Among these 
sources, the theistic and Christian ones have their own and legitimate place. 
 It is the combination of Christianity, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism that 
gave rise to the enormous fecundity of Western culture. These are its moral and 
spiritual sources. They contain the sources of contemporary healthcare as well, 
which is itself a part of Western culture. Neutralizing these sources, by relegating 
them to the sphere of private and optional preferences, will weaken them and our 
achievements as well. What was originally a means to an end, such as technology, 
economics, or the approach to suffering as a problem rather than a mystery, can be 
turned into ends in themselves and produce an unacceptable one-sidedness. In the 
professional caring relation, this can work out as instrumentalism, technocracy, 
the depersonalization of patients, and an incapability to hear questions of meaning. 
On the institutional level, cost-output rationality can become dominant because 
there is no counterbalance offered by a common and shared vision about good care 
and about the human meanings of health, sickness, suffering, and dying. In both 
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cases there is a need for rearticulating the moral sources, and the core values, of 
healthcare. 
 It is not Catholic institutions alone that will solve the value crisis of modern 
healthcare. Nor does Taylor’s analysis support the view that their existence is a 
necessity for good healthcare; even more, he is suggesting that the 
institutionalization of Christianity can work out as a threat for further 
development of the Gospel. And although he pleads for Christianity, he does not 
offer hard evidence for the necessity of retrieving our Christian sources (Smith, 
2002: 231-236). However, the question is not whether Catholic hospitals are a 
necessity—though they may be from an ecclesiastical perspective—but whether 
they should be aimed at self-preservation or at humanizing and evangelizing 
society. In our view, the last option should prevail. Relevant for the Church and for 
Catholic healthcare institutions is this societal perspective: do these institutions 
have visions and sources that can render a valuable and meaningful contribution 
to a system of humane healthcare in modern, Western societies? (see also Chapter 
2 of this study). Taylor’s answer to this criterion is in the affirmative: Christianity 
has such a vision. The challenge for contemporary Catholic institutions is to 
revitalize these sources, not necessarily for the sake of saving their Catholicity, but 
in order to connect modern healthcare with its original sources, and in order to 
maintain a critical stance towards one-dimensionalities of disenchantment, 
technology, and economics.  
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Notes 
1. The introduction of this study distinguishes institutions and organizations. In this chapter and 
the next ones these terms are often used interchangeably.  
2. In Sources of the Self, Taylor’s preference for Christianity as the most promising source for 
safeguarding the achievements of modernity is mostly implicit. In Catholic Modernity, he is 
explicating his stance. According to some comments, the latter publication is more or less the 
final chapter of Sources of the Self. 
3. The concept of a moral framework is fundamental in Taylor’s philosophy. A framework 
consists in “a crucial set of qualitative distinctions. To think, feel, judge within such a 
framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is 
incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available to us” (Taylor, 1989: 
27). Moral frameworks offer the context of moral sources. They reflect a certain horizon of the 
good and desirable life; they offer us the capacity for evaluating the things we actually desire 
from the angle of the intrinsically desirable. Frameworks are embedded in traditions, 
communities, and cultures, and human beings find themselves always, from the cradle to the 
grave, within a specific framework or a specific mixture of frameworks (ibidem: 19). They 
represent ‘horizons of meaning’, to use another Taylorian term. 
4. Taylor prefers to speak about ‘goods’ instead of about ‘values’. In one of the rare moments he 
speaks about “values,” it is negatively: “the very language of morals and politics tends to sink to 
the relatively colorless subjectivist talk of ‘values.’” It invites us to ask “how we do feel about 
our way of living in the world.” (Taylor, 1989: 507; Sources of the Self, 507, italics by Taylor).  
5. ‘Desirable’ is used in an Aristotelian sense: things that are worthy of desire. See also Smith, 
2002: 91.  
6. Breuer qualifies the naturalistic outlook with the concept of ‘value neutrality.’ For her, this 
concept is at the center of Taylor’s interpretation of modernity. Taylor himself, however, - see 
note 3 - rarely uses the term ‘values.’ (Breurer, 2000).  
7. In Varieties of Religion Today (2002), Taylor elaborates this interpretation of secularization 
extensively.  
8. They were prepared by the providential deism of the eighteenth century. See also Smith, 2002: 
Ch.8.  
9. Taylor introduces the term ‘exclusive humanism’ in A Catholic Modernity? (1999: 19). It is a 
form of humanism, “based exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no 
aim beyond this. The strong sense that continually arises that there is something more, that 
human life aims beyond itself, is stamped as an illusion.” 
10. An articulation of this perspective is offered by the apostolic letter of Pope John Paul II. 1984. 
Salvifici doloris, On The Christian Meaning of Human Suffering. http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_11021984_salvifici-doloris_en.html 
11. See, for instance, Pontifical Academy for Life. 2003. Concluding Communiqué on the ‘Ethics of 
Biomedical Research: For a Christian Vision.’ http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_ 
academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pont-acd_life_doc_20030226_ix-gen-assembly-final_en.html 
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Abstract 
In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is 
conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show 
that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can 
be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of 
identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a 
narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his 
concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the 
relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary 
HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the 
diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the 
HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and 
identification with certain goods that are central for an HCO. However, many of 
these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral 
responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit. It should not be 
reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may 
be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity 
as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance 
with demands of social justice. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the moral responsibility of a healthcare organization (HCO) 
by conceiving this responsibility as an inextricable aspect of the identity of a HCO. 
On the one hand, moral responsibility can be approached from the perspective of 
the organization’s way of acting (Frankena, 1973: 62-78). Examples may be: the 
way the HCO acts toward complex bioethical issues like nontreatment decisions or 
the use of scarce resources; the way it deals with its employees or organizes the 
care to patients; or the structures it creates to handle issues such as the setting up 
of an ethics committee and the development of institutional guidelines. 
Responsibility in acting often takes shape in do’s and don’ts, some of which are 
made explicit by hospital rules, procedures, or prescriptions, many, however, are 
implicit in certain kinds of behaviour or working patterns. To act responsibly in 
these different instances requires both that the HCO takes care to deal properly 
with such issues prospectively and realize that it may be called upon to account for 
how it handled such issues retrospectively. 
 On the other hand, the moral responsibility of an HCO may be understood from 
its way of being. Responsibility in this second sense is revealed by the kind of 
organization an HCO is or aspires to be. Instead of do’s and don’ts with regard to 
certain issues or parties, responsibility in being appoints to positive ideals and 
institutional values the HCO identifies with. It denotes the institutional 
responsibility for sustaining and fostering highly valued social goods like restoring 
health, prevention of diseases, alleviation of suffering, respect for persons, 
protection of the vulnerable, and social justice. It also gets shape by fidelity to its 
tradition – such as its founders and their intentions and commitments – and by 
orientation to its mission in changing contemporary and future circumstances 
(Jennings et al., 2004: 1-10).  
 The positive ideals, values and mission the HCO takes responsibility for may 
present an important motivating and inspiring power to employees and 
professionals to act responsibly. Consequently, the two meanings of moral 
responsibility are complementary. Responsibility for being an HCO in accordance 
with ideals, values, and mission should be manifest through actions, and, reversely, 
responsibility in acting should reveal the kind of organization the HCO is and 
aspires to be. 
 The objective of this paper is to discuss these complementary meanings of 
responsibility by interpreting them as basic aspects of the identity of an HCO. We 
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will try to show that, by relating responsibility to identity, we may gain a deeper 
insight into the moral responsibility of an HCO. 
 Our objective will be pursued in three sections. The first section relates morality 
to identity by deriving a concept of identity from the philosophy of Charles Taylor. 
The second section suggest a possible transition from Taylor’s theory to HCOs. 
Because Taylor’s theory considers the identity of persons, this section considers 
whether it is plausible to apply his concept to HCOs. The third section elaborates 
how Taylor’s theory on identity can increase our understanding of the moral 
responsibility of HCOs. The article ends with a short conclusion. 
 
1. Charles Taylor on identity 
1.1. Why Taylor? 
There are several reasons. First, Taylor links the two questions, What do I value? 
and, Who am I? He deduces the identity of persons from their concrete moral 
judgments (Singer, 1998). In a similar way, we believe that the moral choices HCOs 
make, as these are reflected, for instance, in ethical guidelines or in the distribution 
of scarce resources, reflect important aspects of their institutional identity. 
 Second, Taylor emphasizes that morality is not just about what is right or right 
acting, but also about what moves us to behave morally.1 What really moves us 
cannot be sufficiently explained by external incentives, such as financial rewards 
or legal sanctions. In his view, commitments to what is perceived as morally good 
and valuable are the central issue. They are central because human beings derive 
their very identity from these commitments. Analogously, an HCO’s moral 
responsibility should be approached from the perspective of its basic 
commitments. 
 Third, Taylor relates identity and morality to the cultural, social, and historical 
surroundings. He explicitly focuses on ‘‘the making of identity’’ in modern western 
culture (Taylor, 1989). His main question is how modern individuals interpret 
themselves and shape their moral responsibility in the context of contemporary 
North-Atlantic societies. Our assumption is that reflection on the moral 
responsibility of contemporary HCOs makes no sense unless it is related to the 
identity of an HCO as an institution that is bound to the context of western 
societies in every respect: historical, social, cultural, economic, scientific, and so on. 
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 In sum, Taylor links morality to identity by conceiving our moral judgments and 
commitments as intertwined with our identity as beings, living in concrete social 
and historical surroundings. 
 
1.2. Dimensions of the identity of persons  
Taylor distinguishes three dimensions of the identity of persons: a moral, a 
dialogical, and a narrative dimension. 
 
1.2.1. The moral dimension 
The first dimension relates identity to moral concerns.2 These come to the fore in 
the human ability to strongly evaluate certain desires. Although desires are 
common to all living beings, animals included, only humans are able to reflect on 
them and to evaluate them in terms of their desirability, that is to say, in terms of 
what ought to be desired. This evaluation can be ‘weak’ or ‘strong.’ It is weak if a 
choice between different desires can be made on pragmatic grounds, such as 
outcomes, costs, or convenience. For example, a weak evaluation will do if we have 
to make a choice of a holiday either in a warm or in a cold climate. Strong 
evaluations, however, are needed if our choice depends on qualitative distinctions 
about what we consider to be worthy or unworthy, or a higher or lower mode of 
life. Strong evaluations, in contrast to weak ones, refer to judgments about a 
certain way of life that we strive for, and to the kind of person that we aspire to be 
(Taylor, 1985a; Frankfurt, 1971). To use the same example: the choice of the warm 
and sunny country may be attractive for weak reasons, but nevertheless 
undesirable if we know that its government violates human rights. 
 Strong evaluations embody the goods with which we identify ourselves (Taylor, 
1989: 5, 11-15). In Taylor’s view these goods entail both moral and spiritual 
dimensions: they comprise the moral rightness of our behavior towards others; 
our ideas and ideals about a good and meaningful life; and our convictions about 
attributing dignity to human beings.3 
 It is important to denote that the goods we appeal to in our evaluations cannot 
be conceived as merely personal inventions. To explain why we evaluate certain 
desires as good or others as bad, we are bound to the framework of the concrete 
community, culture, and tradition within which we are born and live our lives. 
Frameworks provide us with sets of qualitative and contrasting moral distinctions. 
They enable us to acknowledge that there are certain goods and ends that 
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transcend the individual level, and that are intrinsically valuable and meaningful. 
Because these goods exist beyond us they can command our awe or admiration, 
and function as standards for us (Taylor, 1989: 20). However, although we receive, 
build up, and develop our identity within such frameworks, they do not fully 
determine our understandings of our self. On the one hand, living is itself a process 
of ongoing self-interpretation and evaluation. On the other hand, cultures and 
societies are by themselves subject to changes. In consequence, we are 
continuously redefining and re-evaluating our stance towards the goods. 
 Taylor distinguishes among the ‘life goods’ that denote aspects of a good life, 
such as respect, justice, or health, and ‘hypergoods’ that enable us to rank different 
life goods. The most important however are ‘constitutive goods.’ These goods 
constitute the being good of life goods; for instance, they determine why universal 
justice is a good. To some of us, justice can be ‘made’ good because all humans are 
considered as persons with equal rights; to others, justice can be good because 
they consider all humans as a family, as children of the one and only God. The 
essential feature of a constitutive good, however, is that it functions as a moral 
source: ‘‘something the love of which empowers us to do and be good’’ (Taylor, 
1989: 93). Reflecting or contemplating on a constitutive good can empower us to 
realize this good more completely in our lives and to recognize it as a source of 
who we are and the kind of person we want to be. Moral sources evoke 
commitment and identification, and strengthen motivation. A truly felt respect for 
human rationality and autonomy as promoted strongly by the Enlightenment can 
be a moral source for people to aspire to these goods more fully. For others, this 
aspiration can be empowered by their belief in a God who created us as 
responsible human beings (Smith, 2000: 14-15). 
 
1.2.2. The dialogical dimension  
Identity also demands an answer to the question of who we are in relation to 
others. Identity involves ‘‘webs of interlocutors’’ (Taylor, 1989: 36). These webs 
are inherent to the concept of frameworks, while frameworks are embedded in 
communities of language and shared convictions. It is by participation in 
communities that we discover the qualitative distinctions between good and bad, 
higher and lower, and so on. In this sense we receive our identity from our being 
amidst of others. We are beings who can be addressed, and who can reply. We are 
‘‘respondents’’ (Taylor, 1985b).  
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 Taylor can be considered a communitarian because he resists the idea of 
procedural liberalism that holds that persons are independent, atomistic beings 
that build up their identity by force of their own rationality (Kant) or by calculating 
their own – enlightened – self-interest (utilitarians). Liberalism denies the 
importance of human relations by attaching to them only an instrumental value for 
pursuing personal goals. According to communitarians, however, our relations 
with other people and society at large may not be equated to mere means in 
realizing someone’s personal good, but they are ‘‘the very possibility of being an 
agent seeking that good’’ (Taylor, 1985c: 292) 
 As a consequence of these essential relational and social dimensions of human 
life, the making of identity proves to be an ongoing dialogical process. People stay 
in need of dialogues with other people to learn who they are, what is significant for 
them and to which direction they want to move their lives. They need others to 
become aware of what matters to them. These dialogues do not have to be limited 
to people we can actually meet. We also can engage ourselves in imaginary 
dialogues, for instance, with deceased parents, future generations, people living in 
the third world, and so on. 
 Dialogues are not just a means to check our conceptions and visions, nor a way 
merely to conform our opinions to the opinions of others. Taylor considers them as 
essential: the denial of this dimension would be a denial of what makes life a 
human life. Human beings exist as dialogical beings. 
 
1.2.3. The narrative dimension 
Finally, our identity relates ‘‘to our sense of our life as a whole and the direction it 
is taking as we lead it’’ (Taylor, 1989: 41). It implies an answer to the question of 
where we are at a certain moment of our life. To understand who we are also 
presupposes an awareness of where we came from and to where we are moving: 
‘‘My sense of myself is of a being who is growing and becoming’’ (ibidem: 50). The 
narrative of our life shapes our identity. Telling about our past, present, and future 
is a way of explaining who we are and what matters to us. Hence, our identity is 
necessarily narrative. 
 
The moral, dialogical and narrative dimensions are interdependent. Each of them 
requires the other two for its growth. To know who we are is to know what we 
stand for, who we are in relationship to others, and what we are at a certain 
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moment in our life. Consequently, our identity is not a fixed state once and for all. It 
exists as an ongoing process of continuity and change with respect to creating 
meaning in our life and to evaluate ourselves. Nor is our identity always clearly 
and well articulated. First, we do not always feel the need to articulate to which 
goods we are oriented. The need to reflect on what kind of person we want to be 
will be present only in cases of hard choices that will have an influence on the 
course of our life. Second, any articulation itself will often be tentative and 
imprecise. Giving words to what moves us is usually characterized by uncertainty. 
 Nevertheless, to understand and to make sense of human life we have to 
recognize the existence of these dimensions. They belong to the essence of being 
human. The recognition of their existence corresponds to what Taylor calls the 
‘‘Best Account’’ principle: we cannot deny their existence because they yield the 
best account of human life (ibidem: 58). 
 
1.3. Taylor’s criticism of modern culture 
As we mentioned above, the way persons understand themselves is necessarily 
related to their cultural, social and historical context. Given this connection, Taylor 
is interested in the main characteristics of modern culture. 
 In the historical parts of Sources of the Self Taylor elaborates the development of 
the moral sources of modern identity (ibidem: parts II-V). These sources are 
defined by the turn into inwardness, leading to a strong appraisal of a disengaged 
and self-acquired rationality; the recognition of dignity in the ordinary life of 
family and work; and finally, the high value that modern culture attaches to 
expressivism – identity as an authentic expression of what a person is. These 
sources are in danger, however, because modern Western culture considers them 
merely optional and personal and not objects of public debate and assessment. The 
mainstream of modern moral philosophy offers rational arguments that support 
this degrading of moral sources to personal emotions or preferences. At the same 
time, it encourages a reduction of morality to common accepted norms and a 
proceduralist approach to ethical questions. As a result, modern culture can be 
characterized both by a widespread consensus on moral norms and criteria to 
support high moral standards of universal respect, justice, and benevolence, and 
also by a poverty of sources that commit us to these standards (Adeney, 1991). 
 Taylor considers this non-articulation as a fundamental misconception, and 
with devastating consequences. The hiding of the moral sources of modern culture 
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may result in their deterioration, may deprive them of their potentially 
empowering and motivating force, and may in the end jeopardize the 
achievements of modernization itself (Pijnenburg, ten Have, 2004; also chapter 3 
of this study).  
 For instance, instrumental rationality can degenerate in a dominance of 
technology or economics, if it is drifting away from its original moral impetus: to 
emancipate people, to improve the circumstances of ordinary life effectively, and 
to realize universal benevolence and justice. Another example in the development 
of modern culture is the process of disengagement from encompassing, collectively 
shared frameworks and traditions. This is a gain, because it liberated people and 
enabled them to take up their own responsibility. But, at the same time, this 
process brought with it the loss of collective narratives that are needed to support 
modern subjects in acquiring and in articulating new meanings. As a result, the 
fear of meaninglessness becomes paramount (Taylor, 1989: 18). 
 
2.  Applying Taylor’s concept of identity to HCOS 
It is striking that Taylor hardly pays any attention to the contribution of 
institutions to the development of identity. Going beyond Taylor, Ricoeur attaches 
to institutions a pivotal role in his studies about the self. Like Taylor, Ricoeur also 
connects a theory of identity with a theory of ethics. Both stress the importance of 
the good life and of relations with others, but Ricoeur emphasizes institutions as a 
third dimension. The ethical dimension of the self-consists in ‘‘aiming at the good 
life with and for others in just institutions’’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 172).  
 There are good reasons to agree with this approach. First, most of our lives are 
spent in institutionalized roles, services, activities, and responsibilities: persons 
live as doctors, nurses, and managers in a HCO. Second, institutions can be 
considered as middle terms between persons and society. They present ‘‘a 
structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with these (...)’’  
(ibidem: 194). They are setup by concrete and historical communities, they offer 
frameworks of qualitative distinctions, and they are influential because of their 
ability to exercise power on their members and consumers. Third, institutions 
already include certain conceptions of the good and, therefore, frameworks in the 
sense Taylor refers to: ‘‘What fundamentally characterizes the idea of institution is 
the bond of common mores (...)’’ (ibidem: 194). Consequently, working in an 
institution includes taking a stance towards these conceptions: someone works in 
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accordance with these conceptions or in resistance to them. Institutions are 
constitutive of one’s identity, either by the possibility that a person can identify 
himself with the goods of the institution or by the possibility that he rejects them. 
In other words, a person’s identity is determined not only by the positive 
disposition he has towards the goods of a given institution but also by the negative 
disposition he may assume towards those goods. 
 Within the context of this article we will not elaborate on Ricoeur. The essential 
point that we will derive from his approach is that institutions are constitutive for 
the identity of persons. The question we will deal with is whether the identity of 
these institutions, in casu HCOs, can be clarified with the concepts of Taylor about 
personal identity. 
 Although organizations and persons differ in many respects, they also have 
many similarities. HCOs, for example, have a name, age, past, and future. Like 
persons they fulfill different roles, such as caregiver, employer, trustee of collective 
funds, educator, and partner in a healthcare market. Organizations also have 
characters and temperaments: they are innovative or conservative, open or closed, 
friendly or blunt, religious or secular. In addition, they can be idealistic and 
ambitious, or uninspired, burned out, and just floating from day-to-day. Moreover, 
an organization is founded by persons and staffed by persons. In spite of this, it is 
more than just an aggregate of individuals. It exists as a collective with a 
responsibility that binds all these individuals together and that can be praised or 
blamed for the way it performs its collectively shared tasks (Tongeren, 1986). 
They perform ‘‘actions in concert’’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 195-197). It is in this sense that 
an HCO as a whole can be falling short if it delivers bad healthcare to patients, 
while not denying, at the same time, the responsibility of individual employees. 
When an HCO is blamed for delivering impersonal care, for example, it is not just 
that one person has failed but ‘we’ as a collective have failed and ‘we’ can feel 
guilty because of falling short in ‘our’ moral responsibility. To blame an HCO has a 
pendant in law: HCOs are legal persons or conglomerations of persons, i.e. 
corporations. Like natural persons, legal persons can own properties, enter into 
contracts, take decisions, and so on. In addition, legal personality of corporations 
means that the torts of their employees or agents are attributed to them. 
 Without making the much stronger claim that the identity of organizations is 
identical to the identity of persons – which is a claim that could be rightly disputed 
– the similarities between persons and organizations, the latter conceived as 
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collectives of persons, offer plausible arguments for applying Taylor’s concept of 
identity of persons to organizations. 
 
3. Moral responsibility as a matter of identity 
In this final section we will argue that applying Taylor’s theory of identity to an 
HCO will lead to a more profound insight into its moral responsibility as a social 
institution. 
 
3.1. Moral dimension 
In the introduction of this paper we argued that the moral responsibility of an HCO 
can be conceived as related to the way of acting responsibly and to the way of 
being responsible. From the perspective of Taylor’s theory on identity, we can see 
now that the goods held by the HCO shape its organizational identity. Like persons, 
however, an HCO does not always articulate these goods. What is articulated, for 
instance, by clearly stated values, mission, goals or guidelines on certain moral 
questions, reflects the formal identity of the HCO. They expose the kind of 
organization it officially declares itself to be. Nevertheless, there are also goods 
implied in its practices and policies which are not articulated explicitly. These 
practices and policies show what an HCO actually is; they show its informal 
identity. In the ideal case, formal and informal identity are in harmony with each 
other. 
 An HCO that declares the patient to be its primary focus should give proof of this 
claim in its actual performances. Many practices, however, seem to give priority to 
other interests, such as the organizational interest of efficiency or the personal 
interests of employees. From the perspective of moral responsibility conceived as 
a matter of identity, the question then must be raised whether an HCO really is in 
its daily practice and policy what it claims to be officially. In addition to the 
potential gap between formal and informal identity, there can also be a specific 
reason to re-examine the HCO’s identity in relation to its moral responsibility. 
Changes in culture and healthcare can force the HCO to reflect on the goods it is 
committed to and to question if and how these goods can be harmonized with 
contemporary challenges. To illustrate this point, we will take as an example the 
growing dominance of economic frameworks in healthcare.  
 This dominance is mainly due to a shortage in resources and causes a lot of 
concern and criticism from employees, consumers, and society at large. The 
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opposite and positive side of the coin, however is, that it also offers compelling 
reasons to re-articulate the original goods that motivate care, and to balance these 
goods against other goods (Emmanuel, 2000; Peppin, 1999; Ray et al, 1999; 
Silverman, 2000; Khushf, 2001). Paris and Post for example, point out that the 
traditional good for doctors to be the patient’s advocate now must be 
counterbalanced against goods resulting from emphasis on economic costs (Paris, 
Post, 2000). 
 Essentially, there is a dilemma between two claims: cost-effectiveness for the 
HCO as a whole, and the offering of optimal healthcare services to patients. A 
choice between these claims requires what Taylor calls ‘strong evaluations.’ Both 
claims evoke the question of what kind of organization the HCO wants to be. Some 
ends may be understood to be a more integral part of its identity as a social 
institution than others. The improvement of health and the alleviation of suffering 
are goods that cannot be given up by an HCO without severe damage to its identity. 
It is also a good that caregivers are committed to as part of their professional 
identity. However, the more that economic goods determine decisions the HCO 
makes, the more caregivers feel the pressure of being forced to work and of being 
measured according to values and criteria external to their own professional and 
dearly held values. The latter represent the ‘‘touchstones by which we live and 
work’’ (Pendleton, King, 2002: 1354) 
 In light of the good of healthcare, one approach is to eliminate the dilemma by 
considering cost-effectiveness as only a means to an end. This solution, however, 
would be too simple; in fact, it redefines the dilemma into a non-dilemma by 
eliminating one of the opposing claims. But the dilemma still obtrudes itself, 
because behind cost-effectiveness a more fundamental and very cogent good is at 
stake. The desire to be cost-effective is motivated by the good of justice to other 
patients, now and in the future. One of the arguments of Ricoeur to stress the 
importance of just institutions is, that they bear moral responsibility to distribute 
goods among all members of a community, including the unknown ‘third’ parties. 
For the sake of justice between strangers also Rawls declares justice to be ‘‘the first 
virtue of social institutions’’ (Rawls, 1971: 3). 
 Caregivers are strongly committed to admitted and individual patients: this 
commitment is an integral part of their identity and strongly supported by the 
Hippocratic heritage. But it is only by articulating the institutional good of justice 
that is behind the emphasis on cost-effectiveness that this good can be interpreted 
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and discussed. Articulation will create the opportunity to discuss whether the way 
cost-effectiveness is implemented in a particular HCO or a particular community is 
a means to the end of social justice or has become an aim in itself. 
 To be able to reframe the economics versus care dilemma into a dilemma 
between two institutional goals – care and justice – frameworks are needed in 
which these diverse goods are embodied and articulated and that inspire and 
motivate us. Taylor, however, criticizes modern culture because it neglects such 
frameworks and their underpinning moral sources. Within modern culture’s 
prevailing pluralism frameworks are often reduced to sets of rules and procedures; 
their moral sources are banished to the spheres of the private and the personal 
and left out of the public debate. But by excluding these sources from public 
debate, there is the risk, first, that they get diminished and distorted with regard to 
their content, and a real and profound discussion on how to proportion the 
diversity of goods is hindered. Second, there is the risk that the motivation, being 
an essential feature of moral sources, to strive for justice, carefulness, or respect 
for human dignity gets weakened. To recall, a source both constitutes a good and 
empowers us to do and to be good; they are named ‘sources’ because they evoke 
motivation and identification. Underlying our will to provide good care to patients 
stand strongly valued moral sources we identify ourselves with; for example, 
practical benevolence in ordinary life as our cause of human dignity, or good care 
as the essence of our Hippocratic tradition, or charity as the soul of our religious 
traditions. Underlying our efforts for economic constraints stand other strongly 
valued moral sources that call for justice: our commitment to human rights as 
expressions of our will to give due right to the dignity of human beings, or 
religiously and humanistically inspired ideals to pursue a world of peace and social 
justice. In all these sentences the term ‘our’ not does simply denote sources of ‘us’ 
as individuals, but in the context of this article more importantly, sources of our 
social institutions and of our modern culture. It is on these institutional and 
cultural levels that such sources are in need of articulation. Only by articulating 
sources and their accompanying frameworks, in the case of the sources behind 
offering care and pursuing justice, can we empower engagement and commitment. 
 To reframe a dilemma into competing moral sources is not to solve it. But it is 
brought up to a level where the moral responsibility of an institution is related to a 
diversity of goods that are decisive and empowering with respect to the identity of 
a contemporary HCO. Conversely, reflection on the identity of a contemporary 
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institution can open our eyes to the dilemma: its identity as a societal institution 
urges it to be both a caring and a just institution.  
 
3.2. Dialogical dimension 
HCOs include internal webs of interlocutors. Moreover, they operate in dialogue 
with external interlocutors, like insurance companies, consumer organizations and 
government. In these internal and external dialogues, the identity of the 
organization is defined and developed.4 Dialogue is a forum that contributes to the 
awareness of similarities and differences with other organizations, and of what is 
central, distinctive, and enduring for this particular organization (Goia, 1998: 21). 
It is a means of trying to give the best account of the diversity of goods embodied 
in the HCO and of seeking its most adequate articulations. We will concentrate on 
the internal webs of interlocutors. 
 There are several reasons for emphasizing internal dialogues. The first stems 
from the objective to articulate and evaluate the goods that are implicit in HCOs 
practices and among its employees.  
 The economy versus care dilemma described above illustrates this. By 
articulations organizations can try to express the different senses of the good and 
the plurality of goods. But both the words ‘try’ and ‘senses’ indicate that 
articulations can turn out to be more or less adequate. The ‘best account’ principle 
of Taylor calls for accepting the responsibility to give the best possible account of a 
certain good, while being fully aware also that the best possible account is only 
partial and imprecise, bound to time, situation, and circumstances, and should 
always be open for revision and re-articulation. 
 Adequacy is not a matter of a better or worse description alone. It asks by itself 
for a deliberate responsibility, while any articulation models the sense of the good. 
There is a difference, for instance, between articulating respect for a patient 
because he is a person or a client. Both are a part of the truth. Responsibility of 
HCOs begins when they start to reflect on which articulation offers the best 
account of the sense that patients must be respected, and which corresponds most 
with its strong evaluations. Because, in principle, any articulation is insufficient, 
organizations need dialogues among employees and with patients and consumers 
to be open to different perspectives and to have a clearer understanding of the 
goods which identify them as a collective and which enforces the commitment of 
those involved. 
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 The second reason arises from the fact that much of an HCOs identity is informal 
and stems from practices that are performed daily. To assume moral responsibility 
for these practices by strong evaluation is a way of self-interpretation and critical 
self-evaluation (Vosman, 2003). Strong evaluation means, in this context, that 
employees enter into a critical dialogue about whether their practices really 
correspond with and realize the strongly valued goods of the HCO, and whether 
their practices really reflect their identity and the identity of the HCO. To use the 
same example as mentioned above: a practice in which patients are approached as 
consumers can cause moral distress, because there is a strongly valued good of 
protecting patients or a sense that patients are much more than simply consumers: 
they are – also – persons in need of help, with families, questions of meaning, hope, 
and distress. 
 The third reason for paying attention to internal dialogues is that moral 
responsibility should be rooted in commitments more than in obligations. An 
obligation to fulfill a certain duty, like asking patients for an informed consent, is 
much more appealing if the agent involved is committed to the underlying good of 
respecting people. If this commitment is absent, and informed consent is asked 
only because the law prescribes it, the agent shows an act of compliance not of 
moral responsibility. Dialogues about our strong evaluations do enhance such 
commitments. Like moral sources: they empower us to act and to be good. 
 
3.3. Narrative dimension 
Institutions exist in time. They chronologically precede the actual staff and patients 
and they have the ambition to remain when present staff and patients have left. 
Moreover, any particular HCO is embedded in the extended temporal dimension of 
healthcare as a social institution at large: the goods that shape the identity of a 
particular and contemporary HCO are related to the past and the future of 
mankind, of medicine, and of care for the sick. To reflect and to articulate the 
narrative dimension of the institution identity means: examining its history to 
know what kind of HCO this is, looking at the different stories that are told about 
the HCO, to what goods it was and is committed in these stories, to how it 
understood its moral responsibility in the past and shapes its responsibility for the 
future, and to how it understands itself as a unity in the dialectical relation to 
continuity and change. 
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 To become familiar with the narrative dimension is relevant for what is central, 
enduring, and distinctive. Illustrative is the somewhat sad observation of Blake, 
that many healthcare ethics committees in the USA are quite familiar with 
Beauchamp and Childress and with the leading court opinions of patient’s rights, 
but that they have no familiarity with the values, traditions, or heritage of their 
own organizations (Blake, 1999). 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article we attempt to understand the moral responsibility of a 
contemporary HCO as a part of its identity. 
 We distinguish two meanings of moral responsibility: responsibility as a way of 
acting and responsibility as a way of being. Referring to the philosophy of Charles 
Taylor, we hold that a more profound insight into moral responsibility is gained by 
relating this responsibility to the identity of the HCO and to the multitude of 
identities that are represented by its employees. This relation is reciprocal: the 
way an HCO understands its identity influences its moral behavior, and, 
conversely, in its moral behavior the identity of an HCO is defined and developed. 
 Central to identity is a commitment to and identification with certain goods. For 
an HCO, some of these goods will be found in mission statements, core values, or 
certain policies. Like an iceberg, however, most of its goods are hidden under the 
surface. They are implicit in certain practices. They can also be implicit in certain 
policies, because many of these policies are one-sidedly focused on procedures or 
rules. Procedures or rules may be necessary for an adequate functioning of the 
HCO, but their binding force will be greater to the extent that they are related to 
moral sources that anchor commitment and engagement. 
 To act and to be responsible require the articulation of the different senses of 
the good, as well as the different sources and diversity of goods present among 
employees, in the practices and in the narratives of the HCO. Dialogues and 
practical reasoning about dilemmas and about the goods underlying practices are 
needed as means for critical self-interpretation and self-evaluation. They connect 
responsibility to what is decisive for the identity of an HCO and its employees: this 
cannot be given up without severe damage to the identity of both. 
 We elaborate this identity–responsibility connection through some concrete 
moral challenges for contemporary HCOs offered by the tension between the good 
of care and the good of social justice, the way respect for patients is motivated, and 
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the difference between fulfilling obligations and being committed to goods and 
sources that generate these obligations. 
 The plurality of goods and of senses of these goods offer to mainstream, modern 
moral philosophy an argument for simply accepting the competing moral goods, 
and for solving moral problems by rational procedures and by calculating the 
advantages and disadvantages of different options. In our opinion, however, Taylor 
rightly makes the claim that the opposite should be the case. Certainly, HCOs with 
their different internal ‘webs of interlocutors’ should try to articulate the plurality 
of goods and sources that are present within the organization and the community, 
and bring them into debate. Complex bioethical issues like cloning, decisions about 
the end of human life, the allocation of scarce resources, and the demands for 
social justice ask for a substantive ethics, and not, or not alone, for a procedural 
one (see also Pellegrino, 2000). 
 It may be difficult to articulate moral goods. But this difficulty is not an 
argument for not trying. If this articulation is not tried at all, the HCO is at risk of 
gradually drifting away from the ultimate cornerstone of its identity: to be a caring 
and just institution for both present and future patients. 
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Notes 
1. In line with Bernard Williams, Taylor criticizes modern moral philosophy as being too much 
concentrated on obligations instead of on motivations (Taylor, 1989: 89-90; Williams, 1985). 
2.  For Taylor, a specific argument for paying attention to the relation between identity and 
morality is: ‘‘that the moral philosophies today tend to obscure these connections’’ (Taylor, 
1989: X). 
3.  Several commentators on Taylor use the term ‘‘value’ instead of ‘good’ or use these terms 
interchangeably. See for instance Smith (2000: 113–114); Breuer (2002); Joas (1999: 195–
226). Taylor perceives the use of the value-concept as an illustration of the reduction of 
morality by main streams of contemporary thinking to personal projections or emotions. He 
associates ‘‘values’’ with ‘‘relatively colorless subjectivist talk’’ (Taylor, 1989: 507) and with 
emotions and feelings. As opposed to this subjectivism he understands ‘goods’’ as objective 
parts of reality, and due to this status, significant and demanding for us and able to move us. In 
this article we will follow Taylor’s preference for the term ‘good’ and ‘goods.’  
4. Goia considers the notion of mutiple identities in organizations as ‘‘... perhaps a key (if subtle) 
point of difference between individuals and organizations.’’ In different dialogues with 
different audiences, organization subsume a multiplicity of audiences (Goia, 1998: 21).  
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Abstract 
Main question of this paper is why in modern societies, marked by pluralism and a 
privatization of religion, Catholic HCOs still should articulate their Catholic identity 
on their websites. Three perspectives are explored: of the organization, of the 
Magisterium of the Church, and of Taylor’s philosophy. The organizational 
perspective is explored by interviewed leading persons in Catholic HCOs in the 
United States. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops are used as an example of Magisterial 
articulation. Concerning the third perspective, we introduce a ‘modernized’ 
concept of articulation, to specify Taylor’s critical stance to tendencies in modern 
culture towards non-articulation. In all three perspectives we find strong 
arguments in favor of clearly articulating a HCO’s Catholic identity. It is a way to 
tell who you are, and to make people aware of what is done and why it is done. 
Articulation also enables Catholic identity to become a continuously developing 
characteristic of a healthcare organization, and a source of critical self-awareness. 
At the same time, it demonstrates that the Catholic tradition is a living tradition. 
Ultimately, articulation is a means to the end of good care practices. It is in these 
practices that Catholic identity ought to show itself. 
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Introduction 
This paper deals with the question whether, and if yes, why it is relevant for 
contemporary Catholic healthcare organizations (HCOs) to articulate their Catholic 
identity. This question relates to a more encompassing issue: the meaning of 
institutional Catholic identity against the contemporary backdrop of scientific and 
rational approaches to health problems, religious and moral pluralism, 
secularization, increasing influence of markets, and a decline in religious callings. 
We will answer this question from three different perspectives: an organizational 
one by means of interviews, an ecclesiastical by means of magisterial teaching, and 
a philosophical one referring to Charles Taylor. The answers found in these three 
perspectives will be compared. The discussion will highlight two specific reasons 
in favor of an articulation of Catholic identity. First, it enables Catholic HCOs to 
contribute to the primary objective of the medical-ethical teaching of the Church: 
to sustain a healthcare practice that gives due right to the dignity of human beings. 
Second, by articulating their identity Catholic HCOs can perform an exemplary role 
in contemporary pluralistic society on humanity and justice in healthcare. 
 
1. Interviews 
1.1. Background 
The Catholic identity of a HCO can be expressed in many ways: actual behaviors, 
organizational culture, religious symbols, architecture. However, these expressions 
are not ‘articulations of identity’ in our understanding of the word. In the course of 
this paper we will elaborate on the concept of ‘articulation’, but we start with a 
working definition: articulation is the expression of something in a coherent verbal 
form, for instance our feelings. According to this definition, the information a 
Catholic organization provides on its website concerning its Catholic identity is a 
way of articulating. We employed this working definition in interviews in the U.S., 
in the autumn of 2005. 
 Catholic HCOs in the U.S. present an instructive case for learning about the 
relevancy of articulating. They constitute the largest group of non-profit health 
care sponsors, systems, and facilities in the U.S. (Dougherty, 2004: 181; Pellegrino, 
2004: 1; Catholic Health Association, 2007). At the same time they experience their 
Catholic mission to be under pressure, among others by social groups like Merger 
Watch, that fight faith-based restrictions in providing certain services in, for 
instance, reproductive healthcare or in end-of-life care decisions (Merger Watch, 
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2007). Great pressure also comes from a strongly market-oriented society. Market-
forces, however, also encourage religious organizations to ‘sell’ religion. This is one 
of the explanations why the U.S. contradicts the wide spread assumption that 
modernization automatically leads to secularization (Halman et al, 2005: 61; 
Zuckerman, 2004). Another explanation is sought in the constitutional separation 
between church and state. As Wills puts it: “Thrown back on themselves, the 
churches were encouraged to search for their own essence, make their moral case 
on truly religious grounds, reward people in the proper spiritual currency” (Wills, 
1990: 383). Because of the presence of this complex of opposing and reinforcing 
factors, it is instructive to see how and why Catholic HCOs in the U.S. articulate 
their identity. 
 The objective of the interviews was to collect ideas for reflection on these 
questions. The results are not intended to be representative for the U.S. in general, 
nor for all Catholic healthcare facilities, and even not for the HCOs that were 
involved. But the results help to deepen our understanding of whether, and why it 
is relevant to articulate identity. 
 
1.2. Articulation on websites 
Five Catholic HCOs were involved: three hospitals, a health system and a 
healthcare association. We shall denote the last two as ‘member organizations’. 
Websites are easily accessible, and meant to inform a broad public about, among 
other issues, mission, vision and values of the organization. Mission defines its 
reason to exist. Vision formulates the kind of organization it intends to become. 
Values represent the deeply held beliefs of the organization with respect to how it 
expects everyone to behave (Glossary, 2007). 
 On the websites we visited these distinctions are not always sharp.1 What one 
organization has formulated under mission, another has formulated under vision. 
Sometimes values are presented separately, sometimes as part of the mission. For 
our purposes, these differences are less important. Our main interest is what these 
websites articulate with respect to the Catholic identity of the organization. Three 
coherent elements can be distinguished. 
 The first element consists of the basic commitments of the Catholic 
organization. They refer to special groups, like all persons that need special 
attention, or persons that are poor and vulnerable. Websites also refer to primary 
tasks like the promotion of health through education, research and patient care; 
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the promotion of the common good; or the task to act in communion with the 
Church. 
 The second element is the religiously inspired background. Some refer to the 
Gospel by expressing the goal to affirm the Good News, or to carry out the healing 
mission of Jesus and the Church. Other organizations present their history of 
spiritually motivated care by telling about their founders. The two member 
organizations articulate their background as a ministry of the Church. 
 The third element contains the core values. They encompass a wide range of 
values: respect, integrity, compassion, excellence, knowledge, service to others, 
heritage, trust, integrity, sense of team, accountability, joy, care, service to the 
poor, reverence, wisdom, dedication and creativity. 
 Both member organizations also offer information about Catholic views on 
medical ethics and social justice, as a way to support and educate their members. 
 
1.3. Interviews: method 
In total 27 persons were interviewed about what the organization they work for 
has articulated on its website. 
 Most of the interviewees had a leading position and a specific responsibility 
with regard to the Catholic identity and mission of their organization. Twelve were 
members of, or closely affiliated to the board. Six were closely involved in 
developing institutional ethics policies, for instance as chairman of the ethics 
committee. Five had a management function in the field of medicine, nursing or 
pastoral care. Finally, four were working as practitioners. All of the interviewees 
were believers, most of them Catholic, and ten belonged to a religious congregation 
as priest, nun or friar. 
 The interviewees had been informed in advance about the main theme to be 
discussed: the articulation of Catholic identity. Whether and why is it relevant, how 
is it perceived in a pluralist environment, and how is it implemented? All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. In advance, the interviewees were 
asked if they consented with this procedure, which they all did. The length of the 
interviews was between 30 and 60 minutes. 
 The interviews were semi-structured. There was one main theme to be 
discussed, but dependent on the interviewee’s function, interests, and the course of 
the interview, some aspects received more attention than others. 
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 To prepare the interviews, we focused on mission, vision and value statements 
on the website of their organization that were clearly related to the Catholic 
identity. The website-information was used as interview material. With regard to 
the analysis of the interviews, we proceeded in several steps. First, we did a close 
reading of the transcribed interviews, searching for passages with statements 
about articulation. Second, we coded all statements with regard to identity 
articulation. Third, we selected coded statements that recurred regularly, or that 
expressed a specific reason of the interviewee to attach high importance to 
articulating identity. Finally, we headed the coded statements under seven 
considerations expressed by the interviewees with regard to the relevancy of 
articulating Catholic identity. 
 
1.4. Results 
We will present the seven considerations, and clarify them by inserting illustrative 
quotes.2 
 1. Communication: mission, vision and values tell everyone inside and outside 
the organization what kind of organization it is. It is a way to express “who we are”. 
One of the member organizations values articulation as a way to express the 
“charismas of the sponsoring organizations”. 
 2. Integrity: interviewees define this as the congruence between the kind of 
organization it claims to be and its actual performances. They emphasize that 
articulation of identity is to ensure its integrity, not to outline what makes this 
organization different from others: “Difference is not the important issue; our 
integrity is.” A clear articulation of mission and values offers a criterion to judge an 
organization’s integrity: “It is your framework for action, and for measuring your 
achievements. Not just of what you are doing, but how you are doing it. It is your 
moral foundation. How can you know that you did a good job, when you haven’t said 
what you’re about?” Articulation of mission presents an enduring “call to integrity.” 
That is why one interviewee said that the only way to understand mission is “to 
understand it backwards, from your behavior”. 
 3. Inspiration: you do not only have to make clear what you do, but also why you 
do it, and why all people working in the organization do it. A clearly articulated 
mission statement “is the container of meaning for people’s work. It gives meaning 
to the people within the organization and to the place of the organization in the 
whole context of the larger society. (…) They got committed to the mission and 
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bound, as leader and follower, to something that transcends them both but to which 
they are totally committed. This is what energizes an organization. It also is the basis 
of the relationships between and among all the employees. They are bound not 
because they like you, but because they are committed to the same mission.” A shared 
inspiration can strengthen the internal cohesion of an organization. The effect on 
Catholics will be stronger than on non-Catholics, but the latter might be inspired 
by the stated values, since a Catholic source of inspiration is not a conditio sine qua 
non for offering care that reflect these values: “On the practical level, other 
institutions could say the same thing, from their own perspective.” This means, that 
much of what Catholic hospitals do in everyday practice is not considered to be an 
exclusive Catholic hallmark. 
 4. Invitation: articulating identity is meant to invite people, whatever their 
beliefs, to commit themselves to the organization. This invitation can take different 
forms. A more passive form is to express that people of all religions are welcome: 
“Among non-Catholics, there are two groups I guess. One of these will just ignore the 
mission and use the core values. A second group, even if they are not Catholic, might 
appreciate the religious language (…). The religious identity of this place makes them 
feel very strongly welcomed as a religious person; even though it is the language of 
another religion.” Several interviewees point to the active form of the invitation: 
“We believe that all our associates need to bring their spirituality into the hospital so 
that they can bring the best of who they are and give it to our patients, and to one 
another.” One of the institutions coined this invitation as ‘centered pluralism’. 
“‘Center’ denotes the Catholic identity, but also the fact that this identity always is an 
inclusive one, a complex one, given all of the different types of people we have, and 
administrators, from atheist, to agnostic, to Muslim, and Jewish, and protestant, and 
Catholic. So, it says ‘welcome’ to everyone, but is also an invitation to consider what 
kind of community (…) this is if it has this core and these historical Catholic roots (…). 
It is an invitation to serious conversations that show results, and benefit people.” The 
existent pluralism within the organization offers a reason for conversation. One 
wishes to create “a reflective ethos”. 
 5. Ethics: articulation of Catholic beliefs as a moral source for the organization is 
considered to be a stimulus to all to articulate their own ‘moral sources.’ It invites 
non-Catholics and people without religious faith, to consider the question: “if I 
don’t think it is Jesus as the reason, so why do I? It puts that question before people. 
And when they are just up there, and when they are ungrounded, and the onus is on 
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people to create their own ground, and unless somebody has forcefully stated what 
he or she thinks his or her own ground is, then there is really less motive to establish 
one for yourself.” Articulation of guiding moral sources and values is also a way “to 
attribute conscience to an institution”. Of particular importance is that articulating 
the organization’s Catholic identity expresses that the institution and all who work 
there are bound by the ethical views and guidelines of the Catholic Church. For 
instance: “In obstetrics there might be issues with which non-Catholic physicians will 
not particularly agree, but in terms of how they manage patients here, they have to 
comply with the rules and regulations of this Catholic institution.” This sometimes 
might cause dilemmas, for example with the training of future physicians: “… 
residents should learn all there is to know about abortion, contraception, 
sterilization, etc. They do not have to do it, but they have to get acquainted to it, to 
learn the procedures. If we would not do anything, then we have the problem for the 
future that we would have no ob-gyn physicians anymore that got their education in 
Catholic medical schools. Now we made a contract with a fertility center. Of course, 
there were worries about whether or not this was cooperating with evil. But we 
worked it out in a way that satisfied also the archbishop.” In other words, one 
succeeded in finding a pragmatic solution. A similar result was reached in clinical 
trials demanding participating research subjects not to become pregnant. 
According to the Church contraceptives are not allowed. These discordant 
requirements were reconciled in such a way that the written information to 
research subjects: “did what the drugs companies needed, saying ‘you can not get 
pregnant and you can not father a child’, but in such a way that it was not offensive 
to the Ethical and Religious Directives of the U.S. Bishops. It said nothing about using 
contraceptives and stuff like that. So we do not approve of contraceptives, but we do 
not say anything about using them or not using them.” Some interviewees consider 
discussions on the implications of some ethical views of the Church desirable, but 
difficult: “One of the challenges for a Catholic institution is to invite people to reflect 
on the experiences of the people, and to say, where are the points of tension between 
the tough choices people are making, and the guidelines that we have articulated? 
But that conversation is not taking place, because I do not perceive there is going to 
be openness. In the U.S. we have many Catholics who believe there is no matter of 
gravity: that sterilization is the same as abortion, or as artificial contraception.” 
 6. Being prophetic, defined as ‘counter cultural’. In market-driven, 
commercialized, and businesslike healthcare “the mission statement actually does 
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reflect a kind of countercultural aspect of Catholic healthcare.” Another explained 
this as: “We work from an ethical perspective of the common good. That provides our 
framework for how we think about humane healthcare in this country. Our society, 
on the contrary, looks from the perspective of negative rights: do not take my guns, 
or, do not take my rights to make my own choices. The more I can choose, the better 
it is.” Being prophetic also implicates that: “the Catholic hospital has to commit 
itself, and reaffirm its commitment to the poor, to those who are suffering, to those on 
the margin of society.” With regard to the growing influence of technology in 
healthcare, articulation of Catholic identity is a “reminder of the greater good 
technology has to serve.” This prophetic function can only become productive and 
challenging in combination with ethics and the emphasis on ongoing debates. 
Taking the example of technology we “need to constantly articulate the greater 
good, and rearticulate it. This process is part of articulation”. 
 7. Strategy: an articulated Catholic identity can guide the organization in times 
of great changes like a merger, or of deep crises of, for instance, financial nature. 
Clearly articulated mission and values statements also provide important strategic 
tools for guiding ethical decisions within the organization, analyzing actual 
behaviors and policies, and recruiting and training of people. The strategic reason, 
therefore, plays a role in all considerations mentioned above. It impels the 
organization to put efforts in making the mission alive, as part of its strategy: “if 
there are ways for people to participate and to understand how it applies to them, 
and if they are constantly helped to see what good work they are doing towards the 
mission, and they are rewarded for that, a mission can be immensely helpful”. Special 
attendance in many interviews is given to the language of articulation. There is a 
tension between an explicitly religious and a more neutral vocabulary. The former 
makes use of, as Carol Taylor calls it, “Jesus language”, like ‘healing mission of 
Jesus’, ‘according to the Gospel’, or, ‘the good news’. The latter are limited to 
references to the historical roots in religious communities or persons that founded 
the organization (Taylor C, 2001). A more neutral vocabulary is mostly preferred 
because of the concern that too religious a vocabulary might put people off. Others 
wish to be more explicitly religious, because it should be much more expressive for 
“who we are and how we want our health ministry to be”. 
 The interviews did not disclose to what extent articulation of mission, vision 
and values really affects daily practice. Estimations of some interviewees vary from 
optimism, “we bring mission alive in the way we behave on a day-to-day basis” to the 
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skeptic observation that this is “day dreaming”. All interviewees, however, are 
aware that a mere statement of Catholic identity does not suffice. Ideally, 
articulation of identity should affect day-to-day conduct of employees. 
 In sum: all interviewees underscore the relevancy of articulating the Catholic 
identity of the organization, and motivate this by considerations as mentioned 
above. These considerations are endorsed by organizational theories. These 
theories confirm that it is relevant for any organization to clearly communicate its 
identity as a way to keep up its integrity, to inspire its employees and foster 
internal cohesion, to invite people to commit themselves to the organization, and 
to guide ethical and strategic behaviors (Collins & Porras, 1994; Whetten & 
Godfrey, 1998; Mills & Spencer, 2005). A well-articulated mission is an important 
condition for values-based decision-making (Iltis, 2005). 
 However, the considerations of the interviewees should also be understood 
from the perspective of religious reasons. One wants to be explicit about the 
Catholic identity of the organization: to make clear that this organization is a moral 
agent at the intersection of Catholicism and healthcare (Sulmasy, 1997). By means 
of the articulation of this mission, this vision and these values the organization 
presents itself as a ministry of the Church, committing itself to the Church’s 
religious and ethical views. Second, part of being an institutional moral agent is 
that articulation of Catholic identity empowers them to behave counter-culturally: 
by resisting the dominance of the market, the tendencies of depersonalization, and 
the societal lack of care for the poor and uninsured. Third, being explicit on being 
Catholic, this term is presented as an inclusive characteristic. Inclusive means that 
Catholic identity involves inviting associates, employees and students to bring to 
the organization their own sources of inspiration and their own moral views. 
Reflection and ongoing discussions on the meanings of the Catholic identity in a 
pluralistic environment present a constitutive part of this identity. 
 
2. Magisterium 
Although identity is articulated by means of stated missions, visions and values on 
websites, all interviewees agree that it must be shown in institutional policies and 
guidelines. The organization, advised by its ethics committee, has to articulate its 
guiding principles and values with regard to different ethical and organizational 
issues, and the concrete ways of behavior that flow from them. To pursue that, 
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Catholic HCOs carefully observe the moral teaching of the Catholic Church, as this 
is spread by the Magisterium. 
 The Magisterium is the teaching authority of the Church in matters of faith and 
morals. Since the Middle Ages it has become increasingly concentrated in the 
Church hierarchy, particularly in the pope and bishops (Mahoney, 1989: 116-120; 
Lumen Gentium, nr. 25). In the U.S. this teaching has been concretized in the 
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, fourth edition, 
published in 2001 by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. They 
represent to Catholic HCOs in the U.S. the main normative framework for 
articulating their ethical and religious responsibilities. 
 The Directives themselves can be considered as articulations by the U.S. bishops 
of what it means to be a Catholic healthcare facility. They specify what a healthcare 
organization ought to commit itself to, ethically and religiously, in order to be 
recognized as a Catholic organization. The Directives rely on a rich tradition and 
numerous authoritative documents offered by the Church, from encyclicals, 
pastoral letters, papal addresses, to documents of local bishop conferences.3 
 In the Preamble of the Directives health care is presented as a ministry of the 
Church. To understand this ministry, “one must take into account the new 
challenges presented by transitions both in the Church and in American society”. 
The Bishops want to meet these challenges by relying on “a body of moral 
principles (…) that expresses the Church’s teaching on medical and moral matters 
and has proven to be pertinent and applicable to the ever changing circumstances 
of health care and its delivery.” Its purpose is: “first, to reaffirm the ethical 
standards of behavior in health care that flow from the Church’s teaching about the 
dignity of the human person; second to provide authoritative guidance on certain 
moral issues that face Catholic health care today.” The moral teaching flows 
“principally from the natural law, understood in the light of the revelation Christ 
had entrusted to his Church”. 
 The General Introduction offers the theological background for the Catholic 
health care ministry. It articulates the way health care can be perceived from a 
Christian perspective. Catholic health care is animated by Christian love. From this 
perspective it is possible to interpret “healing and compassion as a continuation of 
Christ’s mission”, suffering as “a participation in the redemptive power of Christ’s 
passion, death, and resurrection”, and death “as an opportunity for a final act of 
communion with Christ”. In the course of history, the bishops continue, this 
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religious background has inspired many to engage themselves with the healing 
mission of the Church: individuals, religious communities, and, increasingly, lay 
Catholics. Church leaders always had, and still have the responsibility to review 
medical, technological and social developments in consultation with the medical 
professionals, to judge these developments “according to the principles of right 
reason and the ultimate standard of revealed truth, and offer authoritative 
teaching and guiding about the moral and pastoral responsibilities entailed by the 
Christian face.” The bishops are aware that the Church does not have all the 
answers to every moral dilemma, but “there are many questions about which she 
provides normative guidance and direction.” 
 The main part of the Directives is divided into six sections: (1) social 
responsibility; (2) pastoral and spiritual responsibility; (3) the professional patient 
relationship; (4) issues in care for the beginning of life; (5) issues in care for the 
dying; (6) forming new partnerships with health care organizations and providers. 
Every section consists of an introduction, in which the most important theological 
and ethical principles are set forth, particularly the principle of human dignity, 
followed by concrete directives. 
 By elaborating the theological background of Catholic care, the Directives first 
offer a source of inspiration with which organizations, and many individuals 
within the organization, can identify. This background provides them with a point 
of orientation when they start to articulate for themselves what it means to be and 
to act as a Catholic organization. Second, the Directives offer moral guidelines 
regarding how a Catholic healthcare organization ought to behave in matters dealt 
with in the six sections named above. Third, by offering inspiration and guidance 
the Directives provide religious substance to the seven considerations in the 
interviews. In particular considerations regarding inspiration, ethics, being 
prophetic, integrity and strategy derive much of their power and contents from the 
ecclesiastical perspective on healthcare. With regard to the consideration 
concerning communication, the focus of the Magisterium is on communicating 
identity by way of a practice of care that bears witness to the basic principles and 
values of the Church. In their turn, Catholic HCOs communicate their commitment 
to the Church’s mission by observing the Directives. With regard to the 
consideration concerning invitation: while in the interviews the articulation of 
Catholic identity was emphasized as an invitation to all whatever their beliefs are, 
the Directives focus primarily on Catholics, but also on all responsible for, working 
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in, and making use of institutionally based Catholic health care services. Among 
this group, there might be many non-Catholics, but they are invited to observe the 
Directives. 
 The answers that can be derived from the Magisterium to the question whether, 
and if yes, why it is relevant that Catholic HCOs articulate their identity lie on other 
levels than the answers provided in the interviews. In the interviews the focus was 
on creating clarity to all involved with regard to the mission, vision and values that 
define the Catholic identity of the organization. The Directives offer them a frame 
of reference to articulate the guiding principles and values behind their 
organization’s ethical and religious practices. Articulation here means: trying to 
explicate as well as possible what these Directives mean in light of moral 
experiences of people responsible in and for the organization, and to elaborate 
these explications in local and feasible policies and guidelines. 
 The question arises whether such articulation is just repeating the Church’s 
teaching, or whether articulation asks for a more nuanced approach. The former 
seems to be suggested by the strongly obliging and binding character of the 
Directives: if Catholic HCOs should operate otherwise, they risk losing the 
designation ‘Catholic’. With regard to the latter we need to deepen our 
understandings of the concept of articulation. 
 
3. Charles Taylor on articulation 
Although Taylor does not deal with Catholic HCOs, from a philosophical 
perspective he clarifies what articulation is, why it is relevant, how it is valued in 
modern western culture, and how articulation of religious sources can contribute 
to modern culture.4 
 Taylor appeals to a broader concept of articulation than we used as a working 
definition: ‘expressing something in a coherent verbal form.’ Taylor defines 
articulation as the process of explicating the goods that underlie moral and 
spiritual experiences. Articulation is “bringing into awareness that which is 
unspoken but presupposed” (Abbey, 2000: 41). Articulation explicates who 
individuals having these specific experiences are, and, hence, enriches the way 
they understand themselves (Joas, 1999: 208-212). It makes them aware of the 
frameworks that orient their lives and influence their identity. These frameworks 
are ‘horizons of meaning’ that help them to take a stance. Frameworks come to 
them through communities, culture and traditions. Western modern culture itself 
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is the fruit of a sometimes harmonious, sometimes discordant interaction between 
different traditions: the Greece-Roman heritage, the Christian tradition, 
Enlightenment and Romanticism. Therefore, to understand the identity of the 
modern subject, we have to retrieve these traditions and the sources that 
empowered them. 
 By consequence, Taylor ‘modernizes’ the concept of articulation. We label this 
as ‘modernizing’ in the sense that Taylor explicitly questions the position of 
articulation in modern culture. The label ‘modernizing’, therefore, is not meant as a 
value judgment, with its connotations of being better than previous concepts, but 
as a way to give due right to the place of articulation in modern culture. Taylor’s 
core message is that in contemporary western society the need for articulation of 
the moral goods that made the achievements of modern culture possible is higher 
than ever, but the tendencies to declare articulation irrelevant and subjective are 
stronger than ever. 
 This is well expressed in the final chapter of his Sources of the Self, where he 
characterizes this study as a work of liberation: “The intuition which inspired it, 
which I have recurred to, is simply that we tend in our culture to stifle the spirit 
(…). We have read so many goods of our official story, we have buried their power 
so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stifling. 
Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling. The intention of 
this work was one of retrieval. An attempt to uncover buried goods through re-
articulation – and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air 
back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit” (Taylor, 1989: 520). 
 In this quotation, several important points of Taylor’s philosophical view on 
articulation in modern culture come together. 
 First, Taylor positively appraises modern culture because of the goods it 
achieved in the course of its history and which energized its development: the 
liberation of the disengaged, autonomous and rational thinking subject; a drive for 
practical benevolence and alleviation of suffering; a quest for universal justice 
based on equal human rights. 
 Second, besides this ‘grandeur’ of modern culture, there is also ‘malaise’ . Taylor 
criticizes modern culture because it favors a neglect of the moral sources of these 
goods. Modern culture entails strong tendencies to consider these sources as 
merely optional and subjective. For instance, the predominant naturalistic outlook 
reduces all human goods and meanings to phenomena that can be described in 
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scientific and behavioral terms and declares terms that do not fit in such a 
description irrelevant. It reduces terms that express the meaning-dimension of 
human existence to non-meaning, to the realm of subjective illusions (Smith, 2002: 
6-7). Taylor objects to this way of reasoning: a term like ‘dignity’ may not be 
described in terms of natural sciences, but it still may be an indispensable term for 
human beings to make sense of their life and of certain moral feelings.  
 Third, Taylor argues that re-articulation of moral sources is needed to revitalize 
the spirit of modernity. Smith qualifies this as the ‘therapeutic aim’ of Taylor 
(ibidem, 2002: 7). 
 In the same chapter of Sources Taylor briefly alludes to Judeo-Christian theism 
as the most promising framework for him to restore the spirit of modern culture. 
In a later work, A Catholic Modernity (1999), Taylor more elaborately analyzes the 
meaning of this religious framework for and in modern culture. That is why Abbey 
calls this work a complement to Sources (Abbey,2000: 199). Or, as Morgan 
formulates it: Taylor holds that in western tradition: “God is one of those realities 
the love of which has empowered people to do and to be good” (Morgan, 1994: 53). 
 The term ‘articulation’ has no place in Catholic Modernity. Nevertheless, Catholic 
Modernity clearly is an articulation of what Catholicity means for Taylor, and how 
it connects to his work as a philosopher of culture. Taylor starts by articulating the 
meaning of the word ‘catholic’ (Taylor, 1999: 14-15): the original word katholou 
comprises both universality and wholeness; wholeness is a goal of human life that 
can only be attained by recognition of diversity among human beings; Catholic, 
therefore, denotes to an ‘oneness in diversity’, not to a ‘sameness’. 
 Concerning the relation between modern culture and Christianity Taylor 
distinguishes two aspects. On the one hand, modernity liberated Christian beliefs 
from Christendom, a “civilization where the structures, institutions, and culture 
were all supposed to reflect the Christian nature of the society” (ibidem: 17). By 
breaking with the so-called Christian society modern culture “carried certain facets 
of Christian life further than they ever were taken or could have been taken within 
Christendom” (ibidem: 16). As an example, Taylor points to the universal human 
rights that would not have been possible under Christendom. 
 On the other hand, however, modern culture started to embrace an ‘exclusive 
humanism’, a notion of human flourishing, without recognition of any valid aim 
beyond this. Any transcendent vision that refers to a dimension beyond life is 
eliminated. Taylor qualifies this elimination as a denial of human experience. For 
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instance, pain, suffering and death are negations of human flourishing, but can 
have deep human significance. A culture that denies transcendence, denies what it 
means to be human. For Taylor, religions are bearers of this transcendent 
dimension, and they contain important moral sources for people to live a good and 
meaningful life.  
 While Catholic Modernity can be considered an articulation of the contents of 
Catholic beliefs, at least as Taylor sees them, Varieties of Religion (Taylor, 2002) 
describes the conditions for the possibility of religion in the secular world of today. 
In this work Taylor does not use the term ‘articulation’, but the shifting position of 
religion in the present-day world has its implications in this regard as well. 
 Varieties sketches the development from a strongly socially and institutionally 
based religion – here denoted by Taylor as a Durkheimian regime and in Catholic 
Modernity as the period of Christendom – towards a strongly privatized and 
experience-based one: a post-Durkheimian situation. 
 In the latter, the emphasis is on authenticity and ‘doing your own thing’ (ibidem: 
84). At the beginning of the 21st century, expressive individualism, already alluded 
to in Sources (Taylor, 1989) and in Ethics of Authenticity (Taylor, 1991) has become 
a mass phenomenon. Taylor observes several attempts in the U.S. to restore 
something of the old situation into a kind of neo-Durkheimian model. For instance, 
together with the moral majority the Christian Right tries to strengthen the idea of 
‘one nation under God’. He also observes tendencies in the leadership of the 
Catholic Church, led by the Vatican, to line up with the Christian Right. However, he 
estimates the possibilities of success as pretty small. What counts in modern world 
is the motto: “Only accept what rings true to your own inner Self” (Taylor, 2002: 
101). Therefore, all attempts to settle a new kind of forced conformity will be 
counterproductive. The spiritual costs will be high: “hypocrisy, spiritual 
stultification, inner revolt against the Gospel, the confusion of faith and power, and 
even worse. Even if we had a choice, I’m not sure we wouldn’t be wiser to stick 
with the present dispensation” (ibidem: 114). With regard to articulation Varieties 
makes clear that, as opposed to previous historical periods, churches may run up 
against resistances if they try to impose their articulations of what is morally good 
and meaningful to their members. Many contemporary believers will accept these 
articulations only in as far as these evoke resonance in their individual experience. 
 In sum, the philosophical perspective represented by Taylor enables us to 
modernize the concept of articulation, in the sense of understanding articulation 
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against the backdrops of modern western culture. This culture tends to consider 
any articulation of what underlies people’s moral and spiritual experiences as 
irrelevant and subjective. Taylor’s claim, however, is that subjective experiences 
cannot be separated from transcending frameworks of goods that come to 
individuals by communities and traditions. What an individual discovers as a 
moral good underlying his experiences is compelling because it is not a mere 
subjective good. It is desired because it is desirable, not vice versa. Christianity is 
one of the frameworks of western culture, containing goods that contribute to the 
morals of modern culture. It lost its dominant position. It cannot be imposed 
anymore on subjects, but only be made accessible and valued through individual 
experiences. 
 
4. Discussion 
As shown above from different perspectives, it is relevant for contemporary 
Catholic HCOs to articulate their identity. The interviewed persons emphasize that 
articulating clear missions, visions and values is relevant for organizational-
theoretical reasons, and for clearly presenting the organization as a Catholic 
facility. The Magisterium emphasizes articulation of principles and values in 
behaviors that flow from the Church’s teaching on the dignity of the human person, 
and offers guidance in present-day moral issues. The Directives apply these 
teachings to U.S. Catholic healthcare facilities. From a philosophical perspective 
Taylor argues that in modern culture articulation is a necessary means to create 
identity, to restore and preserve the moral goods of modern culture, and critically 
to assess the way these goods are being realized. He believes Christianity to be a 
major moral source for the goods of modernity, but as opposed to earlier times, 
modern subjects will be inspired by this source only if and in so far as it connects 
with their individual experience. We called this a modernized concept of 
articulation. From this modernized concept two additional reasons will be 
discussed to answer the question whether and why articulation of Catholic identity 
is relevant. First, articulation is a means to contribute to the moral teaching of the 
Church. Second, articulation is a way for Catholic HCOs to contribute to moral 
dialogues in contemporary pluralistic society.  
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4.1. Catholic HCOs and the Church 
Both Catholic HCOs and the Magisterium emphasize the importance of complying 
with the Directives. Above we found several strong reasons for this emphasis. The 
Directives provide Catholic HCOs with a substantive horizon for their goal to 
continue the healing mission of Jesus. They empower and oblige them to strive for 
humane and holistic care. They offer a critical potential against treating patients 
only as medical problems, or only according to their ability to pay. They help to 
honor the dignity of every patient irrespective of someone’s sometimes degrading 
bodily, mental or social circumstances. In particular, the Directives are valued as a 
robust moral framework for taking care of the poor and marginalized, despite 
financial pressures and consequences. 
 Next to these substantive reasons to observe the Directives, there are practical 
ones. The Code of Canon Law obliges HCOs to follow them: if they do not, they lose 
their designation ‘Catholic’ (Morrisey, 1999). Next, observing the Directives 
protects their Catholic identity in modes of cooperation with non-Catholic 
facilities. Further, there is no reason for not complying with the Directives, because 
according to the interviewees all employees appear to be willing to accept them, 
irrespective of their personal moral and religious convictions. Finally, as some 
interviewees said, any attempt to a less strict identification with the Directives 
would evoke a vehement debate with rigid religious groups, in which there is 
nothing to gain, and much to lose, at least in terms of time. 
 Nevertheless, a modernized concept of articulation allows us to argue that the 
magisterial teaching can be enriched by taking into account the numerous moral 
experiences of people within HCOs with illness, suffering and death, with the 
vulnerability of life, with questions of meaning, and with hard medical-ethical or 
organizational-ethical choices. These experiences are gained against the backdrops 
of the complexities of modern western culture, among others pluralism, 
secularization, high progress in technology and science, strong dominance of 
economical thinking. Standing in this culture, experiences gained by and within 
Catholic HCOs appeal to practical intelligence and conscientious judgments. In 
many cases the ethics committee represents the forum to discuss the institutional 
implications of these experiences, and, hence, to develop policies and guidelines. 
 Articulation will show the plurality of goods, and eventually evils, that are at 
stake: social, psychological, medical, spiritual, ethical, legal, economical, 
institutional and so on. Moreover, because many experiences are gained while 
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standing in caring or governing relations with concrete subjects, the question of 
what one morally owes to this unique man or woman becomes much more 
pressing. Next, by articulating and rearticulating experiences, they mature in the 
course of time: they become a built-up property, a fruit of personal or 
governmental moral growth. An experienced physician, for instance, tries to 
discern the good of a patient by remembering what has proven to be good in 
previous comparable situations without duplicating them into the present, by 
making use of his medical knowledge and by looking forward to what should and 
could be pursued for this patient in this situation. Experience is the cornerstone of 
practical wisdom, known as the virtue of prudence, or the ‘recta ratio agibilium’, 
the rectified judgment of things to be done (Henry, 1993: 32). Medical and 
governmental prudence can add indispensable knowledge to the goal of both HCOs 
and the Church: to realize and sustain good care. Therefore, Catholic HCOs can be 
considered as communities which can not only be taught by the Church, but which 
can also teach something to the Church. This is what Mahoney alludes to when he 
states that the teaching Church – Ecclesia docens – could learn from the learning 
Church – Ecclesia discens (Mahoney, 1989: 222). 
 There is support for this approach also from within Catholic moral tradition. 
This tradition acknowledges experience as an indispensable source of moral 
knowledge, in addition to Divine revelation in Scripture and tradition. As is the 
case with revelation, experiences ask for explanation: why do we experience some 
things as good, or bad, or admirable, or objectionable? In that sense, the plea of 
Taylor in favor of articulation is truly Catholic: articulation is a way to acquire 
moral knowledge by evaluating moral experiences. Catholic moral tradition values 
this moral knowledge explicitly as a way to get some insight in God’s will. The 
connection between human experience and God’s will is made in the Catholic 
appeal to natural law: “… people (can) discover right and wrong by using their 
reason and experience to investigate, individually and collectively, the emergent 
patterns of creation as God is creating them” (Kelly, 2004: 84). The ‘emergent 
patterns of creation’ reflect God’s eternal law of ordering the world to its end. 
Generally, natural law is described as: “the participation of eternal law in the 
rational creature” (Curran, 2002: 23-25). In other words, human beings never can 
know the fullness of God’s plans and will with regard to His creation, and they will 
always be in need of revelation and grace. But their capacities rationally to reflect 
on their experiences enable them to uncover, provisionally and within their 
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cultural and historical conditions, something of God’s intentions. In Catholic 
tradition, faith is not just passive obedience, but also an active search for 
intelligibility, fides quaerens intellectum. Faith tells us that God wants our 
flourishing and fulfillment, and all that jeopardizes these is against God’s will. By 
our reason we can discover what contributes to our flourishing. Therefore, in 
Catholic tradition, morality and rationality are closely interwoven. God prohibits 
some acts because they are wrong, i.e., opposed to human happiness; these acts are 
not wrong because God prohibits them. 
 The connection of rationality and morality legitimates what Catholic HCOs 
actually do. They invite all who enter the organization, irrespective of their beliefs, 
to articulate what they experience as good, right and meaningful, while all have 
this rational capacity to search for what contributes to human happiness, and what 
might not. That is why HCOs can be operative as communities, learning by 
articulation. 
 To conclude, rationally dealing with concrete experiences provides Catholic 
HCOs with a source of moral knowledge that is essential to the Church. This source 
enables them to bring the Magisterial teachings to life, to make them concrete, but 
also eventually critically to question them. The articulating of identity by Catholic 
HCOs does not only consist of following the moral teachings of the Magisterium, 
but also of contributing the ethical validations of practical experiences. Catholic 
HCOs have to bring in these validations with religious assent to the bishops 
(Lumen Gentium, nr.25), but there is no objection in principle that some of the 
Directives become subjects of debate. If such a debate can be performed in an open 
and well-argued way, it can contribute to the moral wisdom of the Church. Catholic 
morality is a living tradition. To sustain that, Catholic HCOs should be considered 
not only a ministry of the Church, but also as a ministry to the Church. 
 
4.2. Catholic HCOs and society 
One of the most visible contributions of Catholic HCOs to American society is their 
practical and effective care for the poor and marginalized. Two studies, one 
historical (Kauffman, 1995) and one sociological (Tropman, 2002) show how the 
outreach toward the poor has marked American Catholic healthcare from its 
beginnings. Interviewees have repeatedly emphasized that: care for the poor is the 
touchstone of their identity; abandoning them would severely damage their 
integrity. While the Catholic hospitals we visited offer concrete care for 
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individuals, member organizations put great efforts in advocacy and healthcare 
reform, among others at the political level, resisting strong counter forces in the 
U.S. that want to hold on to the present system. 
 Underlying the differences between opponents and advocates of the present 
system are different views about what constitutes humane and just healthcare. 
While Catholics, inspired by faith, strongly argue in favor of social justice and of the 
responsibility of a community to its vulnerable members, advocates of the present 
system show strong adherence to individual responsibility, entrepreneurialism 
and resistance against too much government interference. Is it possible to 
reconcile this gap? 
 Dell’Oro characterizes the postmodern society as a society without a common 
moral notion (Dell’Oro, 2002). We are, using an expression of Engelhardt, ‘moral 
strangers’, because we are all supposed to embrace our own conception of the 
good life, lacking a commonly shared conception (Engelhardt, 1996). In his view 
ethics can only play a regulative function: finding rational agreements and 
procedures to sustain peace between people and groups with different senses of 
the moral good. As also Taylor stresses, the advantage of modernity is, that it 
protects everyone in his own autonomy and freedom to pursue his self-chosen 
values. The disadvantage is the absence of any substantive dialogue between 
different senses of the moral good, because any particular sense of the good is 
considered to be not communal by definition, and should, therefore, not be 
articulated, at least not in the public domain. 
 From their specific background, Catholic HCOs can contribute to substantive 
dialogues about humanity and justice. 
 First, as we saw, the Catholic reliance on natural law allows them to argue in 
rational terms that are, in principle understandable to all people. Reason and faith 
converge. Faith can empower people to reach out toward the poor and the 
marginalized. Reason can argue for a concept of justice in which the most 
disadvantaged people get priority. Thus, the reasonableness of giving this specific 
meaning to justice can be defended on non-religious terms, but faith can enforce 
this meaning. Similarly, is it possible to argue on rational and conceivable grounds 
that the numerous experiences of a hospital with sick and vulnerable people 
indicate that the humanity of health care cannot be promoted by a one-sided, 
consumer-driven approach to care, nor with governance of quality by only 
technological or financial measures. A HCO does not have to be Catholic to start 
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debates on justice and humanity with their employees. But being Catholic it has a 
strong motive to stimulate such debates. Moreover, it is by such debates, that 
Catholic identity is created. 
 Second, a Catholic HCO can be considered as a miniature society, with inside the 
same moral and religious pluralism as outside: the lack of a common moral notion 
in society as Dell’Oro argues, presents itself also within the HCOs. This creates 
specific possibilities. One is described by Iltis: because of the absence of a shared 
thick understanding of morality in our morally pluralistic society, an organization’s 
mission is its strongest source of moral obligation in our society (Iltis, 2005: 7-8). 
We consider this an argument in favor of a well-articulated mission and values: it 
offers the organizations a clear and distinctive point of reference. A second 
possibility comes to the fore in the interviews and is supported by Taylor. 
Articulation is an ongoing process of trying to explicate what is presupposed. To do 
this, we need frameworks. Several interviewees emphasized the dialogues 
between people with different views as an integral part of articulating Catholic 
identity. In other words, their ‘own’ Catholic framework is not meant to limit 
reflection and dialogue, but is a reason to invite people to reflection and dialogue. 
Taylor proposes to interpret ‘Catholic’ as ‘oneness in diversity’. Being Catholic at 
the level of institutions is precisely that: welcoming the diversity of opinion. One of 
the interviewees expressed the same in the concept of ‘centered pluralism’. 
Everybody is challenged to articulate and rearticulate her and his views, or 
comments on views of others. In a way it is amazing that, as far as we know, Taylor 
has always pleaded for substantive moral dialogues in modern society, but he has 
never explored the possibilities societal institutions like HCOs can offer in this 
regard. HCOs can construct what MacIntyre calls at the end of After Virtue “local 
forms of community” to sustain “civility and the intellectual and moral life” 
(MacIntyre, 1997: 263). Catholic HCOs are communities where such explorations 
can take place. What they discuss regarding the meanings of humanity and justice 
in healthcare and how they discuss these items can play an exemplary role in 
pluralistic society. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We raised the question whether, and if yes, why it is relevant for contemporary 
Catholic healthcare organizations (HCOs) to articulate their Catholic identity. We 
derived answers to this question from an organizational, an ecclesiastical and a 
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philosophical perspective. Although our focus was on the U.S., most of the reasons 
we found in favor of articulation of Catholic identity seem to be applicable to other 
countries as well. These reasons were grounded on organizational theory; on 
clearly communicating its Catholic identity inside and outside the organization; on 
embodying Catholic identity in diverse religious and ethical behaviors areas in 
coherence with the Magisterial teachings of the Church; and on the necessity of 
articulation as a means to create identity and to (re-)vitalize the moral sources of 
modern culture. 
 From Taylor’s philosophy we derived a concept of articulation that we labeled 
as ‘modernized’. Based on this modernized concept, we discussed two additional 
reasons to articulate Catholic identity. By explicating the substantial moral sources 
and moral goods underlying concrete experiences with health, illness, suffering 
and tough organizational choices, Catholic health care organizations can offer a 
critical and coherent contribution to the Church and to society. The objective of 
this contribution is a practice of humane and just care, in accordance with the 
demands of human dignity. By and within this practice, and the efforts of Catholic 
HCOs to realize it, their identity comes alive. 
 Finally, as we emphasized in the beginning, articulation is only one way to 
embody Catholic identity. It makes people aware of what is done and why it is 
done. It enables Catholic identity to become a continuously developing 
characteristic of a healthcare organization, and a source of critical self-awareness. 
At the same time, it demonstrates that the Catholic tradition is a living tradition. 
Ultimately, articulation is a means to the end of good care practices. It is in these 
practices that Catholic identity ought to show itself. 
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Notes 
1. All websites are accessed in the period October-November 2005. For reasons of 
confidentiality, we removed the names of the HCOs and other information that could lead to 
identification. 
2. Again, for reasons of confidentiality and privacy all quotations are presented in such a way, 
that the author of the quotation is not identifiable. In so far as there is suspicion of a link 
between the author of a certain interview quotation and a specific HCO, we emphasize that the 
views expressed are intended only to convey the personal opinions of those persons 
interviewed, and should not be taken to be indicative of the policy of any particular 
organization. 
3. Some of the most influential Vatican documents in this field are: 
• Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: On the Regulation of Birth, Encyclical, 1968; 
• Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion, 1974; 
• Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia,1980; 
• Pope John Paul II, Salvifici Doloris: On the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering, Apostolic 
letter, 1984; 
• Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin 
and on the Dignity of Procreation Donum Vitae: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, 1987; 
• Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On Social Concern. Encyclical, 1988. 
 All documents are available on the website of the Vatican: www.vatican.va. 
4. For a more expanded study on Taylor’s view on articulation see Pijnenburg, ten Have, 2004.  
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Abstract 
Solidarity belongs to the basic principles of Catholic Social Teaching (CST), and is 
part of the ethical repertoire of European moral traditions and European 
healthcare systems. This paper discusses how leaders of Catholic healthcare 
organizations could understand their institutional moral responsibility with regard 
to the preservation of solidarity. In dealing with this question we make use of 
Taylor’s philosophy of modern culture. We first argue that, just as all healthcare 
organizations, Catholic ones also can embody and strengthen solidarity by just 
doing their quintessential job, i.e. to care for people with ill health. Second, we 
focus on the Catholic identity of these organizations, and argue that this 
characteristic can empower a radical commitment to solidarity. Finally, we argue 
that Catholic social teaching provides a critical ethical framework for approaching 
solidarity from the perspective of the common good. 
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Introduction 
Solidarity belongs to the basic principles of Catholic Social Teaching (CST), but it is 
certainly not exclusively Catholic or Christian. It is also part of the ethical 
repertoire of European moral traditions (ten Have, 2001: 3-9) and European 
healthcare systems (Meulen, Arts, Muffels, 2000). Solidarity expresses the moral 
obligation of communities to secure the well-being of their members, in particular 
the weak and vulnerable. Several developments, however, challenge its 
maintenance. Religious and community-oriented traditions, which formerly 
directed people towards solidarity, are losing influence in modern, secularized 
culture (Taylor, 1999). Furthermore, the rising costs of solidary arrangements 
make many feel dubious if solidarity can be preserved. Moreover, the introduction 
of market mechanisms as a means to control these costs offers an ambivalent 
solution. On the one hand, market mechanisms may contribute to a more effective 
use of scarce means and, hence, to keep solidarity financially affordable. On the 
other hand, these mechanisms might prove to be a snake swallowing its own tail: 
since markets stimulate competition and survival of the strongest, they do not 
animate solidarity with the most vulnerable. These three developments – changes 
in culture, rising costs, and market influences – raise the question of how to 
maintain solidarity. This paper will specify this question as to how leaders of 
Catholic healthcare organizations (HCOs), such as hospitals or nursing homes, 
could understand their moral responsibility with regard to the preservation of 
solidarity.  
 There are two reasons for this specific focus on Catholic HCOs. The first is the 
institutional background. Until now, the issue of solidarity in healthcare has been 
approached mainly from either an individual or a governmental perspective. In the 
former the emphasis is on solidarity as a personal attitude and voluntary action, in 
the latter on payments imposed by the state to contribute to societal solidarity. 
Much less attention has been paid to the meso-level of societal institutes, and the 
way they can take up institutional moral responsibility for solidarity. We aim to 
reduce this gap by demonstrating that all HCOs, Catholic or not, can embody and 
strengthen solidarity by just doing their quintessential job, i.e. to care for people 
with ill health.  
 The second reason is the Catholic identity. We will argue that CST offers a 
perspective to qualify solidarity with a theological meaning that may empower a 
radical commitment to solidarity. It is not argued that CST is the only way to live 
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up to Catholic identity. But we shall demonstrate that with respect to solidarity 
CST offers a firm framework for developing practices and structures that support 
it, because it relates solidarity to a transcendent source and to the common good.  
 We will start with some clarifications with regard to the concept of solidarity. 
Next we will turn to HCOs in general, both Catholic and non-Catholic, and to how 
they can institutionalize practices of solidarity. Then we get to the main subject of 
this paper: what Catholic HCOs can contribute to the preservation of solidarity. We 
will end by briefly sketching five practical implications for Catholic HCOs.  
 
1. Solidarity 
Within the extensive philosophical literature on solidarity we consider five 
dimensions important for this paper.  
 First, solidarity can have an instrumental as well as a non-instrumental value. In 
the first sense, solidarity is a means to a goal; in the second, solidarity is 
intrinsically valued, i.e. for its own sake. For instance, instrumental solidarity is at 
stake in the rule of do-ut-des: someone contributes to healthcare insurance in 
exchange for coverage of one’s own risks (Rehg, 2007: 7). Non-instrumental 
solidarity is reciprocal as well, but in terms of, as Jaeggi (2001: 292) calls it, an 
‘enlarged reciprocity’, which expresses “the belief that the success and well-being 
of others is important to ensure the flourishing of projects with which I myself 
identify.” Non-instrumental solidarity, therefore, is ‘irreducibly social’ (Taylor, 
1995): it cannot be realized without others. People embrace the willingness to take 
care for each other’s well-being as an indispensable moral trait of the kind of 
community they want to identify themselves with.  
 The second dimension is closely connected to the first, but underscores the 
disparate anthropologies behind instrumental and non-instrumental solidarity. 
Instrumental solidarity mirrors a liberal and contractual view of society. It 
understands human beings as self-sufficient individuals who cooperate with each 
other because and as far as cooperation is advantageous. Because of its emphasis 
on independence, the liberal view considers human dependency and vulnerability 
more or less the denial of what it is to be human. Non-instrumental solidarity 
advocates a communitarian view: human beings are considered essentially social 
and communal. It is only in their connectedness with other human beings that they 
can flourish. In the communitarian view interdependence and vulnerability are 
part of the human condition.  
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 Third, solidarity entails a descriptive and a normative aspect. It describes a 
certain connectedness between human beings, but it also prescribes a normative 
claim of mutual support. Solidarity does not automatically emerge from the fact 
that people are connected, it demands a kind of choice. This necessary step is 
among others expressed in the definition of Andrew Mason: solidarity exists 
“among a group of people when they are committed to abiding by the outcome of 
some process of collective decision-making, or to promoting the well-being of 
other members of the group, perhaps at significant cost to themselves” (Mason, 
1998). Only when there is a group and a commitment to a common purpose, 
eventually against one’s own interests, we can speak of solidarity.  
Fourth, solidarity can be voluntary and involuntary. For citizens it is 
compulsory to pay taxes to finance societal solidarity. As opposed to this, to donate 
money to victims of a tsunami is a matter of voluntary solidarity. The borderline 
between the two is often fluent. This is illustrated by the fact that in democratic 
societies every system of imposed payments is principally based on the free-given 
consent of citizens. This consent is at stake, among other things, in the present 
discussions about the limits of insurance coverage. The rising costs of healthcare, 
and, therefore, of individual insurance premiums, make citizens question which 
risks they are willing to cover on a solidarity base, and which risks they want to 
exclude, or to cover only with restrictions. In particular, what is put to the test here 
is the willingness to contribute to non-instrumental solidarity and to commit 
oneself to the promotion of the well-being of people who are thought to be 
accountable for their own bad health situation, for instance because of smoking or 
bad eating habits. We will argue that in order to promote this willingness, HCOs 
can fulfill an important role.  
 Finally, solidarity can be taken as a principle and as a virtue. As a principle 
solidarity is connected to justice, as a virtue it relates to love and charity (Ricoeur, 
1965). These two meanings are complementary. Solidarity as a principle functions 
as a normative guideline for institutional and social structures to protect the 
vulnerable. For instance, the principle of solidarity is at the basis of Dutch 
healthcare insurances. Solidarity as a virtue complements these structures with a 
willingness to be solidary, and to judge what these structures do to real-life people.  
This paper will focus on solidarity in its non-instrumental meaning, corresponding 
to a communitarian view on persons and community, and implying a normative 
claim on members of society to commit themselves to the promotion of each 
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other’s wellbeing, possibly at some personal costs. It emphazises solidarity as a 
virtue, complementary to solidarity as a principle. 
 
2. Healthcare organizations as institutionalized practices of solidarity 
The moral responsibility of HCOs is to be located at a level between individuals and 
the state. HCOs institutionalize practices of solidarity. According to MacIntyre, a 
practice is a socially established activity through which goods are realized that are 
internal to that activity (MacIntyre, 1984: 187). In this sense, we will understand 
HCOs as institutes that are established by society to structure solidarity with 
individuals in need for healthcare, and that express solidarity as a good internal to 
their caring activities. Solidarity is no so much the outcome of their caring 
activities, but is realized in their caring.  
 Within the context of a HCO caring is a joint practice. Institutional care is an 
organized, multidisciplinary and structured activity. We will demonstrate that 
solidarity is inherent to this joint practice of care. This becomes clear as we look at 
the different roles HCOs have to fulfill: the role of caregiver, of organizer of care, 
and of public agent. 
 
2.1. HCOs as caregivers 
To give care is the primary reason of existence for HCOs. Good care requires 
competence in the technical and moral sense of the word, as well as a sound 
balance between personal, professional, and organizational values. If these 
requirements are met, caring can ethically be apprehended as a practice of 
solidarity, and as a gateway to sources of solidarity.  
 The interpretation of care as a practice of solidarity is based on personal 
feelings of compassion that can emerge in caring relations. Of course, compassion 
will not always be experienced. In institutes of organized care there also is the 
danger of the personal being suppressed by routine. Or, there will be diseases that 
might evoke blaming rather than compassion; for instance, when they seem – 
largely – caused by unhealthy lifestyles. Our focus here, however, is on the 
personal experience of compassion with patients’ suffering. We agree with Jaeggi 
and, as we will describe later, with Pope John Paul II, that compassion cannot be 
identified with solidarity as a moral good (Jaeggi, 2000: 291), but we consider it an 
important precondition to make someone sensitive for solidarity. This 
precondition is fulfilled if the concern with the fate of an individual patient is 
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enlarged to a concern with human vulnerability in general. This enlarged 
compassion may empower caregivers to embrace solidarity as an intrinsic moral 
good for the kind of society they want to identify themselves with. Every practice 
of care is a confrontation with the fact of human contingency, vulnerability, and 
dependence, and expresses that individuals are mutually related to each other, as 
opposed to the widely appraised value of independence and autonomy (Tronto, 
1993: 134).  
 A gateway to moral sources becomes available when caregivers are going to try 
to articulate why they experience solidarity as a good, and what empowers them to 
endorse it (Taylor, 1989). A moral source explains why something, in casu 
solidarity, is a moral good, and empowers to strive for it (Taylor, 1989: 93). By 
definition a source is something transcendent: it goes beyond the concrete here 
and now. One becomes aware of it by reflecting upon, and hence, by taking a 
certain distance to the concrete experience.  
 Such a transcendent source is not necessarily a religious one. The distinction 
between horizontal and vertical transcendence illustrates this point (Goodenough, 
2001). Horizontal transcendence expresses the experience of a dimension beyond 
what actually happens, like the experience of something that goes beyond actual 
suffering, but within the contingencies of human life, i.e. without appealing to a 
non-contingent purpose of life. It is, as Luc Ferry would call it, a transcendence in 
the immanence (Ferry, Gauchet, 2005). For instance, a patient with severe pain can 
discover meaning in his suffering by interpreting it as part of a fate that is shared 
by many people and as a sign of a deep connectedness with all living creatures 
(Buytendijk, 1943: 183-186). Horizontal transcendence can also be attributed to 
Taylor’s claim, that human beings by evaluating their moral experiences can 
discover moral goods that appear to them as independent of their desires, 
inclinations, or choices, and that are acknowledged as intrinsically valuable: people 
do not invent them, but they appear to them as morally desirable and worthwhile 
to pursue (Taylor, 1989: 4). Drawing on this meaning of transcendence everyday 
caring experiences can uncover solidarity as a transcendent good, intrinsically 
worthwhile to pursue, because of the insight that suffering and vulnerability are 
commonly shared dimensions of human existence. The relevance of this insight has 
also been recognized by acknowledging vulnerability as one of the basic ethical 
principles for European bioethics and law. The principle of vulnerability expresses 
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the finitude of human condition, and provides the bridging factor between moral 
strangers in a pluralistic society (Rendtorff, 2002).  
 Vertical transcendence comes in when a moral source is religiously inspired and 
connected with a divine reality. The transition to vertical transcendence will not be 
shared by all, but only by people and HCOs that embrace a religious outlook. 
Vertical transcendence qualifies suffering and vulnerability with religious 
categories, and will, for instance, interpret suffering as a calling for the kind of 
solidarity that Christ invoked his apostles: “Heal the sick, raise the dead to life, heal 
people who have leprosy, and force out demons. You received without paying, now 
you give without paying” (Bible 1999, Mt 10,8). Or, solidarity might be inspired by 
the example of the Good Samaritan, that summons people to make oneself 
another’s neighbor (idem: Lk. 10, 25-37). To ‘qualify with religious categories’ 
means that there is no experience of vertical or religious transcendence apart from 
horizontal transcendence: qualifying is interpreting horizontal transcendence from 
a religious frame of reference. 
 
2.2. HCOs as organizers of care 
HCOs can also contribute to the preservation of solidarity by the way they organize 
their caring activities. Organizing means to create the proper conditions for 
responding to the needs and wishes of different stakeholders. In order to evaluate 
the quality of their responses organizations make use of a mix of different moral 
understandings (Tipton, 2002). One understanding focuses on rules and scientific 
validation, another on efficacy and efficiency, a third on human resources 
management. Tipton observes that problems may often arise because every 
singular understanding has a tendency to become imperial (ibidem: 33).  
 Tiptons’s observation is applicable to HCOs. A too technical or formal 
understanding of professional competence, for example, may lead to a depreciation 
of compassion, condemning it as unprofessional weakness. A too market-oriented 
approach evokes the danger that care might become a mere instrument to earn 
money, instead of earning money in order to finance all the needed facilities for 
care. It is evident that an HCO needs enough financial margins in order to fulfill its 
mission to care. It is true as well that a lot of its means, like medicines and 
technology, is produced by markets. But if market principles like competition and 
maximizing profits become too dominant, they can suppress the care according to 
medical needs and to equal access. It would be a simplification to consider market 
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and care as mutually exclusive, but it is clear that there is a tension between the 
two. Also, efficient use of means and time, evidence-based care, and the prudent 
management of human resources represent a plurality of goods to be pursued by 
any HCO. But they are not equally important. Hence, how to weigh them?  
 We suggest to use Taylor’s notion of a ‘hypergood’ to achieve a proper ethical 
ranking. According to Taylor, while ethically evaluating their experiences, persons 
can come to discover a good that appears to supersede all other goods and comes 
closest to defining their identity: this he terms the hypergood. Hypergoods are not 
only “…incomparably more important than others (“other goods”, mp) but provide 
the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor , 
1989: 63). Extrapolating from Taylor’s reference to the individual level, we can 
discover the hypergood of an organization when persons involved – like patients, 
employees, or managers - try to answer the question what good a HCO ultimately 
ought to pursue and what good comes closest to its identity. It seems very unlikely 
that all answers would not point to the same moral hypergood: to be an 
organization that ought to facilitate professional care for people with ill health. 
From the perspective of this hypergood other goods can be ethically judged. Money 
represents a necessary good for the survival of the HCO, it is not the ultimate good 
a HCO has to pursue in light of its identity as organizer of care. This is also how we 
understand Callahan’s plea for a strong moral culture in healthcare, “providing 
values that temper and control untrammeled market practices” (Callahan, 1999: 
229). Care as the hypergood of any HCO is part of this moral culture. It expresses 
that, all things considered, for a HCO caring for people is ‘incomparably more 
important’ than earning money, and that from this point of view the necessity and 
limitations of sound finances have to be judged. 
 
2.3. HCOs as public agents 
We call HCOs public agents since they operate on behalf of and in favor of a 
community that wants to take responsibility for its ill members. In this role they 
bear a moral duty to behave like ‘corporate citizens’. This should include taking 
responsibility for those who are unable to access healthcare, and advocacy on 
issues that are in the interest of the public’s health (Winkler, Gruen, Sussman 
2005: 114-115). For example, the Catholic Health Association (CHA) of the USA 
advocates “a just and compassionate health care system” (CHA, 2008). Although 
CHA does not label this as solidarity, the combined efforts of the members of such 
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an association to improve the situation of vulnerable citizens is how solidarity is to 
be understood in this paper. Therefore, public advocacy of solidarity is a way HCOs 
can contribute to its preservation.  
 Next, HCOs can support and promote citizenship, understood as a capability 
needed in modern and pluralistic democracies, to deal with disagreements and to 
participate in processes of deliberation (Houtepen, ter Meulen, 2000: 366-368). 
Solidarity is not an unanimous concept, and how to structure it asks for reflections 
and deliberations, both in society and within the HCO. As we saw, for instance, 
HCOs have to pursue a plurality of goods, and among the variety of a HCO’s 
stakeholders there will be disagreements and differences. This is also the case if an 
HCO founds it obligation to be solidary on a particular religious identity, for 
example a Catholic one. Institutional Catholic identity does not exclude 
disagreements, but will always include them. First because many stakeholders are 
not Catholic, second because Catholics by themselves are featured by pluriformity 
on how to live up to this identity. To the extent that HCOs take these differences as 
a “learning capacity” (ibidem: 367) and enable their stakeholders to participate in 
this learning, they also promote citizenship and participation in sustaining 
solidarity in society.  
 
3. Catholic HCOs and solidarity 
Above we argued that HCOs, by fulfilling their roles as caregiver, as organizer of 
care and as public agent, can give substance to their institutional moral 
responsibility towards the preservation of solidarity in society. This analysis 
implies that solidarity is not a unique Catholic or Christian concern, but that it is 
grounded in the practice of care. Now we will turn to Catholic HCOs and the 
meaning of solidarity in a Catholic perspective. First we elaborate what is 
distinctive for Catholic solidarity. Next, we discuss the problematic transition to a 
religious outlook in modern Western culture. Finally, we will concentrate on John 
Paul II’s concept of solidarity in his contribution to CST. 
 
3.1. Catholic solidarity?  
What is distinctive for Catholic solidarity? It is not the term ‘solidarity’. The history 
of healthcare shows a long Catholic tradition of care for the sick and the needy that 
was termed charity or social justice, not solidarity (Haisnain-Wynia, Margolin, 
Pittman, 2004; Kauffman, 1995; Heijst, 2008).  
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 Verstraeten describes that by introducing solidarity CST elaborated on a term 
that in the 18the century was used as an answer to the problems of the industrial 
revolution. Comte and Durkheim defined it as a sociological principle for social 
cohesion and unity. Later it became part of Catholic thinking in the philosophy of 
solidarism, developed by Pesch and Gunlach. As opposed to the prevailing 
individualistic liberal concept, they considered a human being ontologically, by his 
concrete nature, oriented to the community, and, reversely, the community to 
every human being. Drawing on this mutuality they formulated a duty to solidarity 
(Verstraeten, 2005: 27-32). 
 Pope John XXIII was the first to use ‘solidarity’ in the Encyclical Mater et 
Magistra in 1961, 70 years after the first social Encyclical Rerum Novarum by Pope 
Leo XIII. But the content is much older in Christian tradition. Pope John Paul II 
refers to these old roots in Centesimus Annus:  
 “In this way what we nowadays call the principle of solidarity, the validity of 
which both in the internal order of each nation and in the international order I 
have discussed in the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, is clearly seen to be one of 
the fundamental principles of the Christian view of social and political 
organization. This principle is frequently stated by Pope Leo XIII, who uses the 
term ‘friendship’, a concept already found in Greek philosophy. Pope Pius XI refers 
to it with the equally meaningful term ‘social charity.’ Pope Paul VI, expanding the 
concept to cover the many modern aspects of the social question, speaks of a 
‘civilization of love’ ” (John Paul II, 1991: 10).  
 While in the philosophy of solidarism solidarity is ontologically grounded, in 
CST some shifts in meaning occur. First, it defines solidarity in a personalistic way: 
a person has the ethical calling to realize himself in a life for the other. Second, 
communality is sociologically interpreted: there is a growing awareness of 
interdependence as a base for realizing personal rights, particularly in economic 
and social life. Third, solidarity gets closely connected to social justice and the 
common good. Primary in social justice is the duty of everyone to contribute to the 
common good, which consists not only of economic prosperity, but also of culture 
and humanity. In reverse, the community has the obligation to enable everyone to 
fully contribute to and participate in the community (Verstraeten, 2005: 32-35).  
So, ‘Catholic solidarity’ is not distinctive in its terminology, but in its 
conceptualization: personalistic, based on factual interdependences, and linked to 
social justice and the common good. In addition, solidarity is enriched with 
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theological meanings. Among other things, CST considers mankind as one human 
family, brotherly and sisterly united as children of one God, the Father. It calls us to 
be ‘our brother’s keeper’ (Bible: Gen. 4,9). The introduction to the Compendium of 
The Social Doctrine of the Church places solidarity in the context of God’s plan of 
history, which entails: “an integral and solidary humanism capable of creating a 
new social, economic and political order, founded on the dignity and freedom of 
every human person, to be brought about in peace, justice and solidarity” 
(Compendium, 2005: 19). 
 The enrichment with theological meanings may inspire persons and 
organizations that share this religious outlook to endorse solidarity, but it does not 
necessarily result in applications that differ from the way solidarity is translated in 
secular arrangements. That is why CST intends to present principles for reflection, 
criteria for judgment and directives for action (Compendium, 2005: 7), not only for 
believers, but “to all people of good will” (ibidem 12). The broadening to non-
believers does, however, result in a problem: western modern culture has become, 
as Taylor expresses, ‘inhospitable’ to religion.  
 
3.2. Religious transcendence in modern culture 
In his lecture of 1999, A Catholic Modernity? (Taylor, 1999), Taylor observes that 
modern secular philosophy and academic discourses about modernity are marked 
by an exclusive humanism that is based on the ideal of human flourishing, and 
recognizes no valid aim beyond this (ibidem: 19). It emphasizes the preservation 
and increase of life and the prevention of suffering as the only goals to pursue. 
Exclusive humanism is strongly perceived as the achievement of Enlightenment 
and is appreciated as a liberation from Christian powers and religion. Christian 
faith has become “what needs to overcome and set firmly in the past”(ibidem: 15) 
on behalf of the primacy of life.  
 On the one hand, Taylor agrees that the gains of Enlightenment, like the 
affirmation of universal human rights, the adherence to a worldwide solidarity and 
the fight against injustices only became possible by breaking with the structures 
and beliefs of Christendom. Christendom is the way Christian faith is embodied in 
all structures, institutions and culture of society. On the other hand the breakout of 
such a Christendom was a necessary condition for the flourishing of the gospel. 
Universal human rights, which certainly belong to the Christian faith in all men 
created in the image of God, would never have been possible as long as 
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Christendom condemned atheists or violators of Christian morals. Drawing on this 
liberation of Christendom, exclusive humanism beliefs that “human life is better off 
without transcendental vision altogether” (ibidem: 19).  
 However, this belief is throwing out the baby with the bath-water. Taylor fears a 
‘spiritual lobotomy’(ibidem: 19), because exclusive humanism fails to see that 
more than just life matters. For instance, suffering is not merely a negation of life, 
but also an affirmation of something that matters beyond life. Previously we called 
this an experience of horizontal transcendence. But, according to Taylor, our age is 
pervaded by a post-revolutionary climate. It is very sensitive to anything that 
smacks to the old order. As a result it is unable to give any transcendent meaning 
to suffering and death, other than as dangers to be combated. It is in this climate 
that “Western modernity is very inhospitable to the transcendent” (ibidem: 25). 
 With regard to solidarity Taylor explicitly questions whether it can be sustained 
without the recognition of a religious source that transcends the primacy of life, or 
without “the full-hearted love of some good beyond life” (ibidem: 28-29). Does 
modern secular culture in its high moral demands such as worldwide solidarity not 
aim higher than its moral sources can sustain?  
 Taylor describes three secular ways that in his view all are insufficient. First, 
modern culture considers solidarity part of decent, civilized human life. But this 
motivation is fragile, because it is driven by a sense of moral superiority, and 
dependent on the “shifting fashion of media attention” (ibidem: 31). Second, 
solidarity is endorsed by a lofty humanism that focuses on the worth of human 
beings and human potential. This motivation, however, can turn into 
disappointment or even anger if people fall short of our high expectations. Third, 
Taylor observes that modernity relates solidarity to justice instead of to 
benevolence. Solidarity becomes a struggle against the injustices in the world, and 
all evil outside us. Here the tragedy is that it can turn us into persons filled with 
hatred and new injustices. He concludes that exclusive humanism “leaves us with 
our own high sense of self-worth to inspire us forward, and a flaming indignation 
against wrong and oppression to energize us. It cannot appreciate how 
problematic all of these are, how easily they can slide into something trivial, ugly, 
or downright dangerous and destructive” (ibidem: 34). Exclusive humanism as a 
source is too meagre to preserve a high-demanding solidarity with people on the 
other side of the globe, or with people we dislike, of who seem to be the cause of 
their own suffering.  
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 Taylor does not pretend to solve this dilemma. However, he believes that faith 
in Christian spirituality can point to a way out. He describes Christian spirituality 
in two ways: “either as a love or compassion that is unconditional – that is, not 
based on what you the recipient have made of yourself -, or as one based on what 
you are most profoundly, a being in the image of God. (…) In either case, the love is 
not conditional on the worth realized in you just as an individual or even in what is 
realizable in you alone. Our being in the image of God is also our standing among 
others in the stream of love, which is that facet of God’s life we try to grasp, very 
inadequately, in speaking of the Trinity”(ibidem: 35). This love, he concludes, is 
only possible “to the extent we open ourselves to God, which means, in fact, 
overstepping the limits set in theory by exclusive humanism” (ibidem: 35). 
 This quote may raise several difficult ethical debates which Taylor does not 
engage in. For instance, the debate with regard to ‘unconditional’. Are people 
entitled to solidary support in cases in which they have deliberatively caused their 
own misfortune? Are there, complementary to rights on healthcare, also 
obligations to abstain from unhealthy behaviors? Can an unconditional solidarity  
weaken people’s own responsibility?  
 But this quote can also be interpreted as bringing in another dimension in such 
debates. In our interpretation, Christian spirituality offers the insight that 
everyone, whatever he has done or still does, is a being in the image of God, and 
that the answer to one’s needs is not condemnation, but care. People may be 
criticized for their behaviors, but loving care should be unconditional.  
 In what respect is this religious framework authorative to non-believers? Can 
Catholic HCOs make it, for instance, a policy for admission to the hospital? In fact, 
such a policy has a long analogy in secular medical ethics: everyone who needs 
care, ought to be entitled to care, whatever (s)he is or has done. The dimension of 
unconditionality is also worthwhile in as far as it puts a barrier on too quick or too 
unthoughtful accusations: behind many so-called unhealthy behaviors there are 
many reasons and complexities, that can hardly be grasped from a distance, or that 
not or only partially can be reduced to one’s personal responsibility;  for instance 
in case of addictions. So, unconditionality makes sense, also from a non-believing 
perspective. But from a believing perspective, the belief in a transcendent divine 
source may give strength to radically commit oneself to such an approach. In the 
Catholic tradition such an unconditional love has been grounded in what van Heijst 
(2008: 200-1; 293), following a study of Pessers (1999), labels as ‘triadic 
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reciprocity’: “do quia mihi datum est” (“I give because I have been given”). 
Standing in a long tradition religious men and women have given care from the 
reassurance that God has taken care of them. In particular, their care concerned 
the ones that were marginalized and sidelined by society.  
 Religiously based solidarity can also empower another radicalization of 
solidarity, as Taylor argues some years later. The forthcoming Kingdom of God 
involves a kind of solidarity that brings us into a network of agape and brakes 
away from established solidarities: “If the Samaritan had followed the demands of 
sacred social boundaries, he would never have stopped to help the wounded Jew” 
(Taylor, 2007: 158). To translate this to today: Christian inspired solidarity brakes 
away from established (forms of) solidarities between, for instance, the insured, or 
fellow countrymen, or people with supposedly healthy lifestyles, etc. It also breaks 
away from established expectations often raised in HCOs with regard to, for 
example, market-strategies, efficiency, results, procedures, and consumer 
satisfaction. These goods are not declared superfluous, but they are placed in and 
related to the normative perspective of Gods Kingdom of agape: “care for the poor, 
the sick and the dying as I care for you” (Bible, 1999: Mt 10,8). 
 
3.3. Social teaching of the Church on solidarity  
CST elaborates on the ethical implications of Catholic beliefs for issues regarding 
our social life. Like all social ethics, CST focuses on the ethical evaluation of social 
institutions and structures. That is why insights of CST are also applicable to 
societal organizations like hospitals and nursing homes.  
 Two anthropological principles are at the basis of CST. Both refer to a 
transcendent, divine source: the dignity of the human person, and his social nature 
(Curran, 2002: 127-37). The first principle rests on the belief that every person is 
endowed with a transcendent dignity, considering the person’s origin and destiny: 
“created by God in his image and likeness as well as redeemed by the most 
precious blood of Christ, the person is called to be a ‘child in the Son’ and a living 
temple of the Spirit, destined for eternal life of blessed communion with God” (John 
Paul II, 1988: 37).  
 The second principle expresses the idea that, since God created us all, we are all 
brothers and sisters. Human beings are social by nature (Jones, 2001: 7), and 
belong to the same family. We are called to live in society and to find fulfillment in 
a life with and for others. The base of human sociability is theological: being 
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created in the image of God involves existing in relationship, because God himself 
is the triune communion of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (Compendium, 
2005: 34). It is, therefore, not a kind of ideology, a ´third way´ between liberal 
capitalism and Marxist collectivism, but a category on its own. It expresses the aim 
of CST: to guide Christian behavior in line of the Gospel.  
 Both principles are correlated to each other in the sense that social structures 
ought to be evaluated according to the respect due to the dignity of every human 
person. But in the course of its development CST gave more weight to the latter, as 
is illustrated by the increased attention for human rights as an indispensable 
condition of the common good (Dillon, 1997). 
 In addition to the roots of solidarity in a transcendent and universal brother- 
and sisterhood of persons, it has its roots in factual interdependences. John Paul II 
(1987: n.38) makes this connection pivotal in his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: 
“It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system determining 
relationships in the contemporary world, in its economic, cultural, political and 
religious elements, and accepted as a moral category.”  
 As we saw earlier, for people it is one thing to be aware that they are 
interdependent, it is quite another thing, as also Jaeggi emphasizes (2001: 297-
300), to conclude they have moral obligations to each other. The latter does not 
automatically flow from the former. To let this happen, people need to recognize 
their moral responsibility toward each other. CST tightens this up by qualifying 
these mutual relations as family ties. 
 Then, John Paul II (1987: n.38) continues: “When interdependence becomes 
recognized in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a 
‘virtue’, is solidarity. This is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress 
at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm 
and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to 
say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible 
for all. This determination is based on the solid conviction that what is hindering 
full development is that desire for profit and that thirst for power already 
mentioned. These attitudes and ‘structures of sin’ are only conquered - 
presupposing the help of divine grace - by a diametrically opposed attitude: a 
commitment to the good of one's neighbor with the readiness, in the gospel sense, 
to ‘lose oneself’ for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to ‘serve 
him’ instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage.”  
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 This quote entails important key-elements of John Paul II´s vision on solidarity.  
 First: solidarity is a virtue, not a feeling of compassion. It is not bound by 
subjective and whimsical appreciations, but based on an acquired and 
continuously anew chosen disposition to show solidarity and to ‘listen’ to what 
solidarity ethically demands. Viewing the context of this paper: Catholic HCOs are 
called to analyze the facts, for instance, of how in real-life society individuals 
become socially marginalized as a result of the prevailing system of social 
provisions, and then to scrutinize what a commitment to the common good, which 
is the good of all and of every individual, would implicate. Answers will differ in 
different situations, and between individuals, but solidarity as an institutional 
virtue entails the firm determination to engage in the search and the debates in 
order to find a more solidary constellation.  
 Second, the goal of solidarity is the common good. This is “the sum total of social 
conditions which allow people, either as groups, or as individuals, to reach their 
fulfillment more fully and more easily” (Vatican II,1965: n. 26). Fulfillment consists 
of three essential dimensions. First, respect for persons and their inalienable right: 
everyone must be permitted to reach his or her vocation. Next, the social wellbeing 
and the development of the group itself: everyone ought to have access to what is 
needed to lead a truly human life, such as food, clothing, work, and healthcare. 
Finally, peace and stability of a just order: the security of every individual and of 
the community as a whole must be secured (CCC, 1905 – 1906). This description 
signifies that no human being can find fulfillment in himself, “that is, apart from the 
fact that he exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others.” (Compendium, 2005: n.165). 
Participation of everyone in the community, therefore, is central to the notion of 
the common good. Exclusion of an individual damages not only that particular 
individual, but also the community.  
 Third, solidarity is not only concerned with the poor, or marginalized, but with 
everyone. Preference for the poor has a primacy in Christian charity (John Paul II, 
1987: n. 42), but poverty is above all a social question that asks for structural, 
political and economic reforms. It also means that poverty is not simply a lack of 
money, just as the common good is more than wealth and welfare. Cochran (1999) 
rightly emphasizes that according to CST the common good is not an economic 
state of affairs, but a community life in which all can flourish. This includes the 
ones who, at first sight, have nothing to contribute, such as severely handicapped 
newborns or patients with advanced Alzheimer disease. The responses they need, 
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such as care, love and compassion, make aware of essential dimensions of the 
humanity of a society, and remind us that human dignity transcends health and 
success. By their very existence these patients demonstrate that the common good 
of a society can not be limited to economic prosperity but consists also of the 
conditions it enhances for letting everyone participate according to one´s own 
preferences and capacities.  
 Fourth, structures of sin, headed under the ‘desire for profit and that thirst for 
power’ raise persistent barriers against the realization of the common good. By 
introducing ‘structures of sin’ John Paul II tries to find a balance between personal 
freedom and systemic determinism. He emphasizes that systems do not totally 
determine human actions because their genesis and their maintenance are 
themselves the fruit of human actions. By using the term ‘sin’ he presents a 
theological reading of modern problems (John Paul II, 1987: n. V): in as far as 
systems are wrong, they are linked to the concrete actions of individuals who 
introduce them, consolidate them and make them difficult to remove. “And thus 
they grow stronger, spread and become the source of other sins, and so influence 
people´s behavior” (ibidem: n.36). A ‘sin’ is not just a fault, or a weakness, but a 
theological category: an abuse of the freedom God has given to human beings, who 
are created to love Him and each other (CCC 387). Again, such a theological 
category is by definition a particularistic, believing interpretation of human and 
structural faults. However, the recent economic crisis has demonstrated that 
failures of market structures at least partly must be linked to personal vices such 
as greed and pride of CEOs, and that these vices have become systematic. Hence, 
the pope has a case here, also for non-believers.  
 Long before this crisis, Longley explores whether the free market can be 
considered a ‘structure of sin’. CST does not value the market system an evil in 
itself. As the Catholic bishops of England and Wales state: the market can 
encourage the creation of wealth and advance prosperity. However, if it becomes 
an ideology it can grow into structural sin: “An economic creed that insists the 
greater good of society is best served by each individual pursuing his or her own 
self-interest is likely to find itself encouraging selfishness” (Longley, 1998, p. 106).  
 We take this as an argument that an HCO cannot be satisfied by its own 
successes alone. Market competition may be a stimulating - even an unavoidable - 
way to strive for the highest quality and performance, but for a Catholic HCO it 
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ought to be subordinated to the higher, common good, even if this should implicate 
a less strong position on the healthcare market.  
 Another example of structural sin is the false idea that in a market all goods, 
even goods like compassion or comfort, can be treated as economic commodities. 
This may be the dark side of the bureaucratic logic of a welfare state that prevents 
people to see that there are human needs that do not ask for a material answer, but 
genuine human support and understanding (John Paul 1991, n. 48).  
 Fifth, John Paul considers a decentering of the self, the readiness to lose oneself 
for the sake of the other, as the most proper way to conquer structural sin. This 
key-element belongs to the heart of the gospel, and, as we saw earlier, the Christian 
agape. The novelty here is not that a decentering of the self is seen as a true 
evangelical virtue, but that it enables one to change structures. It is not a soft, 
idealistic way of life, but a revolutionary force.  
 Finally, not mentioned in the quote above, but relevant with regard to HCOs is 
the principle of subsidiarity. This principle aims at a right balance between 
different levels of responsibility. It would be wrong, according to his principle, to 
assign full responsibility for maintaining solidarity to the state, and to take away 
from societal organizations like HCOs what they can do (Compendium 2005: 
n.185-187). Subsidiarity, therefore, attributes to an HCO freedom in fulfilling its 
role as organizer of care to balance the different goods that it has to realize, for 
instance the good of humane care, the good of economic efficiency and the good of 
being a strong competitor in the market. And in fulfilling its primary role of 
caregiver subsidiarity can be taken as an argument to not take away 
responsibilities from professionals – and, as we would like to add, from 
professional HCOs - that they are perfectly able to perform (Bouchard, 1999). 
 
4. Practical implications 
This paper describes solidarity as an important moral good, strongly rooted in 
Catholic and European traditions, but threatened by a lack of empowering moral 
sources and by worries about its affordability. How should leaders of Catholic 
healthcare organizations, like hospitals or nursing homes, understand their moral 
responsibility with regard to the preservation of solidarity?  
 The first implication is that Catholic HCOs are HCOs in the first place, which 
means that they are institutes that give and organize care, and function as public 
agents. What we found is that the contribution to the preservation of solidarity is 
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not an addendum, but is realized by the very fulfillment of these roles. In principle, 
every HCO can aspire to function as an institutionalized practice of solidarity, i.e. a 
place where through their experiences with care people can become aware of the 
moral importance of solidarity and of the sources that empower them to aspire to 
solidarity. This, however, is only true to the extent that the practices of care remain 
the hypergood of the HCO, not the derivates of economic or bureaucratic systems.  
 Second, sources of solidarity, in the Taylorian sense of the concept, can only be 
discovered by articulation. HCOs should take it as part of their role as organizer of 
care to facilitate opportunities for these articulations, for instance in courses or 
reflective meetings. There is probably not so much a gap between religiously and 
non-religiously based organizations, but between organizations that acknowledge 
the importance of facilitating articulation of moral sources, and organizations that 
consider this as a purely personal, private and optional matter.  
 Third, we appealed to Taylor to demonstrate the plausibility of Catholic 
tradition with regard to solidarity. Taylor strongly pleads for a retrieval of the 
transcendent dimension in modern culture, not primarily for religious reasons, but 
because this dimension is indispensable for the authentically human search for 
meaning. He demonstrates that there is something beyond the primacy of life. In 
this ‘beyond’ a source of solidarity can be found. In the 3th section we 
distinguished between horizontal and vertical transcendence. Caring for the sick 
uncovers horizontal transcendence. Starting from here, Catholic HCOs can foster 
openness within their organizations for this horizontal, non-religious 
transcendence, but they can take a further step by creating openness for vertical 
interpretations, to which also belongs the religious framework that they embrace 
as an institution. For instance, a caregiver who experiences that a PVS-patient is 
more than his handicap may articulate this as respect for human dignity that 
transcends the severely damaged life – horizontal transcendence - , while the 
institution can read the same situation as the disclosure of a dignity that is based 
on this patient being the image of God (vertical transcendence). This approach 
makes it possible that the Catholic identity of an HCO, even if not shared by many 
people, is nevertheless a plausible frame of reference to ‘all people of good will.’ 
 Fourth, CST offers a valuable frame of reference to Catholic HCOs to guide their 
practical behavior with regard to solidarity. Part of its value is that it enlarges the 
scope of moral responsibility of Catholic HCOs and liberates it from an often one-
sided concentration on issues at the beginning or the end of life. But most 
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important is that it offers the challenge to consider a Catholic HCO a moral agent 
with an inalienable subsidiary moral responsibility to consolidate solidarity. 
Consolidation should take place by creating and enhancing institutional structures 
and policies that guarantee the dignity of every human person, and promote the 
common good. The history of health care has proven that the belief in human 
beings created as brothers and sisters can function as a powerful source for caring 
about justice and solidarity. CST provides additional instruments to critically 
analyze all those social, legal or economic structures that might hamper the 
realization of these goods. For example, structural obstacles might be caused by 
markets, but this is not necessarily the case: markets can also strengthen the 
financial base for solidarity. Within organizations structural obstacles can also be 
caused by organizational systems for efficiency or profitability. Again, these 
systems need not to be barriers per se. But they can get perverted when they 
become goals in themselves.  
 The most important ethical contribution of Catholic HCOs to social solidarity 
comes to the fore, when they take the common good as their normative measure 
and pivotal goal. HCOs do not exist for themselves but are part of the common 
good and form an institution established to furnishing the common good, i.e. the 
professional care for people with ill health. Irrespective of the outcome of care, the 
practice of care as it is institutionally embodied reveals HCO´s commitment to the 
good of every individual and of all. Ultimately, the claim of CST, at least in the 
formulation of John Paul II, is very strong: the good of all and the good of each 
individual are inseparable. It means that to refuse care to someone who needs care 
is not only damaging the person involved, but is damaging all. Mutatis mutandis, a 
HCO that denies access to people in need of care, for instance because of their 
inability to pay, may avoid a financial loss, but damages its own moral integrity.  
 Finally, this paper raised the question of how to maintain and strengthen 
people’s motivation towards solidarity in healthcare. In order to find answers we 
strongly focused on moral sources. This could give the false impression that moral 
sources, for instance religious beliefs, precede practices of solidarity. We 
demonstrated, however, that there is also another way around: practices of care 
precede a person’s moral sources of solidarity. Catholic HCOs should take the 
opportunity to combine both: strong religious sources and good practices. This 
reciprocity seems to offer a firm base for the preservation of solidarity. 
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The first objective of this ethical study is to analyze a number of problems that 
HCOs in modern Western culture experience with their Roman-Catholic identity.  
Our second objective is to develop new perspectives on this identity, with a 
particular focus on the moral responsibility of these Catholic HCOs: the way they 
perceive their moral obligations and deal with ethical dilemmas and choices in and 
of the organization. Both objectives are pursued by using Charles Taylor’s 
reflections on identity, modern culture and religion. Drawing on these reflections, 
the second objective is specified by examining how care provided by HCOs can be a 
moral source for the Catholic tradition, and how the Catholic tradition can be a 
moral source for this care and for the identity of the HCOs as moral agents. 
 This final chapter shall start with presenting the outcomes of our theoretical 
analysis of the notion of identity in general and Catholic identity in particular. In 
the second part of this chapter, we shall focus on problems HCOs in modern 
culture experience with the articulation of a Catholic identity. Next, we shall 
discuss the question how from the perspective of our study the notion of moral 
responsibility of Catholic HCOs can be given shape in the practice of healthcare. 
Finally, we shall briefly identify the implications of this study for future research 
and for medical education. 
 
1. Identity 
1.1. Discovering and creating Catholic identity 
A traditional way to understand the Catholic identity of an HCO is the application 
or implementation of Catholic convictions and norms, in particular the moral ones 
taught by the ecclesiastical Magisterium, to the policies and practices of the HCO. 
In this perspective, Catholic identity consists of an external morality which is 
considered to be normative and authoritative for policies and practices of the 
Catholic HCO.  
 Our studies of Taylor enable us to reverse this perspective and to reflect on 
Catholic identity from the internal perspective of the Catholic HCO. Drawing on this 
perspective, Catholic identity appears to be a dynamic process of discovering and 
creating its meaning, rather than the mere application of Catholic teachings. By 
strong evaluation of their moral experiences and by articulating the goods and 
sources underlying these experiences (see Chapters 4 and 5) persons in the 
organization – employees and managers – can come to discover the kind of person 
or organization they are and aspire to be. By discovering this, they create identity.  
 Findings and discussion 
157 
 To be sure, the focus of this study is on organizational identity. Of course, this 
identity is also defined by practical features such as the kind of organization it is 
and its geographical position; for instance a hospital in New York, or a nursing 
home in Amsterdam. However, drawing on Taylor, we propose to consider the core 
of the identity of any HCO a moral one. It is based on the whole set of moral goods 
that are experienced as normative for the behavior and policies of the HCO and its 
employees: they are what they value. We call this ‘internal morality’ (ten Have, 
2001). This internal morality is sometimes made explicit in institutional policies or 
mission statements. But most of the time it is implicit: it is expressed in what 
people actually do and in how HCOs actually behave, in practices and policies. The 
internal morality of a HCO, then, consists of the ensemble of articulated and 
unarticulated understandings of what moral goods should be normative for the 
provision of professional care in and as a HCO. To acquire clarity about the HCO’s 
identity, one has to try to articulate what often is not articulated: the moral sources 
of these understandings. Moral sources can reveal why behaviors, or some policies 
are experienced as morally good, others as bad. Moreover, they also have the force 
to empower organizations, and people within organizations. By means of such an 
articulation of the HCO’s moral sources, – in the sense of what organizations value 
as their central goods – organizational identity is discovered and created.   
 However, in Taylor’s approach, for the discovery and creation of such an 
identity the external morality cannot be missed. In trying to understand why some 
behavior or policies are experienced as morally good and others as morally wrong 
or less desirable, people appeal to moral frameworks and traditions in their 
community, society and culture, and as such external to themselves. They try to 
situate and to understand themselves in front of the plurality of goods and sources 
they encounter in their cultural and social surroundings. We propose to consider 
HCOs likewise socially and culturally embedded. Similar to persons, Catholic HCOs 
exist amidst the present-day pluralism of goods and views, such as the high 
appraisal of autonomy and self-determination, and the confidence in human 
rationality. What makes them particular is that they commit themselves to the 
Catholic tradition as well. Similar to the way persons discover and create an 
identity, also the meaning of the institutional Catholic identity can only be 
discovered and created in this pluralistic context. The meaning of being a Catholic 
HCO must be identified and developed by examining if and what the meaning of 
goods within the Catholic tradition, such as the inviolability of innocent human life 
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or the belief that every human being is an image of God, can support to the 
articulation of concrete moral experiences.  
 The Catholic identity of an HCO is, therefore, an ongoing search for its meaning, 
rather than a status quo. By this search, the Catholic HCO gives an account of the 
kind of organization it is and aspires to be in realizing its goal: to serve the 
healthcare needs of patients and the community in general. For Catholic believers, 
the Catholic identity might be more self-evident, but its real meaning must still be 
discovered in examining concrete experiences. For most non-Catholics, and this is 
a growing majority in the Netherlands (see Chapter 1), Catholic tradition has no 
significance at all. The challenge for present-day Catholic HCOs is to present their 
identity as a horizon against which everyone, irrespective of their beliefs, feels 
invited to explore which goods and sources ought to orient and empower 
themselves personally and professionally, and which ones ought to orient and 
empower the policies of the HCO. We found such an approach in the United States 
(see Chapter 5). Some key elements for the American HCOs we examined in 
presenting their Catholic identity were: the special attention for the poor and 
vulnerable, the Gospel as their inspiring source, the commitment to the common 
good, and the respect for the dignity of every human person. 
 
1.2. Dimensions of identity 
Taylor studies the identity of the modern individual subject, not of modern 
organizations like HCOs. Nevertheless, this study finds his subject-approach useful 
to reflect on the latter and to distinguish the identity of an HCO in three 
dimensions (see Chapter 4). 
a. The moral dimension: the identity of an HCO is discovered in and shaped by the 
moral goods and sources it holds. Some of these are clearly stated, for instance 
on websites or in guidelines. Others, and probably the majority, are implicit in 
daily behavior and practices. The first we have termed formal identity, the 
second informal identity. For informal identity to be discovered and created, the 
goods and sources as they are experienced in behavior and practices ought to be 
articulated. Articulation brings these goods and sources to the surface, makes 
them accessible for communication and critical inquiry, and offers an 
opportunity to disclose possible gaps between the formal and the informal 
identity, between the officially stated goals and ideals and the actual goals and 
values in daily practice. For Catholic HCOs the Catholic tradition can be 
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recognized and vitalized by approaching it as a framework against which 
experiences of people can be clarified and examined. 
b. The dialogical dimension: articulation asks for dialogues, first, as we saw above, 
with communities, traditions and frameworks, second with other people. This 
study pleads for creating and favoring possibilities in the HCO for internal 
dialogues among employees. Three reasons support this plea. First, dialogues 
offer a platform to recognize the plurality of goods within an HCO, for instance 
between compassionate care and economically efficient care, and to find ways 
how to deal with this plurality. Second, dialogues can create awareness of the 
gaps between formal and informal identity and might contribute to narrow 
these gaps. Third, dialogues enable people to articulate and share their basic 
commitments and sources. They enable them to share not only what they do 
and experience, but also why they do it (see also Chapter 5). The Catholic 
identity can be both an invitation for such conversations, and a framework that 
contains goods and sources that can guide people in their articulations. 
 In addition to these internal dialogues, identity is also discovered and 
created by dialogues with external parties. To these parties belong the leaders 
of the Church. Discussions with those leaders are important, both for the Church 
and for Catholic HCOs, to explore the meaning of Catholic identity amidst the 
plurality of frameworks of liberal, democratic, market-oriented and secularized 
societies. 
c. The narrative dimension: for HCOs developing their identity, it is important to 
know their past identity as it was created by its founders, or, in a broader sense, 
the goals that drove societies to establish the institution of healthcare in the first 
place. Also important is a vision on the future: what goals will be pursued, given 
changing circumstances? From this perspective, a Catholic HCO is an author as 
well in the narrative of a faith. They take part in constituting the Catholic 
tradition. In Chapter 1, we made the distinction between the terms ‘tradition-
constituted’ and ‘tradition-constitutive’: the Catholic tradition is understood as a 
constitutive element of a Catholic HCO, but by the way it is interpreted it is also 
constituted by the Catholic HCO. In view of this interpretation, the Catholic 
tradition should be considered broader than the moral tradition of the teaching 
Church. Chapter 1 demonstrated that despite its ambiguities the Catholic 
tradition is principally a narrative of concrete practices of care for all in need 
and for the whole community. This tradition can be recognized and vitalized by 
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investigating how to respond to needs of concrete and unique human beings 
within the context of the contemporary highly sophisticated and rationalized 
modern healthcare. 
 
In short, drawing on Taylor, we argue that establishing the Catholic identity of an 
HCO is an active process of discovery and creation by an organization which takes 
a stance amidst the present-day variety of moral orientations, which articulates the 
reasons why precisely this stance is taken, which discusses this process with 
others internal and external to the organization - persons, communities, traditions, 
and leaders of the Church – and which thus acquires an identity in the light of the 
past and the future. Catholic HCOs are institutionally committed to the Catholic 
framework. However, this commitment can only be given shape by continuously 
and actively discovering and creating its meaning in relation to experiences in the 
practice of institutional professional care and to the modern pluralism of moral 
convictions.  
 
1.3. The Catholic identity asks for a social-ethical approach of healthcare 
As was described in Chapter I, historically the Christian tradition has been the 
more or less self-evident spiritual and moral framework for healthcare. However, 
this has changed profoundly in the Western world. Healthcare has become 
increasingly oriented by science, technology, pragmatism, and economics. Modern 
Western societies have become pluralistic and religiosity got individualized and 
often separated from organized structures. Neither individuals, nor organizations 
as Catholic HCOs, therefore, derive their moral responsibility from a religious 
framework only, but from a mixture of cultural and social frameworks, in which 
religion is one of them. 
 For this reason, an ethical reflection on the meaning of Catholic identity is part 
of the discipline of social ethics, which we described in Chapter 2 as the reflection 
on the moral goodness and badness of social institutions and structures, and on 
their implied moral values and views of men and society. We have demonstrated 
the necessity for this type of ethical reflection and its implications by examining 
the theme of humaneness of healthcare. Such a theme asks for a social-ethical 
research of the prevailing ideas about what counts or does not count in our 
societies as a worthy and dignified life. For example, many people prefer death 
above being demented; or, living in a culture that puts heavy emphasis on being 
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autonomous, productive and healthy, many negatively value dependence as an 
undignified way of life. A social-ethical approach also fosters a critical awareness 
of the dominance of instrumental rationality in healthcare, such as embodied in the 
dominance of technological and economical values.   
 Because social ethics in general entails a critical and normative reflection on the 
social dimension of human existence, a focus on Western culture is appropriate, 
but at the same time too broad. Western culture shares some common features 
such as a high appraisal of individual autonomy and human equality, but there also 
exists a great diversity within Western culture. The social context of healthcare in 
the US, for example, widely differs from the social context of healthcare in Europe. 
The former is characterized by a free-market-based system with minimal 
interference of the state, the latter by a solidarity-based system with the state as 
the controller of market-mechanisms. Similarly, the authority of religious 
frameworks differs between various Western countries. For instance, the US 
counts as a very religious country, the Netherlands as a highly secularized one, and 
for a majority of the Italians being Catholic is part of their culture and identity. In 
the US, the constitutional separation between church and state has enabled 
everyone to live according to his or her personal beliefs. In combination with a 
strongly market-oriented society, this led to a strong presence of different religious 
denominations in the public domain (see Chapter 4). In Europe, this separation led 
to a break with former state-religions and nowadays public religious 
manifestations risk being considered a return to the past. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, where for a period of about a hundred years religion and religious 
organizations were divided in closed pillars, contemporary manifestations of 
organized religion are often perceived as belonging to the Middle Ages, and 
modernization is valued as a liberation of a barbaric religious period (see Chapter 
1). A social-ethical approach of the identity of HCOs implies, therefore, a thorough 
analysis of the social and cultural characteristics of the country involved.  
 In short, the reflection on the present-day meaning of the Catholic identity must 
not only include some general characteristics of modern Western culture as a 
whole, but also the societal and historical specifics of the country involved. The 
way in which the Catholic identity is embedded in HCOs in a country like the 
Netherlands differs from how this is done in other countries. One of the problems 
of the Catholic Church as a world-church is that it often seems to pay too little 
attention to this societal and cultural diversity. 
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1.4. In sum 
These findings with regard to identity give support to the objective of this study to 
examine how institutional care can be a moral source for Catholic tradition, and 
vice versa (see Chapter 1, section 6). They confirm, first, that the Catholic identity 
can offer a framework to individuals in the HCO to orient them in the development 
of their personal and professional identity. Second, the Catholic identity can orient 
organizations with regard to the question how to behave as moral agents of the 
institution of healthcare, given the tensions between different institutional settings 
they are operating in (we will return to this aspect in sections 2.3 and 3.2). Third, 
experiences in the actual practices of institutional care can be constitutive for 
Catholic identity. Finally, Catholic HCOs can contribute to the Church and its moral 
teachings by entering dialogues with leaders of the Church about how they try to 
explore the meaning of being Catholic amidst the plurality of goods of modern 
culture. These four possible approaches of Catholic identity have in common that 
they all take moral experiences of people and of HCOs as a starting point for the 
discovery and creation of Catholic identity.  
 
2. Problematic aspects 
2.1. Catholic identity as a cultural problem 
Despite the above plea (see section 1.3) to approach Catholic identity in relation 
with the specifics of the country involved, this thesis draws on Taylor’s approach 
and looks at some general characteristics of Western culture. This enables us to 
pursue the first objective of this study: to analyze problematic aspects of a Catholic 
identity. The main finding here is that the problematic aspects of embracing a 
Catholic identity are a symptom of a general cultural tendency to be silent about 
central moral goods and sources.  
 In Taylor’s view, modern culture shows an ambivalence of gains and losses. On 
the one hand, new goods have developed, such as freedom, human rationality as a 
base for human dignity, authenticity, universal justice, human rights and practical 
benevolence. On the other hand, it tends to consider the sources of these goods as 
private, optional and a matter of subjective projection (see Chapter 3). According 
to the modern view, the world and reality are neutral and contain no moral goods 
in themselves; it is us who invent these goods and project them on the world and 
reality. In the reduction of moral goods to mere subjective inventions and 
projections, modern culture also finds a reason for not articulating them in public. 
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It favors a tendency to be silent about goods and sources. Taylor considers such 
view a severe mistake, and a danger for modern culture itself: not willing to talk 
about goods and sources of modern culture will in the end jeopardize and distort 
the achievements of this culture. For this reason he qualifies Sources of the Self as a 
work of retrieval: “an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation – 
and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into 
the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit” (Taylor, 1989: 520).  
 For instance, respect for autonomy, which is a gain of modern culture and at the 
centre of many experiences and practices in, for instance, healthcare, is at risk of 
getting narrowed down towards mere atomism or subjectivism if we avoid 
reflections on the original meaning of autonomy, its actual moral functioning and 
whether or not it is obfuscating other important moral goods. Or, (healthcare) 
technology can become a goal in itself if we forget that it originally was a means to 
improve the conditions of ordinary life. Moreover, a culture of non-articulation 
deprives people of a sense of meaning, and of the motivation to really pursue the 
goods they embrace. Therefore, the main reason for (re-)articulating goods is that 
only then they can be retrieved, and function again as powerful sources for 
maintaining the achievements of modern culture: neglecting them generates the 
risk of living beyond our moral means. We argue that problems in maintaining the 
Catholic identity can be understood as a symptom of this general cultural tendency 
to non-articulation. Like all other goods and sources, also the ones embedded in 
Catholic tradition are perceived as subjective and matters of projection, and for 
that reason not considered relevant for the public realm or for healthcare as a 
public facility. We criticize this idea: Christianity contains moral goods and sources 
for healthcare that are important for the humanity of healthcare, such as 
dedication to the common good, or compassion with vulnerable people. They are 
worthy to be retrieved.  
 
2.2. Catholic identity as a transcendence problem 
In addition to the previous general point, our study disclosed a more specific issue: 
the loss of a sense of transcendence in modern culture. This too makes maintaining 
a transcendence-oriented framework as Christianity problematic.  
 To explain this loss one has to start, like Taylor does in A Secular Age (Taylor, 
2007), with the observation that until approximately 500 years ago it was hardly 
imaginable to live outside the Christian framework, whereas in contemporary 
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culture it has become one option besides others. Christian belief developed from a 
collectively shared understanding of the world into a personal matter. Taylor does 
not value the changed influence of religion as a loss only: it also is a gain. 
Modernization and secularization have opened the way to new, non-theistic 
sources, such as the belief in human reason and the order of nature. The first led to 
a strong development of possibilities to effectively improve the world and to 
diminish human suffering by the use of science and technology. The second put 
great emphasis on the ideal of authenticity: identity is not defined by one’s 
belonging to a collective, such as a nation or a church, but lies in expressing one’s 
inner, true natural self. Taylor is positive about both: they freed the way to 
Christian beliefs in a more fully evangelical sense, by enabling people to distance 
themselves from the societal powers of institutionalized ‘Christendom’ (see 
Chapters 3 and 6). However, there is also a loss: keeping distance from the 
religious framework took the form of distancing oneself from any sense of 
transcendence and meanings that go beyond what is actually experienced in the 
here and now. This is, as Chapter 5 describes, at odds with human experience: 
suffering, for instance, is a denial of the modern ideal of human flourishing, but it 
can still have deep human significance. A culture that denies transcendence, denies 
what it is to be human. Taylor describes this denial as a ‘spiritual lobotomy’. In 
situations of suffering, illness, death and dying questions of meaning force 
themselves upon us, but there is no longer a collectively shared framework to 
embed such questions. Questions of meaning have been individualized, and 
modern culture favors an attitude to keep them individual, subjective and optional.  
 Some criticism is appropriate as well. Taylor is not very clear about the concept 
of transcendence as he uses it. On the one hand, it seems to refer to all goods that 
go beyond individual preferences and that are handed over by traditions and 
communities. In Chapter 6, we labeled this as ‘horizontal transcendence’, and we 
described solidarity as such a horizontal transcendent good. To take another 
example, human dignity too presents a horizontal transcendent good. It is not 
respected because individuals choose to respect it, but because it transcends this 
individual choice: it is a good that is transcendent in the sense of intrinsically 
respectable. That is also how it is presented in, for instance, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, where it is called inherent to all members of 
the human family. The main part of Taylor’s philosophical enterprise builds up a 
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convincing argument for recognition of such horizontal transcendent goods and for 
articulating them.  
 On the other hand, and much more explicitly, the concept of transcendence in 
Taylor’s works refers to ‘vertical transcendence’ as confessed and celebrated in 
religions: goods are related to a higher or divine reality, be it called ‘God’, ‘Allah’, 
‘Nirwana’, or ‘Something Higher’. Even more than horizontal transcendent goods, 
vertical ones are considered as highly private and personal options. However, 
whereas Taylor’s plea for articulation very clearly includes all horizontal 
transcendent goods, this is much less the case with vertical transcendent goods. 
Not all people will share a religious outlook, and among the ones who do share it, a 
lot of them will consider their beliefs as highly personal, and only to be articulated 
and celebrated with co-believers. Even Taylor himself, being a practicing Roman-
Catholic, is modest on this point: the Judeo-Christian framework is the most 
promising source of hope for him (see Chapter 5). However, this modesty does not 
prevent him from discussing the Christian framework as a promising source as 
such for modern culture. In chapter 6 we discussed his argument in favor of 
religious sources for the preservation of solidarity, and we expanded it by 
discussing the contents of these religious sources as they are elaborated at in the 
Social Teaching of the Church, in particular by the late Pope John Paul II.  
 Still, the question remains whether modern culture or modern healthcare is in 
need of religion. The answer highly depends on how religion is defined, and how 
religion is shaped. There are many different religions, and every religion has many 
different faces. For instance, in Christianity, there are very rigid and 
fundamentalist groups besides very flexible and open-minded ones. Religion might 
be strictly defined as a belief in a God who creates and governs the world, or in a 
broader sense as any openness to and receptiveness for dimensions beyond mere 
human flourishing that render meaning to the world and to human life. The wrong 
answer would be that we need religion because of its usefulness to sustain moral 
values and norms in society. This answer is theologically objectionable, because it 
degrades faith in God to a tool for something else. It is ethically disputable because 
it presupposes a more or less fixed hierarchical system of values and norms within 
a certain religion or within certain societal circles which needs to be sustained and 
which offers a standard to condemn or combat other ones. However, particularly 
in open, multicultural and multireligious societies as ours, ethics implies an open 
inquiry into the very meaning of values and norms – for instance the proscription 
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of killing – in specific and changing circumstances like unwanted pregnancy or the 
experience of losing one’s dignity because of degrading suffering in the course of a 
disease.  
 The direction towards a right answer to the question about the relevance of 
religion might be, first, a religion-scientific one: humans are by nature religious, in 
the sense that they are beings in search for meaning in their life and their suffering, 
in their relations with others and in the world as a whole. The search for meaning 
is not a religious invention, but a fact of human life that has given birth to religions. 
However religion might be defined, we agree with Taylor’s observation that a 
culture that denies this search for meaning, or considers it a merely private and 
optional choice, denies what it is to be human.  
 Second, a Catholic-theological answer should be that all members of the Church 
are called upon to spread the Kingdom of Christ over all the earth (CCC, 863). It 
expresses the Christian aim to strive for a better, more humane world, which 
means, among others, for more humane and just institutions. To respond to this 
calling Christianity cannot be locked up in the private sphere, but must enter the 
public domain: not in order to convert the public to Christian faith, but to 
contribute to humanity and justice. Likewise, the goal of Catholic HCOs should not 
be to convert people to Catholicism, but to strive for humanity and justice in 
modern institutions of healthcare. In Chapter 6 we demonstrated this by 
perceiving the moral obligations of Catholic HCOs regarding the preservation of 
solidarity as a contribution to the common good. This moral call to humanize the 
world finds it deepest source in the belief in a transcendent God who leads the 
world and history to their final destiny. According to Catholic belief God is present 
in the world, and has revealed himself in a particular way in Jesus Christ as a God 
of love and concern. This belief enables to ‘see’ all care and concern for the other as 
an encounter in which God is present. It introduces a different perspective: no 
longer is care only the series of professional performances to a patient, nor only 
the compassionate concern with another, nor only the effectuation of a contractual 
obligation. Care remains all that, but is also profoundly changed. The appeal to a 
transcendent God widens, and in a sense, “disrupts the existing order.” (Taylor, 
2007: 732-733). This ‘disruption’ might be interpreted in two ways. On the one 
hand, it upgrades all care to a higher level of relevance: in care God himself is 
present. On the other hand, it puts all we do, and all the institutions we create to 
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improve the world under the proviso that these are ways to spread the Kingdom of 
God, but that the full Kingdom is in God’s hands.  
 
2.3. Catholic identity as an institutional problem 
HCOs belong to the institution of healthcare, and the problematic aspect of 
maintaining a Catholic identity is also caused by the institutional crisis of modern 
HCOs.  
 From a normative perspective, which in this study was inspired by the views of 
Ricoeur (Chapter 1 and 4), institutions can be identified by their goals. We drew on 
Ricoeur because a discussion of social institutions and, all the more, of 
organizations is strikingly neglected in Taylor’s studies. Just as the institution of 
education is defined by the goal to educate people, the institution of healthcare is 
defined by the goal to offer care to people who need it. The institution of 
healthcare is society’s answer to human vulnerability; institutionalization is a way 
of an organized and historical community to anchor care for all who need care, 
now and in the future. However, within the context of an HCO this institutional 
goal has to be pursued in relation with other organizational obligations (see 
Chapter 6). HCOs must be financially healthy, they have to comply with scientific 
standards of good care, they have to offer care according to modern technological, 
medical and nursing expectations, they have to give due right to wishes and needs 
of patients, and they must behave as good employers. In other words, in Chapter 1 
we distinguish between institutions and organizations. In the different subsequent 
chapters this distinction is not made, or not as clearly made. However, drawing on 
this distinction we argue that within the walls of an HCO different institutions meet 
each other: the institutions of labor, science, technology, economy, and, naturally, 
care.  
 In several chapters we elaborated the tensions caused in modern HCOs by the 
presence and interaction of science and care, technology and care, and market-
economics and care. The more tensions there are, the more the identity of an HCO 
as an organization belonging to the institution of care is at risk. Removing these 
other institutional settings from an HCO cannot solve these tensions. To neglect the 
importance of sound economics, or scientifically proven healthcare is neither 
possible nor desirable. Instead, the moral responsibility of contemporary HCOs 
implies a thorough balancing and ranking of different institutional goals. In 
Chapter 6 we argued in favor of such a ranking, taking the goal of care as the 
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hypergood of an HCO: because of its belonging to the institution of healthcare it is 
the good that has to be pursued above all other goods and has to provide the 
normative standpoint from which other goods, for instance economic of scientific 
ones, must be sought after.  
 Not dedicating itself to this hypergood places an HCO outside the institution of 
healthcare, and causes an evaporation of the identity of an HCO as an organization 
for healthcare. HCOs showing a greater interest in their position in the market than 
in their goal to offer care to all people who need care cause damage to their 
identity as a care organization. Hence, the first problem of institutional Catholic 
identity regards the care identity, not the Catholic one. In Chapter 3 we quoted 
Richard McCormick: in his view, Catholic identity has become a ‘mission 
impossible’, because of the growing dominance of the market. His observation is 
right, not only with regard to the Catholic identity, but also in the more general 
sense of an HCO’s identity being defined by the institutional goal of healthcare. To 
counter this threat, the commitment to Catholic tradition can be an energizing 
source, because in this tradition the hypergood is the practice of care for and 
compassion with people in need. That is what we will be judged upon, as the 
gospel tells. This source empowers the Catholic HCO to resist itself against 
domination by the market.   
 
2.4. Catholic identity as an ecclesiastical problem 
Although our study demonstrates that the Catholic tradition has much to offer to 
healthcare, it also shows some problems of embracing a Catholic identity, caused 
by the Church itself.  
 Interviewees in Chapter 5 pointed to the rigidity of the way Catholic morals can 
be presented and perceived. They observe a lack of openness and willingness to 
consider tensions between ecclesiastical directives and tough choices people 
sometimes have to make, for instance in cases of unwanted pregnancy or 
degrading suffering. We have also referred to Taylor’s observation that in the 
United States there is a tendency to return to a neo-Durkheimian model. The 
Durkheimian model is characterized by a strong penetration of all social, cultural 
and institutional structures by religion. Nowadays, a neo-Durkheimian model is 
pursued by trying to establish a new kind of forced conformity to Catholic norms 
and guidelines. In order to reach this the leadership of the Church, led by the 
Vatican, tends to line up with the Christian right. This would be at odds with the 
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modern motto, which is positively valued by Taylor, that one only accepts what 
‘rings to your own inner self’. He fears the costs of these efforts to create 
conformity will be “hypocrisy, spiritual stultification, inner revolt against the 
Gospel, the confusion of faith with power, and even worse.” (see Chapter 5).  
At a more general level, the leadership of the Church of the past decades is 
criticized for its lack of appreciation of human experiences as a source of moral 
knowledge. The moral tradition of the Church is presented as a body of closed, 
unchangeable teachings, contrary to this same tradition that emphasizes to 
importance of a Church learning from new developments and actual experiences. 
As Mahoney expresses it: the Ecclesia docens can learn from the Ecclesia discens 
(see Chapter 5). 
 
3. New perspectives on the moral responsibility of Catholic HCOs 
In Chapter 1 we refined the notion of Catholic identity to its normative meaning: 
any HCO is called Catholic, which takes the Catholic tradition, including the 
ecclesiastical moral teaching, as a guiding frame of reference for its practices. The 
Catholic identity is shown and developed by taking into account the search for a 
way to connect present-day society- and culture-bound practices of care with the 
Catholic tradition. Our study opens up several perspectives on how to achieve this. 
 
3.1. Care as a service to God 
The Catholic identity is embodied in the institutional commitment to a tradition 
that is strongly marked by a concrete practice of care for people in vulnerable 
conditions and in situations of suffering. Catholicism understands human beings as 
social and community-oriented. It emphasizes “connectivity, loyalty, and 
involvement” (Tropman, 2002: 15). It supports the communitarian view that no 
human being can find fulfillment in him- or herself, that is, apart from the fact that 
he or she exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others (see Chapter 6 of this study).  
 With regard to healthcare, this understanding of the social nature of human 
beings means that there is no good, neither for the individual nor for the 
community, without caring for each other. Caring is, by its very nature, a way to 
found and strengthen community. A morality of care, therefore, has always been an 
integral part of Catholic tradition.  
 We described the history of this aspect of the Catholic tradition in Chapter 1. We 
demonstrated that Catholic-inspired care has been and still can be a source of 
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empowerment to beneficent practices, based on the conviction that you give to the 
other because God has given to you (see Chapter 6). Hence, Catholic care is much 
more than it is often reduced to: a set of moral do’s and don’ts particularly oriented 
to the beginning and end of human life. Moreover, the practice of care is not 
perceived as a moral obligation externally imposed to us by God, but as a place of 
dedication in which God is present and appeals to us. For that reason every care 
for vulnerable and suffering people is a service to God, even if the caregivers will 
not interpret it that way.  
 It is the major reason for the management of Catholic HCOs to honor the 
primary process of caring as the ultimate domain of their moral responsibility as a 
Catholic organization. HCOs do not have to be Catholic to rank caring as the 
primary process above other necessary organizational goals, such as economic 
solvability. But when they are Catholic, they have even more reason to do so. It 
would be un-Catholic to do otherwise. This also implies that caregivers don’t have 
to be Catholic to give care as Catholic tradition urges. In a sense, Catholic-inspired 
care and atheist care coincide, because, as the Gospel tells, all one does for the 
needy is done for Christ himself, even if Christ is unknown to the doer. 
 
3.2. Care as the ‘hypergood’ 
The Catholic tradition offers a source for critically balancing the process of care 
with other goals an HCO has to pursue. This balancing is inherent to the moral 
responsibility of all present-day HCOs and their managers. They necessarily have 
to operate within different competing institutional settings: institutions of 
economics, science and technology, labor, and law. However, an HCO that 
subordinates its institutional goal of caring to one of these others denies its 
primary goal. The Catholic tradition offers an empowering source to rank care as 
the ‘hypergood’ (see Chapter 6) and as the critical perspective by which other 
institutional goals should be judged.   
 This judgment, however, is more than a matter of priority setting in the 
boardroom, and more than a moral responsibility of managers. Tensions between 
care and, for instance, economics also pervade the actual practices of caregivers: 
they, too, are parties directly involved in these tensions, and for that reason also 
responsible for the way they deal with them. In Chapter 4 we have argued that in 
order to enable a proper judgment, the articulation of goods in both care and 
economics is necessary. Care might easily be perceived as a good, but by 
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articulation caregivers can become aware that underlying economics and the 
emphasis on economic values in many present-day HCOs another important moral 
good can be at stake: the good of justice, in particular of distributive justice. HCOs 
not only bear moral responsibility for patients that are admitted here and now, but 
also for potential patients of tomorrow. Therefore, they have to deal efficiently 
with scarce means and time. In situations where caregivers experience tensions 
between care and economics they themselves should have the opportunity to 
examine and discuss what goods should prevail in their daily practice. How should 
they balance the demands of justice with the demands of personal care? Is the call 
for efficiency legitimate because of the obligation to operate as a just organization, 
and, if so, how to prevent a degrading of care in a series of efficient, but impersonal 
operations?  How should they realize compassionate care in situations of high 
workload? How can management of HCOs stay aware of the fact that compassion is 
not just a commodity, but the essence of care, and the primary empowering source 
of many caregivers? If care is primary to all other goods, what implications follow 
for the way the work is organized? Caregivers and managers can deepen their 
moral responsibility for care by critical reflection on their practices and 
proclaimed values, and by articulating the goods towards which they are oriented 
in actual fact or should be oriented to ideally.  
 Again, these evaluations and discussions are not an exclusive characteristic of 
Catholic HCOs, but the meaning of the Catholic orientation to the needy and 
vulnerable can be discovered and created in enabling people to look for ways the 
hypergood of care can be realized in their own situation. 
 
3.3. The criterion of human dignity 
Care must be given in accordance with human dignity. Human dignity is a central 
good in Catholic tradition, and derives its moral force from its transcendent origin. 
Dignity is attributed to every human being because of his creation by God at His 
image and his destiny with God. This divine origin of human dignity offers a 
counterbalance against mere human, cultural bound interpretations of dignity, or 
of a dignified of undignified life. It also represents a criterion to judge about our 
achievements. In the light of this we used technology as an example in Chapter 3: 
the developments in and the use of technology by HCOs should always be 
subordinated to the criterion of human dignity, next to the criterion of the integral 
good of man. The exact manner in which these criteria apply to a specific 
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technology cannot be defined in advance. It is part of the moral responsibility of 
HCOs to assess every technology used or introduced by these criteria. In many 
HCOs this belongs to the tasks of the Ethical Committee. Catholic tradition also 
appeals to human dignity in order to be conscious of the limits of care and medical 
power: it appraises health, the absence of suffering and the prevention of a 
premature death as highly precious goods, but not as absolute goods. Just as health 
does not enlarge human dignity, disease and suffering do not diminish it. On the 
contrary, not recognizing the limits of life itself and the limits of human and 
medical power to preserve life can in itself be at odds with human dignity.  
 In Chapter 2 we argued that a good way to uphold human dignity in healthcare 
is to focus on situations in which this dignity seems to be the most threatened or 
absent: for instance in situations of progressive Alzheimer, or in policy choices that 
favor investments in people with curable diseases above investments in incurable 
of less spectacular patients.  
 
3.4. Close coherence between morality and rationality 
Studying how Catholic HCOs can contribute to the preservation of solidarity (see 
Chapter 6), we have found that in Catholic social teaching solidarity is not 
exclusively based on theological grounds. Although Pope John Paul II called it one 
of the fundamental principles of the Christian view of social and political 
organization, he also perceived it from a personalist and sociological view. The 
personalist view calls upon everyone to seek fulfillment in a life dedicated to the 
other. The sociological view points to the growing and factual interdependence 
between human beings. The theological view refers to the religious belief that all 
human beings are united as brothers and sisters in one human family under God 
the Father. The appeal to the personalist and sociological view shows that there is 
no separation between a Catholic approach on the one hand, and a rational 
approach that can be understood by all ‘people of good will’ on the other hand. 
This demonstrates a general trait of Catholic morality: the appeal to natural law, 
understood as the ‘participation of eternal law in the rational creature’ (see 
Chapter 5). Through their rational capacities human beings are able to envisage 
what God considers as morally good or evil. Faith is not just passive obedience but 
a search for rational understanding: fides quaerens intellectum. In Catholic tradition 
morality and rationality are closely connected. This implies two things. 
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 First, it offers Catholics and Catholic organizations the possibility to rationally 
debate ethical issues, among others by ethical committees, as a way to introduce 
the Catholic perspective into a pluralistic context. Ethically justifiable decisions 
and policies have to be founded on arguments instead of on religious assumptions. 
However, this is not to be interpreted as a separation between the two: ethical 
arguments always will imply a certain ‘irrationality’, in the sense that there are no 
completely assumption-free views on man and society, inter-human relations, the 
relation between individual and community, or the meaning of disease, death, 
health, et cetera. Catholic tradition challenges everyone to connect these views 
with their ethical arguments.  
 Second, by rationally discussing ethical issues, Catholic HCOs can also 
contribute to the moral tradition of the Church if they include in their discussions 
the arguments and the perspectives of the moral teaching of the Church. Drawing 
on their numerous experiences with hard ethical cases Catholic HCOs can take up a 
moral responsibility to teach the Church, in addition to being taught by the Church 
(see Chapter 5). This presupposes a willingness of the Church or the local bishops 
to learn from Catholic HCOs, and, eventually, to modify the Catholic moral teaching 
on certain issues. If, however, our findings with regard to identity as an 
ecclesiastical problem are correct, this willingness does not always seem to be self-
evident.   
 
3.5. The common good 
The Catholic tradition, in particular the social teaching of the Church, puts great 
emphasis on the common good, which is the good for every individual and for all. 
The notion of the common good is not exclusively Catholic or Christian. Its 
contents are open for rational inquiry and discussion by all. But the way it is 
perceived and promoted by the Church offered a background to persons 
interviewed in the United States to characterize a Catholic HCO as counter-cultural. 
In the US this means: critical of a market-driven, commercialized and businesslike 
healthcare. It shows that according to Catholic conviction the common good is not 
to be reduced to society’s economic prosperity. It should include all conditions that 
foster human flourishing, either as groups, or as individuals (Chapter 6). 
Consequently, this notion of the common good is also critical of all those structures 
that raise barriers against the rights of people to reach their fulfillment. Using a 
theological expression, John Paul II qualified these barriers as ‘structures of sin’.  
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 In Chapter 6 we argued that solidarity is a determined commitment to the 
common good, which is to be pursued, in the first place, by HCOs through their 
quintessential job: offering care to people in their vulnerable condition. Solidarity 
is the virtue that should characterize the Catholic HCO as organizations that show a 
disposition to foster both the community aspects of care between caregivers and 
patients, and the community aspects between all employees. Both ways express 
solidarity in the care for community structures inside the HCO. Solidarity also 
means, that the moral responsibility of Catholic HCOs and in particular of their 
managers can be defined by consistently regarding themselves as part of the 
common good, and not as organizations with a primary focus on their competitive 
position in a health-care market. Nowadays HCOs cannot situate themselves 
outside the market. However, the notion of the common good is a reminder that, 
although they are in the market, they never should be of the market. 
 
3.6. Horizons of meaning 
The emphasis on flourishing and fulfillment in the notion of the common good may 
conceal an essential trait of religions. Religions cover the whole range of life: 
gratitude, happiness, togetherness, contingency, dedication, finitude, mortality, et 
cetera. They offer cognitive conceptions about what life is, about what it is to be a 
human being, about life’s origins and destination. They offer rituals for all kinds of 
life-events: birth, marriage, despair, mourning, death or dying. In addition, they 
offer moral values and norms for the way we ought to live a good life. Religions can 
be understood as attempts to respond to flourishing and fulfillment, and to their 
opposites: human finitude, mortality, deterioration, suffering, or death. The 
answers of religions to these opposites are not ‘effective’ in the way our culture 
usually deals with such problems. However, religions articulate the awareness, by 
wordings, symbols or rituals, that these opposites cannot just be treated as - in 
principal solvable - problems. They are mysteries as well: phenomena which are 
present in everyone’s life, which do not ask for a solution only, but also for 
meaning, especially in situations where no solution can be offered. Religions offer 
horizons of meaning that do not liberate humans from suffering, but can be 
liberating in suffering. The Catholic tradition affirms life as a primary and founding 
good, but not as the highest good. Many martyrs gave up their life to save others. 
This tradition also affirms life as a good despite the realities of suffering and death. 
The value of life is confirmed by the Resurrection: in the end death will be 
 Findings and discussion 
175 
conquered. However, maybe the most important aspect of the Catholic tradition is 
its firm conviction that God is present in suffering and that other people can testify 
of this presence by being present themselves for the one who suffers. Any kind of 
suffering asks for community, love and compassion of other people, and, according 
to Catholic beliefs, in this community God is always present.  
 The implication for the practice of care is that care is not only about cure or a 
series of professional actions, but also about entering into a relation with a 
receptiveness for dimensions of meaningfulness that transcend the actual 
situation, and that are liberating in the actual situation. God-believers can this 
transcendence, for which the receptiveness as such is common to all human beings, 
religiously interpret as God’s presence.  
 
3.7. Catholic identity is inclusive 
Inclusiveness is the way Catholic identity is perceived in Chapter 5: it invites 
everyone, whatever their beliefs are, to contribute to good care and to reflect on 
what good care entails. For Catholic HCOs the Catholic tradition is the central 
framework, but this framework is done justice only when it is introduced into the 
existing pluralistic environment and brought into discussion. This is also a way to 
give due right to the dialogical dimension of identity: recognition of differences is 
not a deathblow for dialogue, but the very condition for it. A Catholic identity 
includes everyone and excludes nobody. 
 
3.8. Catholic identity asks for articulation 
Identity is a quest for identity. This also holds true for a Catholic identity. A 
Catholic identity is a reason to create possibilities for articulation of what people, 
in particular caregivers, experience as good, pursuable, and inspiring, as well as 
their opposites: what they experience as bad, objectionable and killing all 
inspiration. In other words, Catholic HCOs should enable their employees to 
articulate their moral sources. They should invite everyone to reflect on their 
experiences and to articulate what lies behind these experiences: their views on 
human beings, community, meanings of suffering and health, and their sources. As 
one of the interviewees in Chapter 5 challenged non-Christian colleagues in his 
HCO with regard to his dedication to care: “if you don’t think Jesus is the reason, so 
why do you?” A strong and clear articulation of the Catholic identity of an HCO may 
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be a stimulus to all to reflect on their own motives for working in professional care 
and to discover and create their own identity.  
 Articulation is, as has been pointed out throughout this study, trying to spell out 
what moral goods and sources lay behind moral experiences. It is a way to express 
and to interpret oneself, and to explain oneself to the other. Again, articulation is 
not a Catholic privilege: in this regard, the main division is not between Catholic 
and non-Catholic organizations, but between organizations that create 
opportunities for reflection and articulation, and the ones that do not. The 
advantage, however, of Catholic identity is that it refers to particular goods and 
sources. It focuses on the care of persons in vulnerable conditions, as the ultimate 
goal of human fulfillment, and the hypergood of Catholic HCO. It also refers to 
specific religious sources of this care: that God is present in such a care; that it is a 
continuation of the healing mission of Jesus and the Church; that it is a way to 
affirm the Gospel (see Chapter 5). Catholic HCOs may vary in the articulation of 
their religious sources. Nevertheless, an important outcome of our study is the 
relevance that this Catholic-religious focus is clearly articulated in the mission 
statement and core values, rather than of how it is articulated. A clear articulation 
of Catholic identity, among others on HCO’s website, is not a means to force people 
to identify with it. On the contrary, it is, first, a way to invite people to examine and 
articulate their own goods and sources, and to deal with the plurality of moral 
convictions within the HCO and within society. Secondly, it provides a measure for 
organization’s integrity: the coherence between what the HCO states, and its daily 
behaviors.  
 
3.9. Catholic identity as constitutive of a moral community 
As Chapter 6 demonstrates, the Catholic theological idea behind solidarity is that 
we are social by force of creation: beings related to each other as brothers and 
sisters in one human family. The personalist and sociological perspectives 
contribute to this idea (see 3.4. above). Thinking in terms of community, therefore, 
is central to the Catholic tradition. In HCOs this community aspect becomes 
concrete in the practice of care: this practice is in itself the most important source 
of the HCO as a moral community.  
 Chapter 5 offers non-theological tools to build up and strengthen the 
understanding of an HCO as a moral community. This can be stimulated (see also 
3.8) by the articulation of a clear mission, vision and of core values of the 
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organization, which everyone can understand but which are at the same time 
sufficiently open to allow for individual and situation-bound interpretations. But a 
sense of community is also inherent to the practice of care: as we quoted Joan 
Tronto in Chapter 5, care is an expression of the fact that individuals are mutually 
related to and dependent on each other. It means that the caring relation itself 
provides the basis for an HCO as a moral community.  
 The Catholic tradition offers theological grounds for emphasizing this care-
community relation. First, it considers care for each other as the answer to God’s 
care for us. Second, it places the community-ties between people in the 
transcendent perspective of the one human family under God the Father. For both 
these reasons care should be the hypergood of a Catholic HCO. 
 
These nine perspectives have in common, that they all plea in support of being 
open and explicit with regard to the Catholic identity of the HCO concerned, about 
the need to discover and create this identity starting with experiences in the 
practice and policies of care, and about the need to include all employees in the 
exploration and creation of the identity of the HCO. They demonstrate that the 
Catholic tradition can offer an empowering, critical and rational framework to the 
management of Catholic HCOs in order to develop ethically justifiable policies and 
practices in accordance with human dignity and the common good. Catholic 
identity can be perceived as a way to situate HCO’s moral responsibility in context 
of modern and pluralistic society, of different and competing institutional goals 
within a HCO, of tensions between care as the hypergood and an increasing 
influence of the market. 
 
4. Implications for future research 
This study identifies several starting-points to approach the Catholic identity of 
present-day HCOs in Western culture. It also identifies several questions in need of 
future research. 
a. This study contributes to bioethics, and in particular, to a field which has been 
underdeveloped so far: organizational ethics. An HCO has to be considered a 
moral agent, with the primary goal to offer care, but also with competing goals 
as regards economics, employees and society at large. We have argued in favor 
of weighing these competing goals from the perspective of care. We have also 
argued that a Catholic identity itself offers a framework for such a balancing. It 
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would be interesting to examine by empirical research whether and, if yes, how 
this is done.  
b. Since the notion of Western culture is a very general one, more detailed 
research is needed to discover how, for instance in the Netherlands, experiences 
in practices of care are constitutive for the way Catholic HCOs explore and 
create their Catholic identity. As far as we know, several Catholic HCOs in the 
Netherlands have developed policy manuscripts on identity. Some of them are 
mainly restricted to the manner in which the HCO deals with those ethical 
issues about which there are clear viewpoints of the Church, for example on 
euthanasia and abortion. It would be important, first, to learn if and how 
everyday experiences play a role in the way Catholic HCOs deal with such issues. 
Second, it would be important to learn if and how experiences in everyday 
practices in general play a role in discovering and creating the meaning of a 
Catholic identity.  
c. We have repeatedly spoken of ‘good’ or ‘humane’ care. However, these notions 
are in need of more clarification. In recent years research has been initiated in 
the domain of what is called ‘professional loving care’ (Heijst, 2006), and the 
role of ‘presence’ (Baart, 2001) as contributors to good care (also Vosman, 
Baart, 2008). This research combines both theoretical and empirical elements. 
One of the research questions is how caregivers and care receivers perceive 
good and humane care. Our study gives reason to draw on this research, but 
with a specific focus on the manner in which organizational structures and 
systems positively or negatively influence the delivery of good and humane 
care.  
d. This study opens up perspectives on research in moral theology with its plea for 
a re-evaluation of experiences in – medical, nursing, or management - practice 
as sources of moral knowledge. This implies that also moral theology should pay 
more attention to the analysis of the moral aspects of institutions and 
organizational structures, and of experiences of people in these institutions and 
structures. The meaning of researching these experiences lies in disclosing what 
people evaluate as good or bad, and why they arrive at these evaluations. 
Starting from there, moral theology should try to interpret these evaluations in 
the light of the Catholic tradition, and the other way around: what can we learn 
from these experiences about the meaning of Catholic tradition? It would be 
interesting to start with empirical research of experiences of people with regard 
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to euthanasia, which is forbidden by the official moral teaching of the Church. 
Research could investigate the motives of people who request it, or, in the case 
of physicians, who comply with these requests, and whether and how Catholic 
faith plays a role. The interpretative, moral-theological part of the research lies 
in the exploration of the way in which the traditional Catholic viewpoints on life, 
death and suffering can elucidate these experiences, and how these experiences 
can throw light on the Catholic tradition. 
 
5. Implications for medical education 
a. Just as in bioethics in general, also in Dutch medical curricula the field of 
organizational ethics is hardly developed. Instead, organizational ethics or 
business ethics are well developed outside the medical schools. This is striking, 
since most of future physicians will work within HCOs, and will be confronted 
with organizational goals or structures that may be in conflict with the manner 
in which they perceive their obligations towards patients. At the same time, the 
organizations themselves influence the development of professional values and 
attitudes. Moreover, as a matter of the organization’s integrity, every HCO may 
expect professionals to behave according to the core values, mission, and 
guidelines of the organization, even if these do not reflect the individual’s 
morals. Hence, there is sufficient reason to pay attention in medical education to 
the way individual caregivers behave at the intersection of individual 
professional autonomy, and the organization’s identity as expressed in its 
mission, values and norms.  
b. Bioethics finds its origin in moral theology. Many of its founders were 
theologians or had a background in Catholic moral tradition (Curran 2003): 
among others, A. Jonsen, W. Reich, J. Childress, R. McCormick, D. Callahan, and 
with regard to the Netherlands: P. Sporken and Th. Beemer.  
  Despite these religious roots, bioethics gradually developed into a religiously 
neutral discipline. Also in medical education, the Catholic moral tradition hardly 
plays a role, and if it does, it is mostly limited to the presentation of well-known 
moral proscriptions on euthanasia and abortion. The former connection 
between ethical behavior and decisions on the one hand, and reflection on the 
underlying views of man on the other, which was self-evident in Catholic 
tradition, is no longer addressed. Students are now often confronted with hard 
cases and are taught to find solutions (Kimman, 2002). Much less they are 
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taught to reflect on the views of man, including their own, that underlie these 
cases and their solutions, and on (their) views on health and disease, suffering 
and death, dignified and undignified modes of living. Drawing on Taylor we may 
conclude that it is important for medical students to articulate these views by 
reflecting on their own experiences, before they are going to think of finding 
solutions. Students should have the opportunity to reflect on who they are and 
which goods they embrace instead of considering only how they should act in 
difficult situations. For instance, before starting to find an answer to a request of 
a patient for euthanasia, students should be offered opportunities to discuss 
questions like: what do we consider a good death? Is death plain death or is 
there something after? What is the meaning of a human life? Is it a gift? Is it an 
instrumental good, which can be measured according standards of quality, and 
be given up or actively ended if it does not meet those standards? What is a 
good life? What is the place of communities and relationships in experiencing 
the fullness of life?  
 Introducing such questions into the medical education offers students a 
possibility to develop their own identity as a future physician. The objective 
should be to make students more sensitive to a discovery of moral problems 
and dimensions, including the ones that cannot be solved but must be endured 
as part of the human condition. From such an expansion of the goals of medical 
education, it is a small step to appeal to religious frameworks, including the 
Christian one. Above (see 2.2.) we have indicated that human beings are 
religious by nature, in the sense that they are beings in search for meaning in 
their life, in their relations with others and in the world as a whole. If this is 
true, medical education should nurture this religious dimension, not in order to 
save religions or restoring Catholic tradition but to help students to develop a 
mature identity. 
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Modern western culture is marked by pluralism and secularization. Given this 
background, the first objective of this ethical study is to analyze some problems 
raised by this cultural context for the interpretation by Catholic HCOs of their 
religious identity. The second objective is to develop new perspectives on this 
identity, with a particular focus on the relation between identity and the moral 
responsibility of these Catholic HCOs. We understand this moral responsibility as 
the way HCOs perceive their moral obligations, and deal with ethical dilemmas and 
choices.  
 Both objectives are pursued by appealing to the philosopher Charles Taylor. He 
serves as a guide in the exploration of the relations between identity, modern 
culture and religion. Drawing on his reflections, the second objective is made more 
specific by investigating how care, provided by HCOs can be a moral source for the 
Catholic tradition and, reversely, how Catholic tradition can be a moral source for 
this care and for the identity of the HCOs as moral agents. Throughout this study 
this reciprocity in the notion of moral responsibility is examined by arguing: 
a. that the Catholic identity of an HCO can offer a framework to individuals in the 
organization for the development of their personal identity;  
b. that the Catholic identity can orient organizations with regard to the question 
how to behave as moral agents of the institution of healthcare, given the 
tensions between the different institutional settings HCOs are operating in;  
c. that experiences in the practices of institutional care can be constitutive for 
Catholic identity; 
d. that Catholic HCOs can contribute to the Church and its moral teachings. 
 
Chapter 1 describes the general background of this ethical study and characterizes 
it as a primarily hermeneutic enterprise. This study is not a historical or 
sociological description of Catholic healthcare, but intends to develop an 
interpretation of the significance of care and of Catholic tradition for the practice of 
institutional care and policies of present-day Western HCOs. 
 Modern healthcare has a long history of connectedness with a Christian 
framework. During approximately 2000 years Christianity has functioned as a 
moral source that empowered many people to devote their life to caring for the 
sick, disabled, and all in need. Nevertheless, due to scientific and technological 
developments, increasing costs, organizational restructuring, cultural pluralism 
and the transformation of religion in the process of secularization, this source has 
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lost much of its force, both at the level of individual persons, and at the level of 
healthcare organizations (HCOs). It has become an optional framework next to 
others such as economics and science. Its present meaning must be discovered and 
created in the context of concrete experiences of the workers in healthcare, leaders 
of HCOs, people dependent on healthcare – patients and their relatives - and 
citizens in general.  
 In this study, the Netherlands function as an example to demonstrate how 
changes in Catholic healthcare are bound to societal and cultural processes. On the 
one hand, this example clarifies the necessity to relate the issue of Catholic identity 
to the concrete characteristics of a society. In the Netherlands aspects like, among 
others, the rise and decline of pillarization and the rapid transformation of religion 
into an individual belief play a role in the Dutch debate on the present-day 
meaning of the Catholic identity of organizations. On the other hand, the same 
Dutch developments allow for an approach which discusses the problematic 
features of Catholic identity as a phenomenon in modern Western culture in 
general.  
 Our study demonstrates that Taylor’s theories of modern identity, culture and 
religion offer useful tools to analyze and clarify why the Catholic identity of HCOs 
has become problematic in modern Western countries. Taylor considers the 
identity of the modern human agent a reciprocal process between individual and 
the community. In this process, what is good and meaningful for one’s self-
understanding is discovered in the interaction between individual experiences and 
socially and culturally embedded conceptions of the good and the meaningful. 
Drawing on this approach, we argue that the meaning of Catholic identity of HCOs 
too can only be discovered by evaluating experiences of people in those HCOs and 
by examining if and how conceptions about the good and meaningful that are 
embedded in Christian or Catholic tradition, can orient them in their self-
understanding and in their search for their deepest moral sources.   
 However, Taylor focuses on how individuals develop their identity, and on how 
modern culture deals with questions of identity. He hardly pays attention to the 
identity of organizations. For that reason, we turn to Ricoeur’s approach of the 
normative role of institutions. He defines institutions as structures of living 
together, created by a community for specific goals. The healthcare system is 
instituted in order to provide care, just as the educational system is instituted in 
order to provide education. Drawing on Ricoeur we distinguish HCOs as 
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organizations within the institution of healthcare. But we also take a further step. 
An HCO is a complex organization because it is a meeting place of different social 
institutions: of economics, of science, of technology, and of care – which might all 
compete with one another. This characterization allows us to observe that many 
Catholic HCOs face an identity crisis not primarily in the sense of how to concretize 
their Catholic identity, but first of all in the sense that in all HCOs the institutional 
goal of care is at risk of being suppressed by goals of other institutions, in 
particular of economics.  
 In several chapters we analyze how the introduction of the market in healthcare 
can enlarge this risk. For instance, too big an emphasis on economic gains and 
losses can reduce the quality of care to calculable and measurable outcomes. Only 
what can be counted is counted in. Notwithstanding this risk we also positively 
approached the market as a means to contribute to the moral good of justice. There 
is no a-priori contradiction between care and market. Part of the moral 
responsibility of a contemporary HCO is, therefore, to weigh the different 
institutional goals in order to reach a proper ranking. We plead in favor of care as 
the hypergood of an HCO against which other goals ought to be weighed.  
 
Chapter 2 argues that in order to reflect on Catholic identity of HCOs we need a 
social ethical approach. We use the theme of humane healthcare to demonstrate 
this. Social ethics is the reflection on the moral goodness or badness of social 
institutions and structures, as well as on the collectively shared goods and 
prevailing views on people and society that they imply. Modern culture, however, 
shows a lack of consensus about the good. It finds itself in a situation of moral 
pluralism. This is used as an alibi to support moral relativism: since there is no 
common conception of the good and its sources, all moral convictions are 
considered as relative and equal in worth. Only procedural solutions aiming at 
peaceful arrangements of all these different views remain. Drawing on Taylor we 
argue that by neglecting its own moral sources, culture risks to reach higher than 
its moral means can sustain. By doing this it jeopardizes its own achievements. It is 
only by articulation of these sources that they can be retrieved. We propose to use 
so-called negative experiences, which are experiences of what is clearly opposed to 
the good, as starting points for the articulation of goods. For instance, to discover 
and articulate the good of humane healthcare, we suggest starting with situations 
that are clearly experienced as inhumane, or that prevailing views in our society 
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clearly consider inhumane; for instance, the view that severe dementia results in a 
undignified life. On this way we can rediscover important goods in, among others, 
the goals and meaning of healthcare, in autonomy and in human dignity.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses identity as a problem which is specific for our modern culture. 
Drawing on the view, that identity is mainly defined by the moral goods a person 
or a culture embraces, Taylor criticizes the fact  that modern culture tends to 
reduce any conception of the good to something merely private and optional, and 
therefore not in need for any public articulation. We argue that this cultural 
predicament also affects the identity of Catholic organizations. They, too, are 
hindered to articulate the moral goods and sources that they consider distinctive 
for their Catholic identity. In this chapter we investigate some epistemological and 
moral reasons of modern culture for not articulating these moral goods and 
sources. An epistemological reason is, among others, a naturalistic outlook, that 
explains reality in a merely scientific and mechanistic way, and considers all talk 
about values and goods a matter of subjective projections. A moral reason is, 
among others, that talking about moral goods and sources is associated with a life 
of contemplation that once was considered a higher mode of life, but that is 
replaced by the modern appraisal of the ordinary daily life. Another moral reason 
is that moral sources are perceived as by definition particularistic, which should be 
at odds with modern pluralism. However, Taylor observes ambivalence. Modern 
technology, economics and the approach of suffering as a problem instead of a 
mystery were originally means to effectively improve the human condition. 
However, the neglect of this original moral motive may turn these achievements of 
modernity into ends in themselves and produce one-sidedness. When good care is 
equated with what is technologically effective, economically sound, or merely 
problem-solving, the idea of caring as a relation, in which goods like concern and 
compassion are expressed, and a sense of the human meaning of illness, suffering 
and dying tend to disappear. Drawing on this, we argue that the discussion about 
Catholic identity consists of much more than the survival of Catholic HCOs: it is 
about how Catholic tradition can contribute to a humane and just healthcare in 
which such dimensions of care and suffering are taken into account.  
 
Chapter 4 connects the moral responsibility of HCOs with their identity. By making 
this relation explicit, the identity of a HCO can guide the HCO’s moral 
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responsibility. In reverse, in the way an HCO deals with its moral responsibility it 
can discover and develop its identity. We approach the identity of HCOs from the 
three dimensions of identity Taylor has distinguished: a moral, a dialogical and a 
narrative one. Moral identity is developed by strong evaluations of experiences: 
they reveal to the HCOs to which goods they most basically are and should be 
committed, and which goods – should - orient them in their dilemmas and choices. 
Dialogical identity points to the insight that HCOs discover what is really good and 
worthwhile by means of dialogues. Our study elaborates at internal dialogues 
between employees, or between employees and patients about the goods that are 
at stake, and the goods with which they want to identify and to which they are 
committed. Narrative identity refers to the life-cycle of an HCO as a whole: to how 
and why it came to existence, and to where it wants to go in the future. Narratives 
are useful reminders of the identity of an HCO in times of change and hard choices. 
Although not limited to Catholic HCOs, this chapter illustrates that it is relevant to 
relate responsibility to identity, and, hence, that Catholic identity, too, both shapes 
and is shaped by the moral responsibility of an HCO. The Catholic identity offers a 
frame of reference to evaluate moral experiences. The moral meaning of this 
identity can only lighten up by dialogues with and between stakeholders. In 
addition, it can come to life by the recollection of where the HCO comes from, and 
the moral reflection on where it wants to go.   
 
Chapter 5 asks why in modern societies, marked by pluralism and by a 
privatization of religion, Catholic HCOs should, nevertheless, articulate their 
Catholic identity. Three perspectives are explored: the perspective of the 
organization, the Church and Taylor’s philosophical perspective. The inquiry of the 
latter two perspectives is undertaken through a study of literature, the first 
through empirical research: we interviewed leading persons in Catholic HCOs in 
the United States.  
 The organizational perspective was focused on the articulation of Catholic 
identity on the website of the HCO. Interviewees supported such an articulation for 
several reasons. It is a measure for organizational integrity, a source for inspiration 
and cohesion, and a strategic tool in times of change. It also can function as an 
invitation to all, in particular non-Catholics, to put in their own personal moral 
sources and to enter into dialogue about what all these different sources can 
contribute to the good of the patient.  
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 From the ecclesiastical perspective it is important to articulate the values, views 
and moral guidelines that express the Catholic view on the human person, on 
human dignity and on humane care within the context of modern society and 
healthcare. Complementary to this we argue that the moral teaching of the Church 
can be enriched if the Church would be willing to being taught by the numerous 
moral experiences and the accumulated practical wisdom of caregivers and care 
organizations. We find support for this approach within the Catholic moral 
tradition itself: in its acknowledgment of experience as a source of moral 
knowledge, and in the trust, expressed in natural law, given to people to discover 
right and wrong by using reason 
 With regard to the philosophical perspective we label Taylor’s plea in favor of 
articulation of moral sources, and his criticism on tendencies in modern culture 
towards non-articulation, as a ‘modernized’ concept of articulation: a kind of 
articulation that takes into account the conditions of modernity.  We discuss 
Taylor’s vision on the contents of and the conditions for Catholicity in modern 
culture. He considers it a gain that modern culture liberated Christian beliefs from 
institutional and social structures of power. However, he considers it a loss that 
this implied a parting from any recognition of a transcendent dimension in life. In 
stead, modern culture started to embrace an ‘exclusive humanism’: a notion of 
human flourishing without any reference to a dimension beyond life. This is 
devastating for an understanding of what it is to be human, and why experiences of 
suffering and decay, which seem to be the denial of human flourishing, can still 
have a deep human significance. Drawing on this, we evaluate it as a gain and an 
undeniable feature of modern culture that belief has become much more 
individualized and a matter of personal choice. However, we do not consider this 
an argument to abolish Catholic HCOs. At the contrary, it is much more a challenge 
to clearly express the institutional Catholic identity, as a way to invite all to reflect 
on their individual moral experiences, to articulate the moral goods and sources 
involved, and to examine if and in what respect the present meaning of Catholic 
identity for healthcare and the HCO can be clarified by these experiences and 
articulations.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on what Catholic HCOs can contribute to the preservation of 
solidarity in society, as part of their moral responsibility. First, we argue that the 
most vital contribution HCOs can make to solidarity is by just doing their 
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quintessential job, which is to care for people with ill health. Institutional care is by 
itself already to be understood as a practice of solidarity. Second, with regard to 
Catholic HCOs, we demonstrate that Catholic social teaching may offer a strong 
source of a radical commitment to solidarity. It embraces every human being as an 
image of God, as a member of the one human family under God, and for that reason 
entitled to unconditional care. In order to lend force to this view, we refer to the 
social teaching of Pope John Paul II on solidarity. Here, non-theological and 
theological meanings come together. He perceives solidarity as a virtue, “not a 
feeling of vague compassion”. In his view solidarity aims for the common good, not 
only for supporting the poor. Solidarity is also critical of structures – theologically 
interpreted as structures of sin – that raise barriers against the common good. An 
example of such a barrier can be a concept of a market that treats all human needs 
as commodities, for instance the need for compassion. In addition to John Paul II’s 
concept of solidarity, we draw on another important principle of Catholic Social 
Teaching: subsidiarity. This principle offers HCOs an additional argument to take 
their own responsibility in preserving solidarity.  
 
In the final and concluding Chapter 7 we bring together, analyze and interpret the 
results of this study. We start with the theoretical aspects of how to approach 
Catholic identity. Catholic identity is not merely the application of Catholic 
convictions and norms, but has to be discovered and created in the light of 
experiences and the social and cultural environment. This is possible by evaluating 
these experiences and by articulating the goods that are implicated. For this 
articulation one needs moral frameworks present in communities and traditions. 
Catholic tradition is by itself one of these frameworks. It has a particular relevance 
for Catholic HCOs.  
 Then we turn to the objectives of this study. We meet the first objective by an 
analysis of the different problematic aspects of having a Catholic identity. We 
characterize catholic identity as a cultural, institutional and ecclesiastical problem, 
as well as a transcendence problem. The second objective of the study is achieved 
in the subsequent section on the moral responsibility of Catholic HCOs. Among 
others, this study proposes to interpret care to people in need of care as always a 
service to God and as the hypergood of the Catholic HCO, for which Catholic 
tradition offers a strong moral source. We also conclude that Catholic identity is 
inclusive, asks for articulation and can contribute to the HCO as a moral 
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community. In addition, we demonstrate that solidarity, as one of the central 
virtues in Catholic Social Teaching, offers an argument to Catholic HCOs to 
carefully sustain community structures in care and between employees, to situate 
themselves as contributors to the common good, and as critical participants of 
market-mechanisms in healthcare. 
 
Finally, the implications of our study for future research and for education are 
briefly presented. Both as a goal for research and education we emphasize the 
need of a further development of organizational ethics as a branch of bioethics. 
This study shows its importance, and is by itself a contribution to organizational 
ethics. We recommend further research of the question if, and if yes, how daily 
experiences in care are used to discover and create the meaning of Catholic 
identity. We also recommend research in moral theology with regard to the 
influence HCOs and organizational structures and systems have on moral 
conceptions in Catholic tradition, and to investigate if, and how Catholic moral 
tradition can contribute to the ethical analysis of these organizations. With regard 
to medical education our study demonstrates the need to enable students to reflect 
on the way they perceive human beings, health and disease, suffering and death, et 
cetera. At this moment too much emphasis is put on solving cases, and taking hard 
decisions. Students should have the opportunity to reflect on who they are and 
which goods they embrace, instead of focusing mainly on how they should act in 
difficult situations. 
 
 

Samenvatting 
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De moderne westerse cultuur wordt gekenmerkt door pluralisme en secularisatie. 
Tegen deze achtergrond is de eerste doelstelling van deze ethische studie het 
analyseren van enkele problemen die deze culturele context oproept voor het 
interpreteren door katholieke zorginstellingen van hun religieuze identiteit. De 
tweede doelstelling luidt nieuwe perspectieven te ontwikkelen op deze identiteit, 
met specifieke aandacht voor de relatie tussen identiteit en de morele 
verantwoordelijkheid van katholieke zorginstellingen. Morele verantwoorde-
lijkheid wordt door ons verstaan als de manier waarop zorginstellingen hun 
morele verplichtingen zien en omgaan met ethische dilemma’s en keuzes.  
Aan beide doelstellingen wordt gewerkt door een beroep te doen op de filosoof 
Charles Taylor. Hij dient als gids om de relaties tussen identiteit, moderne cultuur 
en religie te onderzoeken. Tegen de achtergrond van zijn reflecties hebben we de 
tweede doelstelling nader gericht op het doel te onderzoeken hoe zorg die door 
zorginstellingen wordt geboden een morele bron kan zijn voor de katholieke 
morele traditie, en, omgekeerd, hoe deze traditie een morele bron kan zijn voor 
deze zorg en voor de identiteit van zorginstellingen als morele actoren.  
Door heel de studie heen wordt deze wisselwerking onderzocht door te 
argumenteren dat: 
a. de katholieke identiteit van een zorginstelling een referentiekader kan bieden 
aan mensen binnen de instelling voor de ontwikkeling van hun persoonlijke 
identiteit; 
b. de katholieke identiteit instellingen kan oriënteren bij de vraag hoe ze zich als 
morele actoren binnen de institutie van gezondheidszorg moeten gedragen, 
gegeven de verschillende institutionele settings waarin zij moeten functioneren; 
c. ervaringen in praktijken van institutionele zorg constitutief kunnen zijn voor 
katholieke identiteit; 
d. katholieke zorginstellingen kunnen bijdragen aan de Kerk en haar morele 
onderricht.  
 
Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft de algemene achtergrond van deze ethische studie en 
karakteriseert haar als een primair hermeneutische onderneming. Deze studie is 
geen historische of sociologische beschrijving van de katholieke gezondheidszorg, 
maar beoogt een interpretatie te ontwikkelen van de betekenis van zorg en 
katholieke traditie voor de praktijk van institutionele zorg en het beleid van 
hedendaagse Westerse zorginstellingen.  
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De moderne gezondheidszorg heeft een lange geschiedenis van verbondenheid 
met de christelijke traditie. Bijna 2000 jaar was het christelijk geloof een morele 
bron waaraan veel mensen de kracht ontleenden hun leven te wijden aan de zorg 
voor zieken, gehandicapten en behoeftigen. Desalniettemin heeft deze bron, 
vanwege wetenschappelijke en technologische ontwikkelingen, organisatorische 
herstructureringen, cultureel pluralisme en de transformatie van religie tijdens het 
secularisatieproces, veel van haar kracht verloren, zowel voor individuen als voor 
organisaties. Zij is een optioneel referentiekader geworden naast anderen als 
economie en wetenschap. Haar huidige betekenis moet worden ontdekt en 
gecreëerd in de context van concrete ervaringen van werkers in de 
gezondheidszorg, van leiders van zorginstellingen, van mensen die van 
gezondheidszorg afhankelijk zijn – patiënten en hun familie – en van burgers in het 
algemeen.  
Nederland functioneert in deze studie als voorbeeld om te laten zien hoe 
veranderingen in de katholieke gezondheidszorg gebonden zijn aan 
maatschappelijke en culturele processen. Enerzijds maakt dit voorbeeld duidelijk 
dat het thema van katholieke identiteit altijd moet worden gezien binnen de 
concrete kenmerken van een samenleving. In Nederland spelen onder meer 
aspecten zoals de opkomst en neergang van de verzuiling en de snelle 
transformatie van religie in een individueel geloof een rol in het debat over de 
hedendaagse betekenis van katholieke identiteit van zorginstellingen. Anderzijds 
bieden de Nederlandse ontwikkelingen ook aanknopingspunten om de 
problematische aspecten van katholieke identiteit te bediscussiëren als een 
algemeen verschijnsel binnen de moderne Westerse cultuur.  
Onze studie toont aan dat Taylor’s theorieën van moderne identiteit, cultuur en 
religie bruikbare handvatten bieden om te analyseren en te verhelderen waarom 
de katholieke identiteit van zorginstellingen problematisch is geworden in 
moderne Westerse landen. In zijn werk beschouwt Taylor de identiteit van de 
moderne mens als een wederkerig proces tussen individu en gemeenschap. In dit 
proces wordt wat goed en betekenisvol is voor iemands zelfverstaan ontdekt in de 
wisselwerking tussen individuele ervaringen en maatschappelijk en cultureel 
ingebedde opvattingen over het goede en betekenisvolle. Met deze benadering als 
uitgangspunt argumenteren wij dat ook de betekenis van katholieke identiteit van 
instellingen alleen kan worden ontdekt door ervaringen van mensen binnen die 
instellingen te evalueren, en door te onderzoeken hoe in de katholieke of 
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christelijke traditie ingebedde opvattingen over wat goed en betekenisvol is hen 
richting kunnen verschaffen bij hun zelfverstaan en het ontdekken van hun diepste 
morele bronnen.  
 Taylor concentreert zich echter op hoe individuen hun identiteit ontwikkelen en 
hoe de moderne cultuur omgaat met identiteitsvragen. Hij besteedt nauwelijks 
aandacht aan de identiteit van organisaties. Daarom gaan we nader in op Ricoeur’s 
benadering van de normatieve rol van instituties. Hij definieert instituties als 
structuren van samenleven die door een gemeenschap worden gecreëerd met 
specifieke doelen. Gezondheidszorg als instituties heeft tot doel zorg te 
verschaffen, zoals de institutie van onderwijs in het leven is geroepen om 
onderwijs te geven. Uitgaande van Ricoeur onderscheiden wij zorginstellingen als 
organisaties binnen de institutie van gezondheidszorg. Maar we gaan een stap 
verder. Een zorginstelling is een complexe organisatie omdat daar verschillende 
maatschappelijke instituties elkaar ontmoeten: van economie, van wetenschap, 
van technologie, en van zorg, die mogelijk alle met elkaar in competitie gaan. Deze 
karakterisering maakt het ons mogelijk te zien dat veel katholieke instellingen een 
identiteitscrisis kunnen hebben, maar niet primair in hoe ze hun katholieke 
identiteit moeten concretiseren, maar vooral in de zin dat het institutionele doel 
van zorg het risico loopt weggedrukt te worden door doelen van andere instituties, 
met name van de economie. 
In verschillende hoofdstukken analyseren we hoe de introductie van de markt 
in de gezondheidszorg dit risico kan vergroten. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld een te grote 
nadruk op economische winst en verlies de kwaliteit van zorg reduceren tot 
meetbare en calculeerbare uitkomsten. Alleen wat kan worden geteld, telt mee. 
Niettegenstaande dit risico hebben we de markt ook positief benaderd als een 
middel om bij te dragen aan het morele goed van rechtvaardigheid. Er is geen a-
priori tegenstelling tussen zorg en markt. Onderdeel van de morele 
verantwoordelijkheid van een hedendaagse zorginstelling is daarom om de 
verschillende institutionele doelen te wegen teneinde te komen tot een goede 
rangorde. Wij pleiten voor zorg als het ‘hypergood’ van een zorginstelling, dat wil 
zeggen het goed tegen welk andere goederen dienen te worden afgewogen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 2 stelt dat we een sociaal-ethische benadering nodig hebben om te 
reflecteren op de katholieke identiteit van zorginstellingen. We gebruiken het 
thema van humane gezondheidszorg om dit aan te tonen. Sociale ethiek is de 
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bezinning op de morele goedheid of slechtheid van sociale instituties en 
structuren, en op de collectief gedeelde goederen en overheersende visies op mens 
en maatschappij die zij impliceren. De moderne cultuur laat echter een gebrek aan 
overeenstemming zien over het goede. Zij bevindt zich in een situatie van moreel 
pluralisme. Dit wordt gebruikt als alibi voor moreel relativisme: omdat er geen 
gemeenschappelijke opvatting over het goede en zijn bronnen bestaat, worden alle 
morele overtuigingen beschouwd als relatief en van gelijke waarde. Ons rest niets 
anders dan procedurele oplossingen om tot vreedzame arrangementen te komen 
tussen deze verschillende visies. Op basis van Taylor argumenteren wij dat de 
cultuur door verwaarlozing van haar morele bronnen riskeert hoger te reiken dan 
haar morele middelen kunnen dragen en daarmee haar eigen verworvenheden op 
het spel zet. Wij stellen voor zogenaamde negatieve ervaringen, dat wil zeggen 
ervaringen die duidelijk contrasteren met wat goed is, te gebruiken als 
vertrekpunten om te articuleren wat goed is. Om bijvoorbeeld het goede van 
humane gezondheidszorg te ontdekken en articuleren suggereren we om te 
vertrekken bij situaties die als duidelijk inhumaan worden ervaren, of die 
overheersende meningen in onze samenleving als inhumaan beschouwen. Een 
voorbeeld is het in de samenleving bestaande beeld, dat ernstige dementie leidt tot 
een mensonwaardig leven. Op deze manier kunnen we belangrijke goederen in de 
doelen en de betekenis van gezondheidszorg, in autonomie en in menselijk 
waardigheid herontdekken.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 stelt identiteit aan de orde als een specifiek probleem voor de 
moderne cultuur. Uitgaande van de visie dat identiteit hoofdzakelijk wordt bepaald 
door de morele goederen die voor een persoon of een cultuur doorslaggevend zijn, 
bekritiseert Taylor het feit dat de moderne cultuur ertoe neigt elke opvatting van 
het goede te reduceren tot iets zuiver privaats en optioneels, en daarom niet 
publiekelijk hoeft te worden gearticuleerd. Wij beargumenteren dat deze culturele 
karakteristiek ook de identiteit van katholieke organisaties aantast. Want ook zij 
worden gehinderd om de morele goederen en bronnen te articuleren die zij als 
bepalend voor hun katholieke identiteit zien. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt enkele 
epistemologische en morele redenen die de moderne cultuur aanvoert voor het 
niet articuleren van deze goederen en bronnen. Epistemologisch is onder meer een 
naturalistische benadering, die de werkelijkheid louter wetenschappelijke en 
mechanistische verklaart, en elk spreken over waarden en goederen als een 
Samenvatting 
198 
subjectieve projectie beschouwt. Een morele reden is onder meer, dat het spreken 
over morele goederen en bronnen geassocieerd wordt met een leven van 
contemplatie dat vroeger als een meer verheven levensstijl werd gezien, maar dat 
plaats heeft moeten maken voor de moderne waardering van het gewone, 
alledaagse leven. Een andere morele reden voor non-articulatie is dat morele 
bronnen per definitie als particularistisch worden beschouwd, wat in strijd zou 
zijn met het modern pluralisme. Taylor echter bespeurt een ambivalentie. De 
moderne technologie, economie en benadering van lijden als een probleem waren 
oorspronkelijk middelen om de menselijke conditie effectief te verbeteren. Maar 
het verwaarlozen van dit oorspronkelijk moreel motief kan deze verworvenheden 
veranderen in doelen op zichzelf en uitmonden in eenzijdigheid. Als goede zorg 
wordt gelijk gesteld met wat technologisch effectief of economisch gezond is, of 
met louter het oplossen van een probleem, neigen de idee van zorg als een relatie 
waarin goederen als betrokkenheid en compassie tot uitdrukking worden 
gebracht, en het gevoel voor de menselijke betekenis van ziekte, lijden en sterven 
te verdwijnen. Tegen deze achtergrond beargumenteren wij dat de discussie over 
katholieke identiteit over méér gaat dan over het voortbestaan van katholieke 
zorginstellingen: zij gaat over de manier waarop de katholieke traditie kan 
bijdragen aan een humane en rechtvaardige gezondheidszorg waarin rekening 
wordt gehouden met zulke dimensies van zorg en lijden.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 verbindt de morele verantwoordelijkheid van een zorginstelling met 
haar identiteit. Door deze relatie expliciet te maken kan de instellingsidentiteit 
leidend worden voor haar morele verantwoordelijkheid. Omgekeerd, door de wijze 
waarop een zorginstelling omgaat met haar morele verantwoordelijkheid, kan zij 
haar identiteit ontdekken en ontwikkelen. We benaderen de instellingsidentiteit 
vanuit de drie identiteitsdimensie van Taylor: moreel, dialogisch en narratief. 
Morele identiteit wordt ontwikkeld door sterke evaluaties van ervaringen: deze 
articulaties maken voor zorginstellingen duidelijk aan welke goederen zij het 
meest basaal zijn gecommitteerd of zouden moeten zijn, en welke goederen 
richtinggevend – zouden moeten - zijn bij hun dilemma’s en keuzes. Dialogische 
identiteit verwijst naar het inzicht dat zorginstellingen het werkelijke goede en 
waardevolle ontdekken in dialogen. Deze studie geeft nadere uitwerking aan 
interne dialogen tussen werknemers, of tussen werknemers en patiënten over de 
goederen waar het hen om gaat en waarmee zij zich willen identificeren. 
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Narratieve identiteit verwijst naar de levenscyclus van een zorginstelling: naar hoe 
en waarom zij is ontstaan en naar waar zij in de toekomst heen wil. Narratieven 
zijn nuttige ‘reminders’ aan de identiteit van een zorginstelling in tijden van 
verandering en moeilijke keuzes.  
Hoewel niet toegespitst op katholieke zorginstellingen illustreert dit hoofdstuk 
het belang om morele verantwoordelijkheid te verbinden met identiteit. Bijgevolg 
kunnen we ook van katholieke identiteit zeggen dat deze vormend is voor en 
wordt gevormd door de morele verantwoordelijkheid van de zorginstelling. 
Katholieke identiteit biedt een referentiekader voor het evalueren van morele 
ervaringen. De morele betekenis van deze identiteit kan slechts aan het licht 
treden in dialogen met en tussen stakeholders. En zij kan tot leven komen in de 
herinnering aan waar de instelling vandaan komt, en de morele bezinning op waar 
de instelling naar toe wil.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de vraag waarom in moderne samenlevingen, die 
gekenmerkt worden door pluralisme en door een privatisering van religie, 
katholieke instellingen toch hun katholieke identiteit zouden moeten articuleren. 
Er worden drie perspectieven verkend: van de organisatie, van de Kerk, en van 
Taylor’s filosofie. De laatste twee perspectieven zijn onderzocht door middel van 
literatuurstudie, de eerst door empirisch onderzoek: we interviewden leidende 
personen in katholieke zorginstellingen in de Verenigde Staten.  
Het organisatorisch perspectief richtte zich op het articuleren van katholieke 
identiteit op de website van de HCO. In de interviews werd zo’n articulatie om 
verschillende redenen ondersteund. Het biedt een maatstaf voor de integriteit van 
de organisatie, het is een bron van inspiratie en cohesie, en een strategisch middel 
in tijden van verandering. Het kan tevens functioneren als een uitnodiging aan 
allen, met name niet-katholieken, om hun eigen persoonlijke morele bronnen in te 
brengen en om met anderen in gesprek te treden over wat al deze verschillende 
bronnen bij kunnen dragen aan het welzijn van de patiënt.  
Vanuit kerkelijk perspectief wordt het belang benadrukt van een articulatie van 
waarden, visies en morele richtlijnen die de katholieke visie op de menselijke 
persoon, op diens waardigheid en op humane zorg tot uitdrukking brengen binnen 
de context van de moderne samenleving en gezondheidszorg. Complementair 
daaraan bepleiten wij dat het morele onderricht van de Kerk verrijkt kan worden 
indien het zich laat onderrichten door de talrijke morele ervaringen en gegroeide 
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praktische wijsheid van zorginstellingen en zorgverleners. We vinden steun voor 
deze benadering binnen de katholieke morele traditie zelf. Deze traditie erkent 
ervaring als een bron van morele kennis en stelt vertrouwen in het vermogen van 
mensen, uitgedrukt in de natuurwet, om met behulp van eigen verstand goed en 
verkeerd te ontdekken.  
Met betrekking tot het filosofisch perspectief duiden we Taylor’s pleidooi voor 
articulatie van morele bronnen en zijn kritiek op tendensen in de moderne cultuur 
tot non-articulatie aan als een ‘gemoderniseerd’ articulatieconcept. We bedoelen 
daarmee een vorm van articulatie die de condities van de moderniteit 
verdisconteert. We bespreken Taylor’s visie op de inhoud van en de condities voor 
katholiciteit in de moderne cultuur. Hij ziet het als winst dat de moderne cultuur 
het Christelijk geloof heeft bevrijd uit institutionele en maatschappelijke 
machtsstructuren. Maar hij beschouwt het als verlies dat dit gepaard ging met een 
afwijzing van elke vorm van erkenning van een dimensie die uitstijgt boven het 
leven. Daarvoor in de plaats omarmde de moderne cultuur een ‘exclusief 
humanisme’: een opvatting van menselijke ontplooiing zonder enige verwijzing 
naar een dimensie uitstijgend boven het leven. Hij beschouwt dit als desastreus 
voor het begrijpen van wat het betekent mens te zijn, en om te snappen waarom 
ervaringen van lijden en aftakeling die een ontkenning lijken te zijn van menselijke 
ontplooiing, toch een diep-menselijke betekenis kunnen hebben. Tegen deze 
achtergronden oordelen we positief over het feit dat geloof veel individueler is 
geworden en een zaak van persoonlijke keuze: dat is winst, en een niet te 
ontkennen kenmerk van de moderne cultuur. We beschouwen dit echter niet als 
een reden om katholieke zorginstellingen te doen verdwijnen. Integendeel, het is 
veel uitdagender om deze identiteit helder uit te spreken, als een manier om allen 
uit te nodigen te reflecteren op hun individuele morele ervaringen, hun morele 
goederen en bronnen te articuleren, en te onderzoeken of en in welk opzicht de 
huidige betekenis van de katholieke identiteit voor de gezondheidszorg en de 
zorginstelling door deze ervaringen en articuleringen kan worden verhelderd.  
 
Hoofdstuk 6 focust op wat katholieke zorginstellingen, als onderdeel van hun 
morele verantwoordelijkheid, kunnen bijdragen aan het in stand houden van 
solidariteit in de samenleving. We beargumenteren ten eerste dat de vitaalste 
bijdrage die zij kunnen doen aan solidariteit is hun meest eigen taak uitvoeren, dit 
is, zorgen voor zieke mensen. Institutionele zorg moet in zichzelf al begrepen 
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worden als een praktijk van solidariteit. Ten tweede, als het gaat om katholieke 
instellingen, tonen we aan dat de katholieke sociale leer een sterke bron kan 
bieden voor een radicale toewijding aan solidariteit. Vanuit deze bron verschijnt 
elke mens als beeld van God, als lid van de ene mensenfamilie onder God, en 
daarom met een aanspraak op onvoorwaardelijke zorg. Om deze visie kracht bij te 
zetten verwijzen we naar het sociale onderricht over solidariteit van Paus 
Johannes Paulus II. Niet-theologische en theologische betekenissen komen hier bij 
elkaar. Hij beschouwt solidariteit as een deugd, ‘niet als een gevoel van vaag 
mededogen’. In zijn visie richt solidariteit zich op het algemeen welzijn, en niet 
alleen op steun bieden aan armen. Solidariteit is ook kritisch op structuren – 
theologisch geïnterpreteerd als structuren van zonde – die drempels opwerpen 
voor het algemeen welzijn. Een voorbeeld van zo’n drempel is een opvatting van 
markt die alle menselijke behoeftes, bijvoorbeeld de behoefte aan mededogen, 
behandelt als handelswaar. In aanvulling op de opvatting van solidariteit bij 
Johannes Paulus II beroepen we ons op we een ander belangrijk beginsel uit de 
katholieke sociale leer: subsidiariteit. Dit beginsel biedt zorginstellingen een extra 
argument om hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de instandhouding 
van solidariteit.  
 
In het laatste en concluderende hoofdstuk 7 brengen we de resultaten van deze 
studie bijeen, en analyseren en interpreteren die. We beginnen met de theoretische 
aspecten van hoe katholieke identiteit benaderd moet worden. Katholieke 
identiteit is niet zomaar het toepassen van katholieke overtuigingen en normen, 
maar moet ontdekt en gecreëerd worden in het licht van ervaringen en van de 
sociale en culturele omgeving. Dit wordt mogelijk door deze ervaringen te 
evalueren en de goederen die erin liggen besloten te articuleren. Voor deze 
articulatie zijn referentiekaders nodig uit gemeenschappen en tradities. De 
katholieke traditie is zelf een van deze referentiekaders. Zij heeft bijzondere 
relevantie voor katholieke zorginstellingen. 
 Daarna wenden we ons tot de doelstellingen van deze studie. Aan de eerste 
doelstelling wordt tegemoet gekomen door een analyse van de verschillende 
problematische aspecten van het hebben van een katholieke identiteit. We 
karakteriseren deze identiteit als een cultureel, institutioneel en kerkelijk 
probleem, alsmede als een transcendentieprobleem.  
Samenvatting 
202 
De tweede doelstelling komt aan de orde in de volgende paragraaf, die handelt 
over de morele verantwoordelijkheid van katholieke zorginstellingen. Deze studie 
stelt onder meer voor om zorg aan mensen in nood te interpreteren als altijd een 
dienst aan God en het ‘hypergood’ van katholieke zorginstellingen, waarvoor de 
katholieke traditie een sterke bron biedt. We concluderen tevens dat katholieke 
identiteit inclusief is, articulatie stimuleert en kan bijdragen aan de zorginstelling 
als een morele gemeenschap. Voorts tonen we aan dat solidariteit, als een van de 
centrale deugden van de katholieke sociale leer, aan katholiek zorginstellingen en 
argument biedt om gemeenschapsstructuren in de zorg en tussen werknemers 
zorgvuldig te ondersteunen, om zichzelf te positioneren als instellingen die 
bijdragen aan het algemeen welzijn, en als kritische actoren binnen 
marktmechanismes in de gezondheidszorg.  
 
Tenslotte presenteren we de implicaties van onze studie voor toekomstig 
onderzoek en onderwijs. Als doel voor beide benadrukken we de behoefte aan een 
verdere ontwikkeling van organisatie-ethiek, als discipline binnen de bio-ethiek. 
Deze studie toont het belang ervan aan, en is zelf al een bijdrage aan de 
organisatie-ethiek. Verder bevelen we onderzoek aan naar de vraag of, en zo ja hoe 
dagelijkse ervaringen in de zorg gebruikt worden om de betekenis van de 
katholieke identiteit te ontdekken en te creëren. We bevelen ook 
moraaltheologisch onderzoek aan naar de invloed van zorginstellingen en 
organisatiestructuren en –systemen op morele opvattingen in de katholieke 
traditie, en te onderzoeken of, en hoe het katholieke morele onderricht bij kan 
dragen aan de ethische analyse van deze organisaties. 
Ten aanzien van het medisch onderwijs toont onze studie de noodzaak aan 
studenten in staat te stellen te reflecteren op hun visies op mensen, gezondheid en 
ziekte, lijden en dood, enzovoort. Op dit moment ligt er teveel nadruk op het 
oplossen van casus en het nemen van moeilijke beslissingen. Studenten zouden de 
kans moeten hebben te reflecteren op wie zij zelf zijn en welke goederen zij 
belangrijk vinden, in plaats van voornamelijk te focussen op hoe ze zouden 
handelen in moeilijke situaties.  
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Het is tegen bepaalde academische mores in om de promotores te bedanken. Dat 
zal ik dan ook niet doen. Desalniettemin moge duidelijk zijn dat ik jegens Henk ten 
Have en Frans Vosman gevoelens van grote dankbaarheid koester. De leden van de 
manuscript- en promotiecommissie zeg ik dank voor hun tijd, inzet en kritische 
commentaren.   
Vele anderen hebben mij in de loop van de jaren geïnspireerd en mijn ideeën 
gescherpt. Om te beginnen mijn huidige en oud-collega’s bij IQ healthcare, sectie 
Ethiek, Filosofie en Geschiedenis van de Geneeskunde. Een bijzonder woord van 
dank geldt Bert Gordijn, inmiddels hoogleraar in Dublin, voor zijn kritische 
commentaren bij de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6. Tevens dank ik Carlo Leget voor zijn 
thomistische helderheid. Bij het leggen van verbindingen tussen eigentijdse 
gezondheidszorg en christelijke traditie vond ik steun bij oud-collega’s en 
bestuursleden van de Katholieke Vereniging van Zorginstellingen en haar 
rechtsopvolger Reliëf; onder hen wil ik speciaal vermelden Frank Gribnau en 
Marianne van Rijn-Zielhorst. Ook mijn oud-collega’s bij de Katholieke Raad voor 
Kerk en Samenleving, met name Pieter-Anton van Gennip, en de Werkgroep Kerk 
en Gezondheid hebben mij geholpen deze verbindingen te maken. Over wat zorg is 
heb ik veel geleerd van mensen in zorginstellingen: patiënten, zorgverleners en 
leden van besturen en directies. Mensen uit landelijke organisaties binnen de 
gezondheidszorg en uit de leiding en het studiesecretariaat van de Rooms-
Katholieke Kerk in Nederland gaven mij meer inzicht in uitgangspunten voor 
beleid. Van grote waarde zijn voor mij de Commissie Identiteit van het UMC St 
Radboud, haar voorganger de ALEA (Adviescommissie Levensbeschouwing en 
Ethiek op de Agenda) en de Werkgroep Menslievendheid: het is een voorrecht om 
met hen vanuit concrete praktijken en ervaringen binnen een modern universitair 
medisch centrum op zoek te gaan naar de eigentijdse betekenis van katholieke 
identiteit.  
Voor de praktische vormgeving van dit proefschrift was de hulp van Rogeer 
Hoedemaekers van grote waarde: nauwgezet en deskundig heeft hij op onderdelen 
mijn Engels taalgebruik gecontroleerd en waar nodig gecorrigeerd. Ik ben IQ 
healthcare erkentelijk voor de secretariële ondersteuning die ik van Jolanda van 
Haren heb gekregen bij het persklaar maken van dit proefschrift.   
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In mijn privéleven heb ik in de loop der jaren trouwe steun en sympathie 
ervaren vanuit mijn familie- en vriendenkring. Bovendien verstonden zij de kunst 
om geduldig het moment af te wachten dat dit proefschrift – eindelijk – klaar was. 
Mijn Brabantse familie weet nou “wir iets bitter, waor hun bruur/zwaoger vur hi 
dur geleerd.”  
Maar mijn grootste dank gaat uit naar Susanne, Anneloes en Ronald. Zij 
herinneren mij voortdurend aan waar het echt om gaat in het leven; een promotie 
is weliswaar een mijlpaal, maar uiteíndelijk ook maar weer van relatief belang. Zij 
zijn met hun liefde en steun voor mij de echte bronnen.   
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Aandacht voor gezondheidszorg en voor katholieke traditie zijn min of meer 
constanten in mijn leven. Ik ben geboren in 1951 in het Brabantse Helvoirt, in de 
hoogtijdagen van het Rijke Roomse leven. Mijn doopnaam weerspiegelt de hoop 
van mijn ouders dat ik ooit de weg van mijn Heeroom zal volgen: priester en 
missionaris bij de paters van Scheut. Tot ongeveer mijn achttiende lijkt het ook zo 
te gaan lopen. Ik volg het gymnasium op Sparrendaal, het missiecollege van de 
Scheutisten in Vught. Deze periode, 1963-1969, wordt getekend door de snelle 
veranderingen die zich na het Tweede Vaticaanse Concilie (1962-1965) in 
kerkelijk Nederland voltrekken. In 1963 en 1964 stijgt op Sparrendaal het aantal 
internen nog tot het recordaantal van 250, in 1969 is reeds besloten het internaat 
op te heffen. Met internaten van andere religieuze ordes en met seminaries is het 
niet anders gesteld.  
 In 1969 vervolg ik nog even de ingeslagen weg, verhuis naar het studiehuis van 
Scheut in Nijmegen, het missiehuis Bisschop Hamer, en ga theologie studeren. Na 
een half jaar wordt ook dit huis van de hand gedaan en ga ik op kamers wonen. Na 
korte tijd vind ik nieuw onderdak bij studenten van de Orde van de Camillianen. 
Deze religieuze orde richt zich op de hulp en zorg aan zieken.  
Een aantal factoren leidt tot het opgeven van mijn priesterambities. Onder meer 
de veranderingen binnen de kerk, de kritische vragen die de theologie opwerpt, en 
mijn eerste vriendinnen. De theologiestudie zelf blijft me echter boeien. In 1972 
behaal ik het kandidaats en ga door met de doctoraalstudie in de moraaltheologie. 
Maar ook ontwikkelt zich de wens tot een opleiding dichter bij de praktijk. Dat 
leidt ertoe dat ik in de jaren 1973-1978 de HBO-Verpleegkunde volg, in combinatie 
met de laatste fase van de theologiestudie. Na het behalen van het HBOV-diploma 
ga ik als verpleegkundige werken in het UMC St Radboud: van 1978 tot 1983 op 
neurologie, van 1983 tot 1985 als hoofdverpleegkundige op gynaecologie. In 1981 
behaal ik het doctoraal in de moraaltheologie met de scriptie Lijden in last. In deze 
scriptie die begeleid werd door mijn leermeester Theo Beemer, werk ik een 
politiektheologische beschouwing uit op de houding van de 
natuurwetenschappelijke geneeskunde ten opzichte van ziekte en pijn.  
 In 1979 heeft intussen ook een gebeurtenis plaatsgevonden die mijn verdere 
leven heeft bepaald. In dat jaar trouw ik met Susanne, eveneens HBO-
verpleegkundige. Samen krijgen we twee kinderen, Anneloes (1985) en Ronald 
(1988).  
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 Op grond van het in 1981 behaalde doctoraal begin ik in 1981 met een kleine 
aanstelling als secretaris van de Werkgroep Kerk en Gezondheid. Deze werkgroep 
behoort eensdeels tot de Katholieke Raad voor Kerk en Samenleving (KRKS). In die 
hoedanigheid bereidt zij adviezen voor ten behoeve van de Nederlandse 
Bisschoppenconferentie over ethische vragen binnen de gezondheidszorg. 
Anderdeels functioneert de werkgroep als adviescollege voor het bestuur van de 
Katholieke Vereniging van Zorginstellingen (KVZ). In 1985 kan ik deze taak 
uitbreiden tot een halve baan, omdat ik in datzelfde jaar voor de andere helft 
binnen het Radboudziekenhuis wordt aangesteld als medisch ethicus. Mijn taak 
binnen het Radboud omvat onderwijs en het opzetten van activiteiten om ethische 
reflectie ‘op de werkvloer’ te stimuleren en te ondersteunen. Dit laatste krijgt 
gestalte in onder meer moreel beraad op afdelingen en het organiseren van 
ziekenhuisbrede thema-avonden ethiek.  
 Intussen bereidt de KVZ een koerswijziging voor naar een meer eigentijdse 
manier om haar leden ondersteuning te bieden op het raakvlak van ethiek en – 
katholieke - identiteit. Teneinde deze nieuwe aanpak, die ik zelf in belangrijke 
mate mede had ontwikkeld, ook te effectueren ga ik in 1991 voltijds werken bij de 
KVZ als algemeen secretaris / directeur. Ik blijf tevens secretaris van de 
Werkgroep Kerk en Gezondheid. Deze periode levert naast talrijke persoonlijke 
contacten ook vele vruchtbare contacten op met zorginstellingen door het hele 
land, met koepelorganisaties in de zorg, met katholieke organisaties en met – leden 
van – de Nederlandse bisschoppenconferentie.  
Eind jaren negentig neemt het UMC St Radboud – toen nog Academisch 
Ziekenhuis Nijmegen St Radboud geheten - het initiatief om samen met de KVZ, 
waarvan het lid is, een project te starten om zijn katholieke identiteit concreet te 
maken binnen de condities van de academische context en de moderne, 
pluralistische samenleving. Vanuit de KVZ ga ik me met dit project belasten. In dit 
kader treed ik ook weer in dienst van het UMC St Radboud; in 2000 voor 50%, in 
2003 volledig. Ik wordt aangesteld als universitair docent ethiek bij de afdeling 
Ethiek, Filosofie en Geschiedenis van de Geneeskunde, sinds 2008 een sectie van IQ 
healthcare. Daarnaast heb ik als bijzonder aandachtsgebied activiteiten 
gerelateerd aan de identiteit van het Radboud. Het focus daarin ligt sinds kort op 
menslievendheid: velen binnen de zorg ervaren dit als de ziel van hun werk en als 
bron van inspiratie. Menslievendheid ontwikkelt zich momenteel tot kernwaarde 
van het Radboud en als maatstaf om instellingsbeleid en -praktijken te beoordelen. 
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Tegelijk heeft menslievendheid de zorg aan concrete mensen in nood 
gemeenschappelijk met de christelijke traditie.  
Tenslotte, vanaf mijn terugkeer in het UMC St Radboud beginnen de 
voorbereidingen van de voorliggende dissertatie. Hierin zijn de lijnen tussen 
gezondheidszorg en katholieke traditie onderwerp geworden van 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek.  

